Law Commons^™

Regulatory Entrepreneurship, Jordan M. Barry, Elizabeth Pollman

Faculty Scholarship

Numerous corporations, ranging from Airbnb to Tesla, and from DraftKings to Uber, have built huge businesses that reside in legal gray areas. Instead of taking the law as a given, these companies have become agents of legal change, focusing major parts of their business plans on changing the law. To achieve their political goals, these companies employ conventional lobbying techniques, but also more innovative tactics. In particular, some attempt to enter markets quickly, then grow too big to ban before regulators can respond. If regulators do take aim at them, they respond by mobilizing their users for political support. This …

Slides: Introduction To Constructive Engagement In The Oil And Gas Industry, Susan T. Wildau, Christopher W. Moore

Best Practices for Community and Environmental Protection (October 14)

Presenters: Susan T. Wildau and Christopher W. Moore, CDR Associates (Collaborative Decision Resources), Boulder, CO

22 slides

Lobbying Disclosure: A Recipe For Reform, William Luneburg, Thomas Susman

Articles

In deterring corruption in lobbying, both disclosure and regulation may be appropriate tools. The 1995 federal Lobbying Disclosure Act, however, should be overhauled if it is to meet its objective of providing “effective public disclosure of the identity and extent of the efforts of paid lobbyists to influence Federal officials.” Recommendations for reform include increasing the amount of usable information reported (including reporting spending for grassroots lobbying), improving enforcement of the LDA, and enhancing public availability of lobbying information.

The Allocation Of Resources By Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation And Administrative Regulation, John M. De Figueiredo, Rui J.P. De Figueiredo Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

One of the central concerns about American policy making institutions is the degree to which political outcomes can be influenced by interested parties. While the literature on interest group strategies in particular institutions - legislative, administrative, and legal - is extensive, there is very little scholarship which examines how the interdependencies between institutions affects the strategies of groups. In this paper we examine in a formal theoretical model how the opportunity to litigate administrative rulemaking in the courts affects the lobbying strategies of competing interest groups at the rulemaking stage. Using a resource-based view of group activity, we develop a …