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Full-Text Articles in Law
Chevron Bias, Philip A. Hamburger
Chevron Bias, Philip A. Hamburger
Faculty Scholarship
This Article takes a fresh approach to Chevron deference. Chevron requires judges to defer to agency interpretations of statutes and justifies this on a theory of statutory authorization for agencies. This Article, however, points to a pair of constitutional questions about the role of judges – questions that have not yet been adequately asked, let alone answered.
One question concerns independent judgment. Judges have a constitutional office or duty of independent judgment, under which they must exercise their own independent judgment about what the law is. Accordingly, when they defer to agency interpretations of the law, it must be asked …
Early Prerogative And Administrative Power: A Response To Paul Craig, Philip A. Hamburger
Early Prerogative And Administrative Power: A Response To Paul Craig, Philip A. Hamburger
Faculty Scholarship
What does English experience imply about American constitutional law? My book, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, argues that federal administrative power generally is unconstitutional. In supporting this conclusion, the book observes that eighteenth-century Americans adopted their constitutions not only with their eyes on the future, but also looking over their shoulder at the past – especially the English past. This much should not be controversial. There remain, however, all sorts of questions about how to understand the English history and its relevance for early Americans.
In opposition to my claims about American law, Paul Craig lobs three critiques from across the …
Vermeule Unbound, Philip A. Hamburger
Vermeule Unbound, Philip A. Hamburger
Faculty Scholarship
My book asks Is Administrative Law Unlawful? Adrian Vermeule answers “No.” In support of his position, he claims that my book does not really make arguments from the U.S. Constitution, that it foolishly denounces administrative power for lacking legislative authorization, that it grossly misunderstands this power and the underlying judicial doctrines, and ultimately that I argue “like a child.”
My book actually presents a new conception of administrative power, its history, and its unconstitutionality; as Vermeule has noted elsewhere, it offers a new paradigm. Readers therefore should take seriously the arguments against the book. They also, however, should recognize that …