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Full-Text Articles in Law
Regulating Impartiality In Agency Adjudication, Kent H. Barnett
Regulating Impartiality In Agency Adjudication, Kent H. Barnett
Scholarly Works
Which should prevail—the Take Care Clause of Article II or the Due Process Clause? To Justice Breyer’s chagrin, the majorities in Lucia v. SEC and Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB expressly declined to resolve whether the U.S. Constitution condones SEC administrative law judges’ and other similarly situated agency adjudicators’ current statutory protection from at-will removal. The crux of the problem is that, on one hand, senior officials may use at-will removal to pressure agency adjudicators and thereby potentially imperil the impartiality that due process requires. On the other hand, Article II limits Congress’s ability to cocoon executive officers, including potentially …
If Established By Law, Then An Administrative Judge Is An Officer, Jennifer L. Cotton
If Established By Law, Then An Administrative Judge Is An Officer, Jennifer L. Cotton
Georgia Law Review
Administrative Judges (AJs) are a large and often overlooked group of federal agency adjudicators. While courts have examined Article II Appointments Clause challenges to Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), courts have yet to encounter a legal challenge to the constitutionality of AJs’ appointment procedures. The constitutionality of any federal government actor’s appointment is dependent upon whether that actor is an “officer” or an “employee” under the Article II Appointments clause. It is apparent that the current “significant authority” test that the Supreme Court has espoused to distinguish between officers and employees is unworkable. This Note endeavors to set forth a bright-line …
To The Victor Goes The Toil -- Remedies For Regulated Parties In Separation-Of-Powers Litigation, Kent H. Barnett
To The Victor Goes The Toil -- Remedies For Regulated Parties In Separation-Of-Powers Litigation, Kent H. Barnett
Scholarly Works
The U.S. Constitution imposes three key limits on the design of federal agencies. It constrains how agency officers are appointed, the extent of their independence from the President, and the range of issues that they can decide. Scholars have trumpeted the importance of these safeguards with soaring rhetoric. And the Supreme Court has permitted regulated parties to vindicate these safeguards through implied private rights of action under the Constitution. Regulated parties, for their part, have been successfully challenging agency structure with increased frequency. At the same time, regulated parties, courts, and scholars have largely ignored the practical question of “structural …
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's Appointment With Trouble, Kent H. Barnett
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's Appointment With Trouble, Kent H. Barnett
Scholarly Works
This article considers whether the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Director’s appointment of the Bureau’s Deputy Director comports with the Appointments Clause. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act established the Bureau in July 2010, as well as the offices of the Bureau’s Director and Deputy Director, to coordinate the regulation and enforcement of federal consumer-financial-protection laws. Under that act, the Director appoints the Deputy Director. The Appointments Clause permits “Heads of Departments” to appoint inferior officers like the Deputy Director. But it is unclear if the Bureau is a “department” and thus if the Director is a department …