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Full-Text Articles in Law
Administrative Law Judges And The Erosion Of The Administrative State: Why Jarkesy May Be The Straw That Breaks The Camel's Back, Nicholas D'Addio
Administrative Law Judges And The Erosion Of The Administrative State: Why Jarkesy May Be The Straw That Breaks The Camel's Back, Nicholas D'Addio
Catholic University Law Review
The Trump-era unitary executive movement sought to expand presidential
power and shrink the influence of the administrative state through deregulation.
This movement ripples into the present moment, as Trump’s overhaul of the
federal judiciary installed a comprehensive system to delegitimize
administrative agency action— a system that is certain to endure. The
independence and role of administrative law judges (ALJs) has proven a key
target of the movement. Most recently, in the 2022 case of Jarkesy v. Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Fifth Circuit held that the dual-tiered for-cause
removal protections of SEC ALJs violated the Take Care Clause of Article …
A Major Question For The Sec: Analyzing Constitutional Limits On Regulatory Authority, Matthew Diller, Meredith Berger, Samuel W. Buell, John M. Golden, Suzanne Ashley, Coy Garrison, Aaron Saiger, Suman Naishadham, Mary Jo White
A Major Question For The Sec: Analyzing Constitutional Limits On Regulatory Authority, Matthew Diller, Meredith Berger, Samuel W. Buell, John M. Golden, Suzanne Ashley, Coy Garrison, Aaron Saiger, Suman Naishadham, Mary Jo White
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
No abstract provided.
Overseeing The Administrative State, Jill E. Fisch
Overseeing The Administrative State, Jill E. Fisch
Seattle University Law Review
In a series of recent cases, the Supreme Court has reduced the regulatory power of the Administrative State. Pending cases offer vehicles for the Court to go still further. Although the Court’s skepticism of administrative agencies may be rooted in Constitutional principles or political expediency, this Article explores another possible explanation—a shift in the nature of agencies and their regulatory role. As Pritchard and Thompson detail in their important book, A History of Securities Law in the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court was initially skeptical of agency power, jeopardizing Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR)’s ambitious New Deal plan. The Court’s acceptance …
The Administrative State's Jury Problem, Richard Lorren Jolly
The Administrative State's Jury Problem, Richard Lorren Jolly
Washington Law Review
This Article argues that the administrative state’s most acute constitutional fault is its routine failure to comply with the Seventh Amendment. Properly understood, that Amendment establishes an independent limitation on congressional authority to designate jurisdiction to juryless tribunals, and its dictate as to “Suits at common law” refers to all federal legal rights regardless of forum. Agencies’ use of binding, juryless adjudication fails these requirements and must be reformed. But this does not mean dismantling the administrative state; it is possible (indeed, necessary) to solve the jury problem while maintaining modern government. To that end, this Article advances a structural …
Administrative Apparition: Resurrecting The Modern Administrative State’S Legitimacy Crisis With Agency Law Analysis, Tabitha Kempf
Administrative Apparition: Resurrecting The Modern Administrative State’S Legitimacy Crisis With Agency Law Analysis, Tabitha Kempf
Catholic University Law Review
There is an enduring discord among academic and political pundits over the state of modern American government, with much focus on the ever-expanding host of federal agencies and their increasing regulatory, investigative, enforcement, and adjudicatory authority. The growing conglomerate of federal agencies, often unfavorably regarded as the “administrative state,” has invited decades of debate over the validity and proper scope of this current mode of government. Advocates for and against the administrative state are numerous, with most making traditional constitutional arguments to justify or delegitimize the current establishment. Others make philosophical, moral, or practical arguments in support or opposition. Though …
David Versus Godzilla: Bigger Stones, Jerry Ellig, Richard Williams
David Versus Godzilla: Bigger Stones, Jerry Ellig, Richard Williams
Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)
For four decades, U.S. Presidents have issued executive orders requiring agencies to conduct comprehensive regulatory impact analysis (RIA) for significant regulations to ensure that regulatory decisions solve social problems in a cost-beneficial manner. Yet experience demonstrates that agency RIAs often fail to live up to the standards enunciated in executive orders and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) oversees agency compliance with the executive orders, but OIRA is about half the size it was when it was established in 1980. Regulatory agency staff outnumber OIRA staff by a ratio of 3600 …
A False Sense Of Security: How Congress And The Sec Are Dropping The Ball On Cryptocurrency, Tessa E. Shurr
A False Sense Of Security: How Congress And The Sec Are Dropping The Ball On Cryptocurrency, Tessa E. Shurr
Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)
Today, companies use blockchain technology and digital assets for a variety of purposes. This Comment analyzes the digital token. If the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) views a digital token as a security, then the issuer of the digital token must comply with the registration and extensive disclosure requirements of federal securities laws.
