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Articles 1 - 19 of 19
Full-Text Articles in Law
Movement On Removal: An Emerging Consensus On The First Congress, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Movement On Removal: An Emerging Consensus On The First Congress, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Faculty Scholarship
What did the “Decision of 1789” decide about presidential removal power, if anything? It turns out that an emerging consensus of scholars agrees that there was not much consensus in the First Congress.
Two more questions follow: Is the “unitary executive theory” based on originalism, and if so, is originalism a reliable method of interpretation based on historical evidence?
The unitary executive theory posits that a president has exclusive and “indefeasible” executive powers (i.e., powers beyond congressional and judicial checks and balances). This panel was an opportunity for unitary executive theorists and their critics to debate recent historical research questioning …
Amicus Brief In Sec V. Jarkesy On Original Public Meaning Of Article Ii & Presidential Removal, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Amicus Brief In Sec V. Jarkesy On Original Public Meaning Of Article Ii & Presidential Removal, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Faculty Scholarship
In holding that the SEC’s administrative law judges’ protections against removal were unconstitutional, the Fifth Circuit extended Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 447 (2010), and Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020). Those precedents were based on an incomplete historical record. Subsequent historical research shows that the Founding generation never understood Article II to grant the President an indefeasible removal power.
To be sure, this evidence does not suggest Congress should have unlimited power to protect any executive office or delegate removal to itself. Rather, the bottom line is that the evidence of original public …
President Biden's Executive Order On Competition: An Antitrust Analysis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
President Biden's Executive Order On Competition: An Antitrust Analysis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
In July, 2021, President Biden signed a far ranging Executive Order directed to promoting competition in the American economy. This paper analyzes issues covered by the Order that are most likely to affect the scope and enforcement of antitrust law. The only passage that the Executive Order quoted from a Supreme Court antitrust decision captures its antitrust ideology well – that the Sherman Act:
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time …
Structural Deregulation, Jody Freeman, Sharon Jacobs
Structural Deregulation, Jody Freeman, Sharon Jacobs
Publications
Modern critics of the administrative state portray agencies as omnipotent behemoths, invested with vast delegated powers and largely unaccountable to the political branches of government. This picture, we argue, understates agency vulnerability to an increasingly powerful presidency. One source of presidential control over agencies in particular has been overlooked: the systematic undermining of an agency’s ability to execute its statutory mandate. This strategy, which we call “structural deregulation,” is a dangerous and underappreciated aspect of what then-Professor, now-Justice Elena Kagan termed “presidential administration.”
Structural deregulation attacks the core capacities of the bureaucracy. The phenomenon encompasses such practices as leaving agencies …
Faithful Execution And Article Ii, Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Faithful Execution And Article Ii, Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Faculty Scholarship
Article II of the U.S. Constitution twice imposes a duty of faithful execution on the President, who must "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" and take an oath or affirmation to 'faithfully execute the Office of President." These Faithful Execution Clauses are cited often, but their background and original meaning have never been fully explored. Courts, the executive branch, and many scholars rely on one or both clauses as support for expansive views of presidential power, for example, to go beyond standing law to defend the nation in emergencies; to withhold documents from Congress or the courts; or …
The Depravity Of The 1930s And The Modern Administrative State, Gary S. Lawson, Steven Calabresi
The Depravity Of The 1930s And The Modern Administrative State, Gary S. Lawson, Steven Calabresi
Faculty Scholarship
Gillian Metzger’s 2017 Harvard Law Review foreword, entitled 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, is a paean to the modern administrative state, with its massive subdelegations of legislative and judicial power to so-called “expert” bureaucrats, who are layered well out of reach of electoral accountability yet do not have the constitutional status of Article III judges. We disagree with this celebration of technocratic government on just about every level, but this Article focuses on two relatively narrow points.
First, responding more to implicit assumptions that pervade modern discourse than specifically to Professor Metzger’s analysis, we challenge the normally unchallenged …
The Never-Ending Assault On The Administrative State, Jack M. Beermann
The Never-Ending Assault On The Administrative State, Jack M. Beermann
Faculty Scholarship
This Article is an exploration of the twists and turns of the never-ending assault on the administrative state. Without attempting to resolve all of the separation of powers controversies that have existed since the beginning of the Republic, this Article examines and analyzes the fundamental constitutional challenges to the administrative state as well as the more peripheral constitutional difficulties involving the administrative state and the nonconstitutional legal challenges that have arisen over the decades. In my view, the legal and political arguments made in favor of major structural changes to the administrative state do not provide sufficient normative bases for …
Presidential Exit, J.B. Ruhl, James Salzman
Presidential Exit, J.B. Ruhl, James Salzman
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
"The biggest problem that we're facing right now has to do with George Bush trying to bring more and more power into the executive branch and not go through Congress at all, and that's what I intend to reverse when I'm president of the United States of America."
"Why is @BarackObama constantly issuing executive orders that are major power grabs of authority?"
"President Trump signed the 30th executive order of his presidency on Friday, capping off a whirlwind period that produced more orders in his first 100 days than for any president since Harry Truman. The rash of executive orders …
Indeconstructible: The Triumph Of The Environmental “Administrative State”, Stephen M. Johnson
Indeconstructible: The Triumph Of The Environmental “Administrative State”, Stephen M. Johnson
Articles
Shortly after the 2017 Presidential inauguration, a senior advisor to the President proclaimed that a top priority of the Administration would be the “deconstruction of the administrative state.” A primary target of the Administration’s deconstruction efforts was the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and federal environmental regulations.
