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Full-Text Articles in Law

Coequal Federalism And Federal-State Agencies, Dave Owen, Hannah J. Wiseman Jan 2020

Coequal Federalism And Federal-State Agencies, Dave Owen, Hannah J. Wiseman

Georgia Law Review

Dividing authority between the federal government and the
states is central to the theory and practice of federalism.
Division is the defining feature of dual federalism, which
dominates the U.S. Supreme Court’s federalism
jurisprudence. Recent academic theories of federalism
emphasize overlap and interaction but still assume that
federal and state actors will work within separate institutions.
Each approach can be problematic, yet assumptions of
separation remain the bedrock of federalism. This Article
discusses a different form of federalism: coequal federalism.
Under coequal federalism, federal- and state-appointed
officials collaborate within a single agency that makes
decisions binding on the federal government …


The Other Hobbs Act: An Old Leviathan In The Modern Administrative State, Jason N. Sigalos Jan 2020

The Other Hobbs Act: An Old Leviathan In The Modern Administrative State, Jason N. Sigalos

Georgia Law Review

The Hobbs Administrative Orders Review Act is a
little-known statute, one that is often mistaken for a
federal criminal statute with a similar name.
The lesser-known Hobbs Act requires aggrieved parties
to challenge certain agency orders in a federal court of
appeals within sixty days of the order’s promulgation.
However, if no party does so, are later parties bound by
a potentially unlawful agency order in subsequent
enforcement actions? The U.S. Supreme Court recently
dodged this question in PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton
& Harris Chiropractic, Inc. That case concerned a suit
between two private parties under the Telephone
Consumer …


Chevron Abroad, Kent H. Barnett, Lindsey Vinson Jan 2020

Chevron Abroad, Kent H. Barnett, Lindsey Vinson

Scholarly Works

This Article presents our comparative findings of how courts in five other countries review agency statutory interpretation. These comparisons permit us to understand and participate better in current debates about the increasingly controversial Chevron doctrine in American law, whereby courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations of statutes that an agency administers. Those debates concern, among other things, Chevron 's purported inevitability, functioning and normative propriety. Our inquiry into judicial review in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia provides useful and unexpected findings. Chevron, contrary to some scholars' views, is not inevitable because only one of these countries has …


The Guardian Trustee In Bankruptcy Courts And Beyond, Lindsey Simon Jan 2020

The Guardian Trustee In Bankruptcy Courts And Beyond, Lindsey Simon

Scholarly Works

Litigation systems create dangers of unfairness. Citizens worry, and should worry, about exploitive settlements in aggregate litigation, potential biases in administrative proceedings, and troubling power imbalances in criminal trials. Public confidence in adjudicative processes has eroded to an all-time low. This Article explores the untapped potential of adding independent watchdog entities to address systemic threats to the integrity of government decisionmaking. These entities, which I call “guardian trustees,” do not fit within the traditional framework of our adversary system. Though guardian trustees already operate in bankruptcy proceedings, they have thus far received little attention in scholarly literature. This Article begins …


Regulating Impartiality In Agency Adjudication, Kent H. Barnett Jan 2020

Regulating Impartiality In Agency Adjudication, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

Which should prevail—the Take Care Clause of Article II or the Due Process Clause? To Justice Breyer’s chagrin, the majorities in Lucia v. SEC and Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB expressly declined to resolve whether the U.S. Constitution condones SEC administrative law judges’ and other similarly situated agency adjudicators’ current statutory protection from at-will removal. The crux of the problem is that, on one hand, senior officials may use at-will removal to pressure agency adjudicators and thereby potentially imperil the impartiality that due process requires. On the other hand, Article II limits Congress’s ability to cocoon executive officers, including potentially …