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Articles 1 - 28 of 28
Full-Text Articles in Law
Movement On Removal: An Emerging Consensus On The First Congress, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Movement On Removal: An Emerging Consensus On The First Congress, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Faculty Scholarship
What did the “Decision of 1789” decide about presidential removal power, if anything? It turns out that an emerging consensus of scholars agrees that there was not much consensus in the First Congress.
Two more questions follow: Is the “unitary executive theory” based on originalism, and if so, is originalism a reliable method of interpretation based on historical evidence?
The unitary executive theory posits that a president has exclusive and “indefeasible” executive powers (i.e., powers beyond congressional and judicial checks and balances). This panel was an opportunity for unitary executive theorists and their critics to debate recent historical research questioning …
The National Security Consequences Of The Major Questions Doctrine, Timothy Meyer, Ganesh Sitaraman
The National Security Consequences Of The Major Questions Doctrine, Timothy Meyer, Ganesh Sitaraman
Faculty Scholarship
The rise of the major questions doctrine—the rule that says that in order to delegate to the executive branch the power to resolve a “question of ‘deep economic and political significance’ that is central to [a] statutory scheme,” Congress must do so expressly—threatens to unmake the modern executive’s authority over foreign affairs, especially in matters of national security and interstate conflict. In the twenty-first century, global conflicts increasingly involve economic warfare, rather than (or in addition to) the force of arms.
In the United States, the executive power to levy economic sanctions and engage in other forms of economic warfare …
Administrative Harms, Philip A. Hamburger
Administrative Harms, Philip A. Hamburger
Faculty Scholarship
Administrative power imposes serious wounds on the United States, its Constitution, and its citizens. Therefore, a persuasive defense of administrative power would need to respond to these harms, showing that it is constitutional and otherwise desirable, notwithstanding its many costs. If the administrative state is defensible, it will be necessary to wrestle with all of the damage it incurs.
Interring The Unitary Executive, Christine Chabot
Interring The Unitary Executive, Christine Chabot
Faculty Publications & Other Works
The President's power to remove and control subordinate executive officers has sparked a constitutional debate that began in 1789 and rages on today. Leading originalists claim that the Constitution created a “unitary executive” President whose plenary removal power affords her “exclusive control” over subordinates' exercise of executive power. Text assigning the President a removal power and exclusive control appears nowhere in the Constitution, however, and unitary scholars have instead relied on select historical understandings and negative inferences drawn from a supposed lack of independent regulatory structures at the Founding. The comprehensive historical record introduced by this Article lays this debate …
Removal Of Context: Blackstone, Limited Monarchy, And The Limits Of Unitary Originalism, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Removal Of Context: Blackstone, Limited Monarchy, And The Limits Of Unitary Originalism, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Faculty Scholarship
The Supreme Court's recent decisions that the President has an unconditional or indefeasible removal power rely on textual and historical assumptions and a "removal of context." This article focuses on the "executive power" part of the Vesting Clause and particularly the unitary theorists' misuse of Blackstone. Unitary executive theorists overlook the problems of relying on England's limited monarchy: the era's rise of Parliamentary supremacy over the Crown and its power to eliminate or regulate (i.e., make defeasible) royal prerogatives. Unitary theorists provide no evidence that executive removal was ever identified as a "royal prerogative" or a default royal power. The …
Presidential Primacy Amidst Democratic Decline, Arshaf Ahmed, Karen Tani
Presidential Primacy Amidst Democratic Decline, Arshaf Ahmed, Karen Tani
All Faculty Scholarship
