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Full-Text Articles in Law
Defining Ambiguity In Broken Statutory Frameworks And Its Limits On Agency Action, Amanda Urban
Defining Ambiguity In Broken Statutory Frameworks And Its Limits On Agency Action, Amanda Urban
Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law
“The Problem” occurs when a statute’s provisions become contradictory or unworkable in the context of new or unforeseen phenomena, yet the statute mandates agency action. The application of an unambiguous statutory provision may become problematic or unclear. Similarly, unambiguous provisions may become inconsistent given a particular application of the statute. During the same term, in Scialabba and UARG, the Supreme Court performed a Chevron review of agency interpretations of statutes facing three variations of the Problem, which this Note characterizes as direct conflict, internal inconsistency, and unworkability. In each case, the Court defined ambiguity in various, nontraditional ways and …
The Sec, Administrative Usurpation, And Insider Trading, Adam C. Pritchard
The Sec, Administrative Usurpation, And Insider Trading, Adam C. Pritchard
Articles
The history of insider trading law is a tale of administrative usurpation and legislative acquiescence. Congress has never enacted a prohibition against insider trading, much less defined it. Instead, the SEC has led in defining insider trading, albeit without the formality of rulemaking, and subject to varying degrees of oversight by the courts. The reason why lies in the deference that the Supreme Court gave to the SEC in its formative years. The roots of insider trading law are commonly traced to the SEC’s decision in Cady, Roberts & Co. Cady, Roberts was only made possible, however, by the …
Thin Rationality Review, Jacob Gersen, Adrian Vermeule
Thin Rationality Review, Jacob Gersen, Adrian Vermeule
Michigan Law Review
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts review and set aside agency action that is “arbitrary [and] capricious.” In a common formulation of rationality review, courts must either take a “hard look” at the rationality of agency decisionmaking, or at least ensure that agencies themselves have taken a hard look. We will propose a much less demanding and intrusive interpretation of rationality review—a thin version. Under a robust range of conditions, rational agencies have good reason to decide in a manner that is inaccurate, nonrational, or arbitrary. Although this claim is seemingly paradoxical or internally inconsistent, it simply rests on an …
Major Questions About The "Major Questions" Doctrine, Kevin O. Leske
Major Questions About The "Major Questions" Doctrine, Kevin O. Leske
Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law
After over a decade of hibernation, the United States Supreme Court has awoken the “major questions” doctrine, which has re-emerged in an expanded form. Under the doctrine, a court will not defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory provision in circumstances where the case involves an issue of deep economic or political significance or where the interpretive question could effectuate an enormous and transformative expansion of the agency’s regulatory authority. While the doctrine’s re-emergence in recent Supreme Court cases has already raised concerns, a subtle shift in its application has gone unnoticed. Unlike in earlier cases, where the Court …
Energy Deference, Sharon B. Jacobs
Energy Deference, Sharon B. Jacobs
Publications
Electricity law is complex, and the Supreme Court knows it. Lawyers are familiar with the adage that generalist courts tend to defer to agency decisions where the subject matter is complex or technical. But what features of a case make the Court more or less likely to defer to the agency's judgment? And how exactly do deference regimes work in the presence of complexity? This essay offers insights gleaned from Court's opinion in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n (“EPSA”). It explains, first, that Courts are highly deferential in energy cases due to both the complexity of …
Debunking Humphrey's Executor, Daniel A. Crane
Debunking Humphrey's Executor, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
The Supreme Court’s 1935 Humphrey’s Executor decision paved the way for the modern administrative state by holding that Congress could constitutionally limit the President’s powers to remove heads of regulatory agencies. The Court articulated a quartet of features of the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) statutory design that ostensibly justified the Commission’s constitutional independence. It was to be nonpartisan and apolitical, uniquely expert, and performing quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial, rather than executive, functions. In recent years, the staying power of Humphrey’s Executor has been called into question as a matter of constitutional design. This Essay reconsiders Humphrey’s Executor from a different angle. …