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Full-Text Articles in Law
Corporate Officers As Agents, Deborah A. Demott
Corporate Officers As Agents, Deborah A. Demott
Faculty Scholarship
Although officers are crucial to corporate operations, scholarly and theoretical accounts tend to slight officers and amalgamate them with directors into a single category, "managers." This essay anchors officers within the common law of agency-as does black-letter law-which crisply differentiates officers from directors. Understanding that agency is central of the legal account of officers' positions and responsibilities is crucial to seeing why, like directors, officers are fiduciaries, but distinctively so, not as instances of generic "corporate fiduciaries." Officers, like directors, owe duties of loyalty, but also particularized duties of care, competence, and diligence. Additionally, officers' duties of performance encompass two …
The Fiduciary Character Of Agency And The Interpretation Of Instructions, Deborah A. Demott
The Fiduciary Character Of Agency And The Interpretation Of Instructions, Deborah A. Demott
Faculty Scholarship
This chapter in a forthcoming book justifies the conventional characterization of common-law agency as a fiduciary relationship. An agent serves as the principal’s representative in dealings with third parties and facts about the world, situating the agent as an extension of the principal for legally-salient purposes. A principal’s power to furnish instructions to the agent is the fundamental mechanism through which the principal exercises control over the agent, a requisite for an agency relationship. The agent’s fiduciary duty to the principal provides a benchmark for the agent’s interpretation of those instructions. The chapter draws on philosophical literature on the identity …
Brief Of Amica Curiae, Deborah A. Demott In Support Of The Petitioner, Maples V. Thomas, Deborah A. Demott
Brief Of Amica Curiae, Deborah A. Demott In Support Of The Petitioner, Maples V. Thomas, Deborah A. Demott
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Ratification: Useful But Uneven, Deborah A. Demott
Ratification: Useful But Uneven, Deborah A. Demott
Faculty Scholarship
Ratification permits a principal to determine to be bound by the legal consequences of action taken by an agent after the fact of the agent’s conduct when the principal would otherwise not be bound. By ratifying a principal may clarify the effects of uncertainty, furnishing reassurance to the agent, the third party with whom the agent dealt, and other parties interested in the status of the transaction. However, at the point the principal decides whether to ratify, the principal knows facts not known to agent and third party at the time of the agent’s unauthorised transaction, in particular subsequent developments …
For Whom The Tel Tolls: Can State Tax And Expenditure Limits Effectively Reduce Spending?, Thad Kousser, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Ellen Moule
For Whom The Tel Tolls: Can State Tax And Expenditure Limits Effectively Reduce Spending?, Thad Kousser, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Ellen Moule
Faculty Scholarship
Can voters stop state governments from spending at high rates through the enactment of tax and expenditure limits (TELs), or do these laws become dead letters? We draw upon the principal-agent literature to theorize that TELs – one of the most frequent uses of the initiative process across the country – may be circumvented by the sorts of elected officials who would inspire their passage.
In order to investigate our claim, we conduct an event study. First, we test for the effectiveness of TELs across states using a differences-in-differences model. Second, we dissect our treatment variable using different legal provisions …
Limitations On Contract Termination Rights—Franchise Cancellations, Ernest Gellhorn
Limitations On Contract Termination Rights—Franchise Cancellations, Ernest Gellhorn
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.