Fifty years ago, when the Harvard Law Review asked Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., to take stock of the Supreme Court’s 1970 Term, Kalven faced a task not unlike Professor Cristina Rodríguez’s. That Term’s Court had two new members, Justices Harry Blackmun and Warren Burger. The Nixon Administration was young, but clearly bent on making its own stamp on American law, including via the Supreme Court. Kalven thus expected to see “dislocations” when he reviewed the Court’s recent handiwork. He reported the opposite. Surveying a Term that included such cases as Palmer v. Thompson, Younger v. Harris, Boddie v. …
The American Law Of Overruling Necessity: The Exceptional Origins Of State Police Power, William J. Novak
The American Law Of Overruling Necessity: The Exceptional Origins Of State Police Power, William J. Novak
Book Chapters
One of the most significant legal-constitutional moments in the history of the American republic occurred in the Confederation Congress on September 26 and 27, 1787. On those dates, the handiwork of the historic Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia was now "laid before the United States in Congress assembled." And the momentous question for the extant official lawmaking body of the US government was what to do next. Under Article 1 3 of the Articles of Confederation, any alteration of the articles had to be agreed to by Congress and confirmed by the legislatures of every state. Notably, the Philadelphia convention had …
The Trump Administration And Administrative Law, Peter L. Strauss
The Trump Administration And Administrative Law, Peter L. Strauss
Faculty Scholarship
Shortly after the 2018 mid-term elections ended a two-year period of "unified government," under the Republican party,1 twenty one law professors from around the country met at Chicago-Kent College of Law to discuss the seven papers contained in this edition of its Law
Review. Commentaries written in response to each of these papers will appear in the next edition of the Law Review. For those reading any of these essays in the interval between publication of this and the commentary issue, this necessary inconvenience is regrettable; the commentaries (and ensuing open discussion) were enriching and, indeed, have contributed to the …
Sanctuary Networks And Integrative Enforcement, Ming Hsu Chen
Sanctuary Networks And Integrative Enforcement, Ming Hsu Chen
Publications
My intended focus is on the widespread response--in cities, churches, campuses, and corporations that together comprise "sanctuary networks"--to the Trump Administration's Executive Order 13768 Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States as an instance of the changing relationship between federal, local, and private organizations in the regulation of immigration. After briefly covering the legal background of the Trump Interior E.O., the focus of the Article shifts to the institutional dynamics arising in communities. These institutional dynamics exemplify the beginnings of a reimagined immigration enforcement policy with a more integrative flavor.
Our Regionalism, Jessica Bulman-Pozen
Our Regionalism, Jessica Bulman-Pozen
Faculty Scholarship
This article provides an account of Our Regionalism to supplement the many accounts of Our Federalism. After describing the legal forms regions assume in the United States — through interstate cooperation, organization of federal administrative agencies, and hybrid state-federal efforts — it explores how regions have shaped American governance across the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.
In the years leading up to the New Deal, commentators invoked regions to resist centralization, arguing that state coordination could forestall expansion of the federal government. But regions were soon deployed to a different end, as the federal government relied on regional administration to …
The Twin Demons Of The Trump-Bannon Assault On Democracy, Joseph P. Tomain
The Twin Demons Of The Trump-Bannon Assault On Democracy, Joseph P. Tomain
Faculty Articles and Other Publications
On January 30, 2017, President Donald Trump signed an executive order "Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs." Then, on February 24, he signed an executive order on “Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda.” Together these two executive orders constitute a severe threat to American society and the American economy. In the words of Stephen Bannon, Trump’s chief strategist, they represent a plan for “the deconstruction of the administrative state.”