While the President can use a variety of tools, including the appointment power, budget power, treaty power, and executive orders, to influence the manner in which the EPA and other agencies interpret and enforce laws, the President has very little power to unilaterally “deconstruct the administrative state.” The “administrative state” is a creation …
Sanctuary Networks And Integrative Enforcement, Ming Hsu Chen
Sanctuary Networks And Integrative Enforcement, Ming Hsu Chen
Publications
My intended focus is on the widespread response--in cities, churches, campuses, and corporations that together comprise "sanctuary networks"--to the Trump Administration's Executive Order 13768 Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States as an instance of the changing relationship between federal, local, and private organizations in the regulation of immigration. After briefly covering the legal background of the Trump Interior E.O., the focus of the Article shifts to the institutional dynamics arising in communities. These institutional dynamics exemplify the beginnings of a reimagined immigration enforcement policy with a more integrative flavor.
Presidential Administration In The Obama Era, Jud Mathews
Presidential Administration In The Obama Era, Jud Mathews
Jud Mathews
The President And The Constitution, Peter L. Strauss
The President And The Constitution, Peter L. Strauss
Faculty Scholarship
That comprehensive and undefined presidential powers hold both practical advantages and grave dangers for the country will impress anyone who has served as legal adviser to a President in time of transition and public anxiety.... The purpose of the Constitution was not only to grant power, but to keep it from getting out of hand.... With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations.
The President's Enforcement Power, Kate Andrias
The President's Enforcement Power, Kate Andrias
Faculty Scholarship
Enforcement of law is at the core of the President’s constitutional duty to “take Care” that the laws are faithfully executed, and it is a primary mechanism for effecting national regulatory policy. Yet questions about how presidents oversee agency enforcement activity have received surprisingly little scholarly attention. This Article provides a positive account of the President’s role in administrative enforcement, explores why presidential enforcement has taken the shape it has, and examines the bounds of the President’s enforcement power. It demonstrates that presidential involvement in agency enforcement, though extensive, has been ad hoc, crisis-driven, and frequently opaque. The Article thus …
Presidential Control Of Administrative Agencies: A Debate Over Law Or Politics?, Cary Coglianese
Presidential Control Of Administrative Agencies: A Debate Over Law Or Politics?, Cary Coglianese
All Faculty Scholarship
Recent controversy over the unitary executive may be part of what Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo have called the “oldest debate in constitutional law.” Yet in this essay, I ask whether this debate is as much legal as it is political. Focusing on the Environmental Protection Agency’s decision to grant California a waiver from national automobile emissions standards, I contrast the divergent reactions to presidential influence under President Bush and President Obama. In both administrations the EPA faced clear presidential pressure, but critics of President Bush’s involvement generally applauded the actions taken by President Obama. The main difference appears to …
Presidential Control Of The Elite "Non-Agency", Kimberly L. Wehle
Presidential Control Of The Elite "Non-Agency", Kimberly L. Wehle
All Faculty Scholarship
This article examines the constitutionality of legislation creating a new form of independent agency – in effect, a “non-agency” agency residing in the no-man’s land between Articles I and II of the Constitution. In the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB” or “Board”) and endowed it with massive governmental powers while insulating it from traditional mechanisms for ensuring accountability. Congress deemed the PCAOB not an agency, rendered it substantially immune from judicial review, empowered Board members to set their own salaries and budget, and gave the embattled Securities and Exchange Commission – not the President …
Combating Midnight Regulation, Jack M. Beermann
Combating Midnight Regulation, Jack M. Beermann
Faculty Scholarship
The flurry of regulatory activity by the outgoing administration of President George W. Bush has raised, once again, the specter of midnight regulation. Whatever the reason for midnight regulation, there seems to be a general consensus that something has gone wrong when an outgoing administration takes important action while the incoming administration is essentially waiting to take over. Most late term action is subject to the obvious question of "if this action was so important, why didn't the administration take it in the last seven and three-quarters years or so?" Even though the Constitution leaves the incumbent in office for …
Assessing The Advocacy Of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response To Philip Harter, Cary Coglianese
Assessing The Advocacy Of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response To Philip Harter, Cary Coglianese
All Faculty Scholarship
For many years, advocates of negotiated rulemaking have advanced enthusiastic claims about how negotiated rulemaking would reduce litigation and shorten the rulemaking process. In an earlier study, I tested these claims systematically by assessing the effectiveness of negotiated rulemaking against existing rulemaking processes. I found that negotiated rulemaking neither saves time nor reduces litigation. Recently, Philip Harter, a longtime advocate of negotiated rulemaking, has criticized my study and asserted that negotiated rulemaking has succeeded remarkably in achieving its goals. Harter criticized the way I measured the length of the rulemaking process, claimed that I failed to appreciate differences in litigation, …
The Consent Of The Governed: Against Simple Rules For A Complex World, Cynthia R. Farina
The Consent Of The Governed: Against Simple Rules For A Complex World, Cynthia R. Farina
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Professor Farina argues that recent proponents of enhanced presidential power overstate the ability of the President to legitimize the regulatory state. It accuses pro-presidentialists of premising their claims on a conception of the "will of the people" that is neither an accurate description of how citizens actually participate in modern government nor an authentic constitutional understanding of how citizens would consent to public policy decisions. The paper concludes by insisting that no single mode of democratic legitimization can "save" the regulatory enterprise; rather, administrative law must look to a plurality of institutions and practices that contribute to an ongoing process …
Presidential Power And Administrative Rulemaking, Harold H. Bruff
Presidential Power And Administrative Rulemaking, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
No abstract provided.