Law Commons^™

The Politics Of Selecting Chevron Deference, Kent H. Barnett, Christina L. Boyd, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

In this article, we examine an important threshold question in judicial behavior and administrative law: When do federal circuit courts decide to use the Chevron deference framework and when do they select a framework that is less deferential to the administrative agency's statutory interpretation? The question is important because the purpose of Chevron deference is to give agencies-not judges-policy-making space within statutory interpretation. We expect, nonetheless, that whether to invoke the Chevron framework is largely driven by political dynamics, with judges adopting a less deferential standard when their political preferences do not align with the agency's decision. To provide insight, …

Visualizing Change In Administrative Law, Aaron L. Nielson

Georgia Law Review

Although few realize it, the structure of administrative law has not changed much in two decades. Unlike past eras of upheaval, the key statutes, institutions, and judicial doctrines that defined administrative law in the early 1990s remain remarkably intact today. Administrative law's complexity, however, makes it difficult to see the big picture. This Article addresses that complexity by introducing a new visual framework. This framework has two principal benefits. First, it illustrates how administrative law's many parts fit together and shows that the field has been in a holding pattern for a long time. Second, it also allows scholars to …

Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated Congress’ use of two layers of tenure protection to shield Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) members from the President’s removal. The SEC could appoint and remove PCAOB members. An implied tenure-protection provision protected the SEC from the President’s at-will removal. And a statutory tenure-protection provision protected PCAOB members from the SEC’s at-will removal. The Court held that these “tiered” tenure protections unconstitutionally impinged upon the President’s removal power because they prevented the President from holding the SEC responsible for PCAOB’s actions in the same …

The Chevron Two-Step In Georgia's Administrative Law, David E. Shipley

Georgia Law Review

Like federal and state administrative agencies
throughout the nation, Georgia's many boards,
commissions and authorities make policy when they apply
their governing statutes in promulgating regulations and
in ruling on specific matters like granting or denying an
application for a permit or determining the residency of a
candidate for public office. Sometimes governing statutes
are clear, but sometimes there is ambiguity. When there is
ambiguity in the governing statute, an agency must
interpret that legislation when it promulgates regulations
or decides a particular contested matter. This Article asks
and answers the fundamental question of what deference,
if any, must a …

The Chevron Two-Step In Georgia's Administrative Law, David Shipley

Scholarly Works

The Georgia Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have long accepted the General Assembly’s authority to enact legislation that establishes administrative agencies and empowers those agencies to promulgate rules and regulations to implement their enabling statutes. In addition, the Georgia Constitution provides that the General Assembly may authorize agencies to exercise quasi-judicial powers. Administrative agencies with broad powers enjoy a secure position under Georgia law.

Like federal and state administrative agencies throughout the nation, Georgia’s many boards, commissions and authorities make policy when they apply their governing statutes in promulgating regulations of general applicability, and in ruling on specific matters …

Wilderness, The Courts And The Effect Of Politics On Judicial Decisionmaking, Peter A. Appel

Scholarly Works

Empirical analyses of cases from federal courts have attempted to determine the effect of judges’ political ideology on their decisions. This question holds interest for scholars from many disciplines. Investigating judicial review of the actions of administrative agencies should provide strong evidence on the question of political influence because applicable rules of judicial deference to administrative decisions ought to lead judges to reach politically neutral results. Yet several studies have found a strong correlation between results in these cases and proxies for political ideology. Cases involving the interpretation of environmental law have been of particular interest as a subset of …

Federalism And Accountability: State Attorneys General, Regulatory Litigation, And The New Federalism, Timothy L. Meyer

Scholarly Works

This Comment will examine how one particular state institution, state attorneys general (SAGs), has operated within a unique set of institutional and political constraints to create state-based regulation with nationwide impact in policy areas including consumer protection, antitrust, environmental regulation, and securities regulation. This state-based regulation casts doubt on one of the principle rationales advanced in the Supreme Court's anticommandeering line of cases for limiting federal power; namely, that such a move enhances electoral accountability, a concept central to our democracy. If in the absence of federal regulation a series of narrowly accountable state-based actors can create nationwide regulation in …

The Status Of Administrative Agencies Under The Georgia Constitution, David E. Shipley

Scholarly Works

This Article discusses the place of administrative agencies under the Georgia Constitution. The rules of the Georgia Supreme Court on these issues, like the comparable rulings from the U.S. Supreme Court, make excellent reading for anyone interested in Georgia law, government, politics, and history. Most of the decisions surveyed in this Article are correct, but not necessarily for the reasons given by the Georgia Supreme Court. Some of the opinions offer comprehensive treatises on sections of the Georgia Constitution and aspects of administrative law, while others reach conclusions without much explanation. Some results are at odds with prior decisions that …

The Constitutional Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, Dan T. Coenen

Scholarly Works

A cornerstone of the United States Constitution is its separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the national government. The Framers of the Constitution reasoned that separated powers would guard against tyranny by blocking the undue concentration of authority in any single governmental department. In crafting the Constitution, however, the Framers could not anticipate every dispute their scheme of separated powers might engender. One modern separation-of-powers conflict not specifically anticipated by the constitutional text involves so-called "intracircuit nonacquiescence.”

Intracircuit nonacquiescence occurs when executive-branch decision makers refuse to follow a circuit court's precedents even when acting subject …