Law Commons^™

Procedural Fairness In Antitrust Enforcement: The U.S. Perspective, Christopher S. Yoo, Hendrik M. Wendland

All Faculty Scholarship

Due process and fairness in enforcement procedures represent a critical aspect of the rule of law. Allowing greater participation by the parties and making enforcement procedures more transparent serve several functions, including better decisionmaking, greater respect for government, stronger economic growth, promotion of investment, limits corruption and politically motivated actions, regulation of bureaucratic ambition, and greater control of agency staff whose vision do not align with agency leadership or who are using an enforcement matter to advance their careers. That is why such distinguished actors as the International Competition Network (ICN), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the …

You’Re Fired! Why The Alj Multi-Track Dual Removal Provisions Violate The Constitution & How To Fix Them, Linda D. Jellum

Articles

This Article explains why the for-cause removal provisions for ALJs are unconstitutional and offers three potential solutions to remedy this problem. Part I provides background information, which explains that the APA was a compromise of competing interests. Some wanted ALJs to be completely in-dependent from their agencies to further unbiased decision-making and inde-pendence, and others feared agencies would lose control over setting policy, should ALJs have such an independent function.Ultimately, Congress com-promised by including provisions to make the ALJs more independent, while also ensuring that agencies retained complete control to set policy.

As part of the independence piece of the …

Non-Alj Adjudicators In Federal Agencies: Status, Selection, Oversight, And Removal, Kent H. Barnett, Russell Wheeler

Scholarly Works

This article republishes—in substantively similar form—our 2018 report to the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) concerning federal agencies’ adjudicators who are not administrative law judges (ALJs). (We refer to these adjudicators as “non-ALJ Adjudicators” or “non-ALJs.”) As our data indicate, non-ALJs significantly outnumber ALJs. Yet non-ALJs are often overlooked and difficult to discuss as a class because of their disparate titles and characteristics. To obtain more information on non-ALJs, we surveyed agencies on non-ALJs’ hearings and, among other things, the characteristics concerning non-ALJs’ salaries, selection, oversight, and removal. We first present our reported data on these matters, which …

The Shadow Of Free Enterprise: The Unconstitutionality Of The Securities & Exchange Commission's Administrative Law Judges, Linda D. Jellum, Moses M. Tincher

Articles

Six years ago, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), for the first time giving the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) the power to seek monetary penalties through its in-house adjudication. The SEC already had the power to seek such penalties in federal court. With the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC’s enforcement division could now choose between an adjudication before an SEC Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) or a civil action before an Article III judge. With this new choice, litigants contended that the SEC realized a significant home-court advantage. For example, the Wall Street Journal …

Against Administrative Judges, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

The single largest cadre of federal adjudicators goes largely ignored by scholars, policymakers, courts, and even litigating parties. These Administrative Judges or “AJs,” often confused with well-known federal Administrative Law Judges or “ALJs,” operate by the thousands in numerous federal agencies. Yet unlike ALJs, the significantly more numerous AJs preside over less formal hearings and have no significant statutory protections to preserve their impartiality. The national press has recently called attention to the alleged unfairness of certain ALJ proceedings, and regulated parties have successfully enjoined agencies’ use of ALJs. While fixes are necessary for ALJ adjudication, any solution that ignores …

Resolving The Alj Quandary, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

Three competing constitutional and practical concerns surround federal administrative law judges (“ALJs”), who preside over all formal adjudications within the executive branch. First, if ALJs are “inferior Officers” (not mere employees), as five current Supreme Court Justices have suggested, the current method of selecting many ALJs likely violates the Appointments Clause. Second, a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision reserved the question whether the statutory protections that prevent ALJs from being fired at will impermissibly impinge upon the President’s supervisory power under Article II. Third, these same protections from removal may, on the other hand, be too limited to satisfy impartiality …

The "Hidden Judiciary": An Empirical Examination Of Executive Branch Justice, Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Administrative law judges attract little scholarly attention, yet they decide a large fraction of all civil disputes. In this Article, we demonstrate that these executive branch judges, like their counterparts in the judicial branch, tend to make predominantly intuitive rather than predominantly deliberative decisions. This finding sheds new light on executive branch justice by suggesting that judicial intuition, not judicial independence, is the most significant challenge facing these important judicial officers.

Administrative Law Judges: Past, Present And Future, John Paul Jones

Law Faculty Publications

Prof. Jones' account of the history of administrative law judges. The text of this article is taken from his address at the annual conference and seminar of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges, held October 16-19, 1991 in Richmond, Virginia.

Book Review. Judges, Bureaucrats, And The Question Of Independence By Donna Price Cofer, William D. Popkin

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.