The purpose of the administrative state can be most simply stated this way: Unless otherwise stated in the enabling legislation, government regulation makes sense when the benefits of regulation outweigh the costs …
Signing Statements And Presidentializing Legislative History, John De Figueiredo, Edward H. Stiglitz
Signing Statements And Presidentializing Legislative History, John De Figueiredo, Edward H. Stiglitz
Faculty Scholarship
Presidents often attach statements to the bills they sign into law, purporting to celebrate, construe, or object to provisions in the statute. Though long a feature of U.S. lawmaking, the President has avowedly attempted to use these signing statements as tool of strategic influence over judicial decision making since the 1980s — as a way of creating “presidential legislative history” to supplement and, at times, supplant the traditional congressional legislative history conventionally used by the courts to interpret statutes. In this Article, we examine a novel dataset of judicial opinion citations to presidential signing statements to conduct the most comprehensive …
The Bounds Of Executive Discretion In The Regulatory State, Cary Coglianese, Christopher S. Yoo
The Bounds Of Executive Discretion In The Regulatory State, Cary Coglianese, Christopher S. Yoo
All Faculty Scholarship
What are the proper bounds of executive discretion in the regulatory state, especially over administrative decisions not to take enforcement actions? This question, which, just by asking it, would seem to cast into some doubt the seemingly absolute discretion the executive branch has until now been thought to possess, has become the focal point of the latest debate to emerge over the U.S. Constitution’s separation of powers. That ever‐growing, heated debate is what motivated more than two dozen distinguished scholars to gather for a two‐day conference held late last year at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, a conference organized …
The Judicial Role In Constraining Presidential Non-Enforcement Discretion: The Virtues Of An Apa Approach, Daniel E. Walters
The Judicial Role In Constraining Presidential Non-Enforcement Discretion: The Virtues Of An Apa Approach, Daniel E. Walters
Faculty Scholarship
Scholars, lawyers, and, indeed, the public at large increasingly worry about what purposive presidential inaction in enforcing statutory programs means for the rule of law and how such discretionary inaction can fit within a constitutional structure that compels Presidents to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Yet those who have recognized the problem have been hesitant to assign a role for the court in policing the constitutional limits they articulate, mostly because of the strain on judicial capacity that any formulation of Take Care Clause review would cause. In this Article, I argue that courts still can and …
The Judicial Role In Constraining Presidential Nonenforcement Discretion: The Virtues Of An Apa Approach, Daniel E. Walters
The Judicial Role In Constraining Presidential Nonenforcement Discretion: The Virtues Of An Apa Approach, Daniel E. Walters
All Faculty Scholarship
Scholars, lawyers, and, indeed, the public at large increasingly worry about what purposive presidential inaction in enforcing statutory programs means for the rule of law and how such discretionary inaction can fit within a constitutional structure that compels Presidents to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Yet those who have recognized the problem have been hesitant to assign a role for the court in policing the constitutional limits they articulate, mostly because of the strain on judicial capacity that any formulation of Take Care Clause review would cause. In this Article, I argue that courts still can and …
Reverse Nullification And Executive Discretion, Michael T. Morley
Reverse Nullification And Executive Discretion, Michael T. Morley
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Quitting In Protest: A Theory Of Presidential Policy Making And Agency Response, Charles M. Cameron, John M. De Figueiredo, David E. Lewis
Quitting In Protest: A Theory Of Presidential Policy Making And Agency Response, Charles M. Cameron, John M. De Figueiredo, David E. Lewis
Faculty Scholarship
This paper examines the effects of centralized presidential policy-making, implemented through unilateral executive action, on the willingness of bureaucrats to exert effort and stay in the government. Extending models in organizational economics, we show that policy initiative by the president is a substitute for initiative by civil servants. Yet, total effort is enhanced when both work. Presidential centralization of policy often impels policy-oriented bureaucrats ("zealots") to quit rather than implement presidential policies they dislike. Those most likely to quit are a range of moderate bureaucrats. More extreme bureaucrats may be willing to wait out an opposition president in the hope …
Foreign Hard Look Review, Ganesh Sitaraman
Foreign Hard Look Review, Ganesh Sitaraman
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
For decades, courts and scholars have been engaged in a protracted and largely polarized debate over a seemingly simple question: how should courts address cases that implicate foreign affairs? On the one hand are those who seek expansive deference to the Executive's conduct offoreign affairs. On the other are those who argue that the courts must enforce the rule of law in foreign affairs cases lest they abdicate their responsibility to keep the Executive in check This Article provides an alternative approach to the judicial role in foreign relations cases--one that navigates between judicial abdication and judicial entanglement. It argues …
The Transformative Twelfth Amendment, Joshua D. Hawley
The Transformative Twelfth Amendment, Joshua D. Hawley
Faculty Publications
This paper argues that the Twelfth Amendment represents far more than a mechanical adjustment of the electoral college. Rather, it is the constitutional text that gives us the political presidency that we know today. The Twelfth Amendment worked a major structural change in the relationship between the legislative and executive branches and for that reason bears directly on the debate over the unitary executive and the meaning of “executive power.” Specifically, presidential removal power is best justified not by the original Article II, but by the constitutional structure the Twelfth Amendment created. And the scope and definition of executive power …
Reforming Lawyers Into Irrelevance?: Reconciling Crisis And Constraint At The Office Of Legal Counsel, Peter Margulies
Reforming Lawyers Into Irrelevance?: Reconciling Crisis And Constraint At The Office Of Legal Counsel, Peter Margulies
Law Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Can He Legally Do That? Does The President Have Directive Authority Over Agency Regulatory Decisions?, Robert V. Percival
Can He Legally Do That? Does The President Have Directive Authority Over Agency Regulatory Decisions?, Robert V. Percival
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Saving Special Places: Trends And Challenges With Protecting Public Lands [Outline], Robert B. Keiter
Saving Special Places: Trends And Challenges With Protecting Public Lands [Outline], Robert B. Keiter
The Future of Natural Resources Law and Policy (Summer Conference, June 6-8)
7 pages.
