Law Commons^™

Chevron Step Two's Domain, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

An increasing number of judges, policymakers, and scholars have advocated eliminating or narrowing Chevron deference—a two-step inquiry under which courts defer to federal agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes the agencies administer. Much of the debate centers on either Chevron’s domain (i.e., when Chevron should apply at all) or how courts ascertain statutory ambiguity at Chevron’s first step. Largely lost in this debate on constraining agency discretion is the role of Chevron’s second step: whether the agency’s resolution of a statutory ambiguity is reasonable. Drawing on the most comprehensive study of Chevron in the circuit courts, this Essay explores how …

Sovereign Immunity - The State Department’S Decision To Recognize And Allow The Claim Of Sovereign Immunity Is Binding Upon The Courts And Is Not Subject To Review Under The Administrative Procedure Act, Robin B. Gray Jr., George P. Shingler

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Against Administrative Judges, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

The single largest cadre of federal adjudicators goes largely ignored by scholars, policymakers, courts, and even litigating parties. These Administrative Judges or “AJs,” often confused with well-known federal Administrative Law Judges or “ALJs,” operate by the thousands in numerous federal agencies. Yet unlike ALJs, the significantly more numerous AJs preside over less formal hearings and have no significant statutory protections to preserve their impartiality. The national press has recently called attention to the alleged unfairness of certain ALJ proceedings, and regulated parties have successfully enjoined agencies’ use of ALJs. While fixes are necessary for ALJ adjudication, any solution that ignores …

Chapter 11 Shapeshifters, Lindsey Simon

Scholarly Works

Logic and equity would seem to demand that when administrative agencies are creditors to a bankrupt debtor, they should have the same status as other creditors. But a creditor agency retains its regulatory authority over the debtor, permitting it to continue with agency business such as conducting enforcement proceedings and awarding licenses. As a result, though bankruptcy law and policy both strongly support equal distribution of the estate, administrative agencies have been able to circumvent these goals through the use of “shapeshifting” behaviors. This Article evaluates two dangerous shapeshifting scenarios:

(1) where the agency avoids the limitations of creditor status …

Codifying Chevmore, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

This Article considers the significance and promise of Congress’s unprecedented codification of the well-known Chevron and Skidmore judicial-deference doctrines (to which I refer collectively as “Chevmore”). Congress did so in the Dodd-Frank Act by instructing courts to apply the Skidmore deference factors when reviewing certain agency-preemption decisions and by referring to Chevron throughout.

This codification is meaningful because it informs the delegation theory that undergirds Chevmore (i.e., that Congress intends to delegate interpretive primacy over statutory interpretation to agencies under Chevron or courts under Skidmore). Scholars and at least three Supreme Court Justices have decried the judicial inquiry into congressional …

The Dean Rusk Award 1984-1985: The 1984 "Country Of Origin" Regulations For Textile Imports: Illegal Administrative Action Under Domestic And International Law?, David Stepp

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Section 337 And The Gatt: A Necessary Protection Or An Unfair Trade Practice?, Nathan G. Knight Jr.

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

The National Environmental Policy Act Of 1969 And Its Implications For Nafta: Public Citizen V. United States Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C.), Rev'd 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993)., Kristin R. Loecke

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Substance, Procedure, And The Divided Patent Power, Joseph S. Miller

Scholarly Works

The Patent Office has the power to issue rules that “shall govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office,” 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2), but not the power to issue substantive rules. It has been this way since 1870, when Congress first granted the Office this regulatory power, in nearly these same words. Just how broad is this grant? How should a reviewing court determine whether a challenged Patent Office rule is procedural (and thus valid) or substantive (and thus invalid)? It is remarkable that in 2010, 140 years after Congress gave the Patent Office this power, the proper sorting standard …