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Full-Text Articles in Law

Antiquities Act Monuments: The Elgin Marbles Of Our Public Lands?, James R. Rasband Oct 2006

Antiquities Act Monuments: The Elgin Marbles Of Our Public Lands?, James R. Rasband

Celebrating the Centennial of the Antiquities Act (October 9)

13 pages.

Includes bibliographical references


Florida East Coast Railway And The Structure Of Administrative Law, Michael P. Healy Oct 2006

Florida East Coast Railway And The Structure Of Administrative Law, Michael P. Healy

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

A typical Administrative Law course presents the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co. as establishing the rule that statutory text quite close to the magic words, "on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing," is needed to trigger the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) formal hearing requirements for a rulemaking. Florida East Coast Railway is a prime example of an underrated case because, even though the case is well known, its renown is a consequence only of its black letter rule about rulemaking procedures. Many scholars and practitioners do not appreciate the case for …


Legislation And Legitimation: Congress And Insider Trading In The 1980s, Thomas W. Joo Feb 2006

Legislation And Legitimation: Congress And Insider Trading In The 1980s, Thomas W. Joo

ExpressO

Legislation and Legitimation:

Congress and Insider Trading in the 1980s

Abstract

Orthodox corporate law-and-economics holds that American corporate and securities regulation has evolved inexorably toward economic efficiency. That position is difficult to square with the fact that regulation is the product of government actors and institutions. Indeed, the rational behavior assumptions of law-and-economics suggest that those actors and institutions would tend to place their own self-interest ahead of economic efficiency. This article provides anecdotal evidence of such self-interest at work. Based on an analysis of legislative history—primarily Congressional hearings—this article argues that Congress had little interest in the economic policy …


Congressional Administration, Jack M. Beermann Feb 2006

Congressional Administration, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, at least since President Reagan's precedent-setting Executive Order 12291, the phenomenon of direct presidential supervision of agencies has received significant attention in legal scholarship. Congress's involvement has been much less thoroughly examined, and, although most people are familiar with congressional hearings and oversight, the dominant image as a legal matter is that once Congress legislates, it loses control over how its laws are administered unless it chooses to legislate again. In the political science/public policy literature, the understanding of Congress's role in monitoring agencies has evolved from despair that Congress is not sufficiently engaged to a recognition …


Out Of Thin Air: Using First Amendment Public Forum Analysis To Redeem American Broadcasting Regulation, Anthony E. Varona Jan 2006

Out Of Thin Air: Using First Amendment Public Forum Analysis To Redeem American Broadcasting Regulation, Anthony E. Varona

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

American television and radio broadcasters are uniquely privileged among Federal Communications Commission (FCC) licensees. Exalted as public trustees by the 1934 Communications Act, broadcasters pay virtually nothing for the use of their channels of public radiofrequency spectrum, unlike many other FCC licensees who have paid billions of dollars for similar digital spectrum. Congress envisioned a social contract of sorts between broadcast licensees and the communities they served. In exchange for their free licenses, broadcast stations were charged with providing a platform for a "free marketplace of ideas" that would cultivate a democratically engaged and enlightened citizenry through the broadcasting of …


The Irrational Auditor And Irrational Liability, Adam C. Pritchard Jan 2006

The Irrational Auditor And Irrational Liability, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

This Article argues that less liability for auditors in certain areas might encourage more accurate and useful financial statements, or at least equally accurate statements at a lower cost. Audit quality is promoted by three incentives: reputation, regulation, and litigation. When we take reputation and regulation into account, exposing auditors to potentially massive liability may undermine the effectiveness of reputation and regulation, thereby diminishing integrity of audited financial statements. The relation of litigation to the other incentives that promote audit quality has become more important in light of the sea change that occurred in the regulation of the auditing profession …