Law Commons^™

Loper Bright And The Future Of Chevron Deference, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

The question presented in Loper Bright Industries v. Raimondo¹ is “[w]hether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.” The Court denied certiorari on another question focused on the merits of the case,² indicating that at least four of the Justices are anxious to revisit or at least clarify Chevron. It’s about time, although it’s far from certain that the Court will actually follow through with the promise the certiorari grant indicates.^{3 …}

Fda In The Time Of Covid-19, Elizabeth Mccuskey

Faculty Scholarship

Over the past century, Congress has made the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) responsible for regulating the safety and efficacy of drugs and devices being deployed in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. The FDA’s regulatory infrastructure was built for public health threats and to combat manufacturers' misinformation about treatments.

This article spotlights the ways in which FDA has been adapting to a new challenge during the COVID-19 pandemic: combating misinformation emanating from within the executive branch.

Remedial Payments In Agency Enforcement, Seema Kakade

Faculty Scholarship

During the Obama Administration, the government settled many enforcement cases involving alleged violations of the nation’s federal statutes. The settlements have several requirements, including that the defendants pay money for beneficial projects to mitigate or offset harm directly or indirectly caused by defendant’s actions. For example, the government settled an environmental enforcement case against Volkswagen that included payments for environmental projects, and a mortgage enforcement case against Bank of America that included payments for housing education projects. These payments have spawned renewed criticism amongst conservative groups who have long claimed that payments for projects are mechanisms for agencies to get …

Disguised Patent Policymaking, Saurabh Vishnubhakat

Faculty Scholarship

Patent Office power has grown immensely in this decade, and the agency is wielding its power in predictably troubling ways. Like other agencies, it injects politics into its decisions while relying on technocratic justifications. It also reads grants of authority expansively to aggrandize its power, especially to the detriment of judicial checks on agency action. However, this story of Patent Office ascendancy differs from that of other agencies in two important respects. One is that the U.S. patent system still remains primarily a means for allocating property rights, not a comprehensive regime of industrial regulation. Thus, the Patent Office cannot …

The Porous Court-Agency Border In Patent Law, Saurabh Vishnubhakat

Faculty Scholarship

The progression toward reevaluating patent validity in the administrative, rather than judicial, setting became overtly substitutionary in the America Invents Act. No longer content to encourage court litigants to rely on Patent Office expertise for faster, cheaper, and more accurate validity decisions, Congress in the AIA took steps to force a choice. The result is an emergent border between court and agency power in the U.S. patent system. By design, the border is not absolute. Concurrent activity in both settings over the same dispute remains possible. What is troubling is the systematic weakening of this border by Patent Office encroachments …

Responding To Agency Avoidance Of Oira, Nina A. Mendelson, Jonathan B. Wiener

Faculty Scholarship

Concerns have recently been raised that US federal agencies may sometimes avoid regulatory review by the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). In this article, we assess the seriousness of such potential avoidance, and we recommend a framework for evaluating potential responses. After summarizing the system of presidential regulatory oversight through OIRA review, we analyze the incentives for agencies to cooperate with or avoid OIRA. We identify a wider array of agency avoidance tactics than has past scholarship, and a wider array of corresponding response options available to OIRA, the President, Congress, and the courts. We argue …

"Streamlining" The Rule Of Law: How The Department Of Justice Is Undermining Judicial Review Of Agency Action, Shruti Rana

Faculty Scholarship

Judicial review of administrative decision making is an essential institutional check on agency power. Recently, however, the Department of Justice dramatically revised its regulations in an attempt to insulate its decision making from public and federal court scrutiny. These “streamlining” rules, carried out in the name of national security and immigration reform, have led to a breakdown in the rule of law in our judicial system. While much attention has been focused on the Department of Justice’s recent attempts to shield executive power from the reach of Congress, its efforts to undermine judicial review have so far escaped such scrutiny. …

Reconceptualizing Chevron And Discretion: A Comment On Levin And Rubin, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

Professors Ronald Levin and Edward Rubin want to change the way we think about important administrative law concepts. Ronald Levin's paper, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered,1 argues that Chevron's currently ill-defined second step ought to be reconceptualized as an application of arbitrary or capricious review. Edward Rubin's paper, Discretion and Its Discontents,3 is part of his ongoing project to reconceptualize the way we think-and, more importantly, the way we talk-about the modern administrative state. Professor Rubin suggests that the oft-used word "discretion" does not usefully describe the bureaucratic operation of the modern managerial state and that it profitably …

Legislative Oversight Of Administrative Agencies In Minnesota, J. David Prince

Faculty Scholarship

Due to the expanding role of agencies within the Executive branch at both the state and federal level, legislatures are struggling to fulfill their obligation to hold agencies accountable and to modify legislative mandates when necessary. In order for the legislature to fulfill this obligation, it must have the capability to exercise policy formation and oversight goals. This Article will first examine the need for legislative oversight and the legislative oversight mechanism in Minnesota. Next, the Article discusses the legislative controls currently being used at the federal and state level. Executive control mechanisms and their possible use by a legislature …