Includes bibliographical references
"Robert B. Keiter, Wallace Stegner Professor of Law, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law"
Law Casebook Description And Table Of Contents: Constitutional Environmental And Natural Resources Law [Outline], Jim May, Robin Craig
Law Casebook Description And Table Of Contents: Constitutional Environmental And Natural Resources Law [Outline], Jim May, Robin Craig
The Future of Natural Resources Law and Policy (Summer Conference, June 6-8)
6 pages.
"James May, Widener University School of Law" -- Agenda
Agenda: Celebrating The Centennial Of The Antiquities Act, University Of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center, University Of Colorado Boulder. Center Of The American West
Agenda: Celebrating The Centennial Of The Antiquities Act, University Of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center, University Of Colorado Boulder. Center Of The American West
Celebrating the Centennial of the Antiquities Act (October 9)
For 100 years, the Antiquities Act has been used by nearly every President in the 20th century to set aside and protect lands threatened with privatization and development. The list of lands first protected under the Antiquities Act – and that might never have been protected without it – is truly remarkable. Many of our most treasured national parks including the Grand Canyon, Olympic, Zion, Arches, Glacier Bay, and Acadia, began as national monuments. All told, Presidents have issued 123 proclamations setting aside millions of acres of land under the Antiquities Act.
The Natural Resources Law Center and the Center …
State Executive Lawmaking In Crisis, Jim Rossi
State Executive Lawmaking In Crisis, Jim Rossi
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Courts and scholars have largely overlooked the constitutional source and scope of a state executive's powers to avert and respond to crises. This Article addresses how actual and perceived legal barriers to executive authority under state constitutions can have major consequences beyond a state's borders during times of crisis. It proposes to empower state executives to address federal and regional goals without any previous authorization from the state legislature-a presumption of state executive lawmaking, subject to state legislative override, which would give a state or local executive expansive lawmaking authority within its system of government to address national and regional …
Executive Power And The Public Lands, Harold H. Bruff
Executive Power And The Public Lands, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
No abstract provided.
The President's Power To Detain "Enemy Combatants": Modern Lessons From Mr. Madison's Forgotten War, Ingrid Wuerth
The President's Power To Detain "Enemy Combatants": Modern Lessons From Mr. Madison's Forgotten War, Ingrid Wuerth
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This article uses three sets of cases from the War of 1812 to illustrate three problems with how modern courts have approached the detention of "enemy combatants" in the United States. The War of 1812 cases show that modern courts have relied too heavily on deference-based reasoning, and have failed to adequately consider both international law and congressional authorization when upholding the detentions as constitutional. The War of 1812, termed "Mr. Madison's War" by contemporary opponents, was fought largely on our own territory against a powerful foreign enemy, making it an especially rich source for comparison to the modern war …
Independent Counsel And The Constitution, Harold H. Bruff
Independent Counsel And The Constitution, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
No abstract provided.