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- Activist; Company; Target Controlled Company; Activism; Controlled Companies; Shareholder-Empowering; Shareholder-Empoyerment; Shareholder; Election; Minority Directors; Directors; Principal-Principal; Agency; De jure; De facto; Corporate Governance; Appointment; Board Representation; Institutional Investor; Board Representation; Controller; Non-activist; Shareholder Engagement (1)
- SEC; Commission; Enforcement; Enforcement Actions; Rule 102; 102; mandatory referral; attorney discipline; attorney conduct; attorney (1)
Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Law
Why Does The Sec Hate Lawyers And Will The Bitterness Ever Go Away: A Review Of The Reasons For The Current State Of This Relationship And A Proposed Path Forward, Ernest Edward Badway, Joshua Horn, Christie Mcguinness
Why Does The Sec Hate Lawyers And Will The Bitterness Ever Go Away: A Review Of The Reasons For The Current State Of This Relationship And A Proposed Path Forward, Ernest Edward Badway, Joshua Horn, Christie Mcguinness
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) and its staff (“Staff”) have brought numerous actions against lawyers in a variety of contexts over the last several years. These enforcement actions have arguably prevented zealous advocacy as well as potentially leaving lawyers reluctant to make certain arguments on behalf of their clients so as to avoid potential disciplinary actions against them. While it is important for the Commission and its Staff to ensure that lawyers do not engage in violative conduct, this Article notes that the SEC and its Staff’s actions should be limited to only those occasions …
Activist Shareholders At De Facto Controlled Companies, Gaia Balp
Activist Shareholders At De Facto Controlled Companies, Gaia Balp
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Activist campaigns are likely to increasingly target controlled companies. Studies concerning activism at controlled companies focus on shareholder-empowering tools, such as the right to nominate and elect minority directors on the board, as a pathway for limiting the principal-principal agency problem. However, not enough attention has been paid to the distinction between de jure and de facto controlled companies. Building on a recent case concerning a leading Italian corporation, this Article analyzes the possible unexpected corporate governance consequences of successful activist intervention at de facto controlled companies, showing that, where minority shareholders are granted the right to appoint directors on …