To determine whether a digital asset is a security, the SEC relies on the test that the Supreme Court established in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. Rather than enforcing a statute or agency rule, the SEC enforces securities laws by applying the Howey test on a fact-intensive …
Reflections On The Effects Of Federalism On Opioid Policy, Matthew B. Lawrence
Reflections On The Effects Of Federalism On Opioid Policy, Matthew B. Lawrence
Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)
No abstract provided.
The Opioid Litigation: The Fda Is Mia, Catherine M. Sharkey
The Opioid Litigation: The Fda Is Mia, Catherine M. Sharkey
Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)
It is readily agreed that federal preemption of state tort law alters the balance between federal and state power. Federal preemption is a high-profile defense in almost all modern products liability cases. It is thus surprising to see how little attention has been given to federal preemption by courts and commentators in the opioid litigation. Opioid litigation provides a lens through which I explore the role of state and federal courts and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in striking the right balance of power. My purpose here is not to resolve the divide among the few courts that have …
Administrative Law: Whose Job Is It Anyway?, Allison Mather
Administrative Law: Whose Job Is It Anyway?, Allison Mather
Pepperdine Law Review
This Note examines the current state of judicial deference to administrative agencies and suggests modifying the doctrine to better comport with the Constitution. It examines the history of administrative agencies and the rise of judicial deference. The Note explores the present-day applications of judicial deference and analyzes whether the current doctrine is consistent with both its initial underlying policies and the Constitution. Ultimately, judicial deference to administrative agencies raises serious separation of powers concerns and should be modified to remain faithful to the nation’s founding principles.
The Administrative State: Problems Associated With Congressional Intent, Statutory Interpretation, And The Powers Granted To Administrative Agencies, Serje Havandjian
The Administrative State: Problems Associated With Congressional Intent, Statutory Interpretation, And The Powers Granted To Administrative Agencies, Serje Havandjian
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
While reading this article, two questions should be kept in mind: (1) why the Court held that the TSA promulgated whistleblowing regulation was not considered to have the force and effect of law, and how that effects other regulations, and (2) how should the Supreme Court respond if a conflict of congressional intent and statutory interpretation arises within another regulatory or administrative agency's internal scheme for regulating such issues? With a careful analysis of statutory interpretation and determining congressional intent, and some luck, this article will try to answer these questions. Ultimately, what we will find is that although Congress …
Inside Regulatory Interpretation: A Research Note, Christopher J. Walker
Inside Regulatory Interpretation: A Research Note, Christopher J. Walker
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
We now live in a regulatory world, where the bulk of federal lawmaking takes place at the bureaucratic level. Gone are the days when statutes and common law predominated. Instead, federal agencies—through rulemaking, adjudication, and other regulatory action—have arguably become the primary lawmakers, with Congress delegating to its bureaucratic agents vast swaths of lawmaking power, the President attempting to exercise some control over this massive regulatory apparatus, and courts struggling to constrain agency lawmaking within statutory and constitutional bounds. This story is not new. Over two decades ago, for instance, Professor Lawson lamented the rise of the administrative state and …
Optimal Abuse Of Power, Adrian Vermeule
Optimal Abuse Of Power, Adrian Vermeule
Northwestern University Law Review
I will argue that in the administrative state, in contrast to classical constitutional theory, the abuse of government power is not something to be strictly minimized, but rather optimized. An administrative regime will tolerate a predictable level of misrule, even abuse of power, as the inevitable byproduct of attaining other ends that are desirable overall.
