Law Commons^™

Government By Contract And The Structural Constitution, Kimberly L. Wehle

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Although private parties have performed government functions throughout most of Western history, mainstream administrative law scholarship is dotted with concerns over the extent to which modern federal government activities are outsourced to private contractors. Federal contractors routinely exercise authority that is classically “executive” in nature. They write regulations, interpret laws, administer foreign aid, manage nuclear weapons sites and intelligence operations, interrogate detainees, control borders, design surveillance systems, and provide military support in combat zones. Administrative law places few constraints on private contractors, and prevailing constitutional principles — the state action and private delegation doctrines, in particular — are either inept …

Union Salts As Administrative Private Attorneys General, Michael C. Duff

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The legitimacy of union salting campaigns has been debated frequently and bitterly over the last several years. Salts, the agents of these campaigns, are professional union organizers who apply for, and sometimes obtain – often surreptitiously – employment with non-union employers in furtherance of union objectives. Although recent decisions of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), under the influence of the W. Bush administration, have erected administrative and legal roadblocks to the conduct of salting campaigns, it is likely that the “Obama Board” will revisit the issues surrounding them. This article argues that salts have served a legitimate function by …

A Cost-Benefit Interpretation Of The "Substantially Similar" Hurdle In The Congressional Review Act: Can Osha Ever Utter The E-Word (Ergonomics) Again?, Adam M. Finkel, Jason W. Sullivan

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The Congressional Review Act permits Congress to veto proposed regulations via a joint resolution, and prohibits an agency from reissuing a rule “in substantially the same form” as the vetoed rule. Some scholars—and officials within the agencies themselves—have understood the “substantially the same” standard to bar an agency from regulating in the same substantive area covered by a vetoed rule. Courts have not yet provided an authoritative interpretation of the standard.

This Article examines a spectrum of possible understandings of the standard, and relates them to the legislative history (of both the Congressional Review Act itself and the congressional veto …

Federal Power, Non-Federal Actors: The Ramifications Of Free Enterprise Fund, Harold J. Krent

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In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board the Supreme Court invalidated Congress’s decision to protect members of the Board from at will removal by the Securities and Exchange Commission, whose members in turn are protected from at will removal at the hands of the President. In the Court’s view, the congressional structure – in particular, the double layer of tenure insulation -- undermined the Article II imperative that all exercises of significant executive authority be subject to strong supervision by the President. The Court’s insistence in Free Enterprise Fund on formal presidential control over an inferior executive …

Allocating Power Within Agencies, Elizabeth Magill, Adrian Vermeule

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Standard questions in the theory of administrative law involve the allocation of power among legislatures, courts, the President, and various types of agencies. These questions are often heavily informed by normative commitments to particular allocations of governmental authority among the three branches of the national government. These discussions, however, are incomplete because agencies are typically treated as unitary entities. In this essay, we examine a different question: How does administrative law allocate power within agencies? Although scholars have sometimes cracked open the black box of agencies to peer inside, their insights are localized and confined to particular contexts. We will …

Deregulation Vs. Reregulation Of Telecommunications: A Clash Of Regulatory Paradigms, Christopher S. Yoo

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For the past several decades, U.S. policymakers and the courts have charged a largely deregulatory course with respect to telecommunications. During the initial stages, these decisionmakers responded to technological improvements by narrowing regulation to cover only those portions of industry that remained natural monopolies and deregulating those portions that became open to competition. Eventually, Congress began regulating individual network components rather than services, mandating that incumbent local telephone companies provide unbundled access to any network element. As these elements became open to competition, the courts prompted the Federal Communications Commission to release almost the entire network from unbundling obligations. The …