There are three principal grounds for this claim. First, the architects of the modern administrative state were not only worried about misrule by governmental officials. They were equally worried about “private” misrule—misrule effected through the self-interested or self-serving behavior of economic actors wielding and abusing …
National Security Rulemaking, Robert Knowles
National Security Rulemaking, Robert Knowles
Florida State University Law Review
Agencies performing national security functions regulate citizens’ lives in increasingly intimate ways. Yet national security rulemaking is a mystery to most Americans. Many rules—like those implementing the National Security Agency’s vast surveillance schemes—remain secret. Others are published, but the deliberations that led to them and the legal justifications for them remain hidden.
Ordinarily, these rules would undergo the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice-and-comment process, which has earned wide, if not universal, praise for advancing democratic values and enhancing agency effectiveness. But a national security exception from notice-and-comment in the APA itself, along with the overuse of classification authority, combine to insulate …
Flexing Agency Muscle?, Richard J. Lazarus
Flexing Agency Muscle?, Richard J. Lazarus
Georgia Law Review
"Muscular" is not an adjective that commentators typically associate with federal agencies. The Office of the President of the United States prides itself in its muscularity, and ever since the days of President Theodore Roosevelt, the President is frequently said to enjoy the rhetorical advantages presented by that Office's "bully pulpit."' Congress routinely is characterized as flexing its legislative muscle in the statutory commands and prohibitions included in its enactments, and in the harsh critiques it launches in highly publicized oversight hearings. And the courts are regularly accused by everyone, of every possible ideological stripe, of being excessively muscular every …
Agency As Principal, Brigham Daniels
Agency As Principal, Brigham Daniels
Georgia Law Review
A presumption of a principal-agentrelationship between the elected branches and the bureaucracy permeates administrative law and scholarship. This typical framework consistently casts agencies as agents, never principals. This Article challenges that assumption and explores the ways in which agencies can act as principals to the elected branches. Agencies, in fact, commonly manipulate the elected branches. The challenge posed by the Article to the typical understandingof the relationship between agencies and the elected branches not only provides a more nuanced understanding of the modern administrative state but also raises serious questions about administrative law, which regularly employs this same faulty assumption.
Gaming The Past: The Theory And Practice Of Historic Baselines In The Administrative State, J.B. Ruhl, James Salzman
Gaming The Past: The Theory And Practice Of Historic Baselines In The Administrative State, J.B. Ruhl, James Salzman
Vanderbilt Law Review
In 1988, candidate George H. W. Bush was in a tight race for the presidency, behind in the polls to the Democratic challenger, Michael Dukakis. Stung by the D+ grade given by the League of Conservation Voters, Bush was searching for a way to claw back some of the environmental vote.' He saw an opening in wetlands. Perceived as worthless swamps and wasted development opportunities for most of our nation's history, conversion of wetlands for agricultural and urban land uses has resulted in a staggering loss of resources. Beginning in the 1970s, however, views started to change, with growing recognition …
The Future Of Agency Independence, Lisa S. Bressman, Robert B. Thompson
The Future Of Agency Independence, Lisa S. Bressman, Robert B. Thompson
Vanderbilt Law Review
Independent agencies have long been viewed as different from executive-branch agencies because the President lacks authority to fire their leaders for political reasons, such as failure to follow administration policy. In this Article, we identify mechanisms that make independent agencies increasingly responsive to presidential preferences. We find these mechanisms in a context where independent agencies traditionally have dominated: financial policy. In legislative proposals for securing market stability, we point to statutorily mandated collaboration on policy between the Federal Reserve Board and the Secretary of the Treasury. In administration practices for improving securities regulation, we focus on White House coordination of, …
The Independent Agency After Bowsher V. Synar--Alive And Kicking, William H. Hardie, Iii
The Independent Agency After Bowsher V. Synar--Alive And Kicking, William H. Hardie, Iii
Vanderbilt Law Review
Because the modern administrative agency combines executive, legislative, and judicial powers, various authorities throughout history have argued that the fundamental structure of the administrative system is unconstitutional. Recently, the relationship between the separation of powers doctrine and the administrative state has returned to the foreground of both American politics and constitutional law. Attempts by the current executive branch to rein in the policy and rule making activities of "independent" federal agencies have resulted in both praise and cries of foul from the legal community and Congress.' These attempts at executive branch control have been precipitated by a perceived shift in …