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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Statutory Separation Of Powers, Sharon B. Jacobs
The Statutory Separation Of Powers, Sharon B. Jacobs
Publications
Separation of powers forms the backbone of our constitutional democracy. But it also operates as an underappreciated structural principle in subconstitutional domains. This Article argues that Congress constructs statutory schemes of separation, checks, and balances through its delegations to administrative agencies. Like its constitutional counterpart, the “statutory separation of powers” seeks to prevent the dominance of factions and ensure policy stability. But separating and balancing statutory authority is a delicate business: the optimal balance is difficult to calibrate ex ante, the balance is unstable, and there are risks that executive agencies in particular might seek expansion of their authority vis-à-vis …
Executive Power And The Public Lands, Harold H. Bruff
Executive Power And The Public Lands, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
No abstract provided.
Towards A Constitutional Architecture For Cooperative Federalism, Philip J. Weiser
Towards A Constitutional Architecture For Cooperative Federalism, Philip J. Weiser
Publications
In this Article, Professor Weiser calls for a new conception of federal-state relations to justify existing political practice under cooperative federalism regulatory programs. In particular, Professor Weiser highlights how Congress favors cooperative federalism programs--that combine federal and state authority in creative ways--and has rejected the dual federalism model of regulation--with separate spheres of state and federal authority that current judicial rhetoric often celebrates. Given the increasing dissonance between prevailing political practice and judicial rhetoric, courts will ultimately have to confront three fault lines for current cooperative federalism programs: the legal source of authority for state agencies to implement federal law, …
That The Laws Shall Bind Equally On All: Congressional And Executive Roles In Applying Laws To Congress, Harold H. Bruff
That The Laws Shall Bind Equally On All: Congressional And Executive Roles In Applying Laws To Congress, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
No abstract provided.
Specialized Courts In Administrative Law, Harold H. Bruff
Specialized Courts In Administrative Law, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
No abstract provided.
Separation Of Powers Under The Texas Constitution, Harold H. Bruff
Separation Of Powers Under The Texas Constitution, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
No abstract provided.
Public Programs, Private Deciders: The Constitutionality Of Arbitration In Federal Programs, Harold H. Bruff
Public Programs, Private Deciders: The Constitutionality Of Arbitration In Federal Programs, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
No abstract provided.
Independent Counsel And The Constitution, Harold H. Bruff
Independent Counsel And The Constitution, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
No abstract provided.
On The Constitutional Status Of The Administrative Agencies, Harold H. Bruff
On The Constitutional Status Of The Administrative Agencies, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
No abstract provided.
Judicial Review And The President's Statutory Powers, Harold H. Bruff
Judicial Review And The President's Statutory Powers, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
No abstract provided.
Congressional Control Of Administrative Regulation: A Study Of Legislative Vetoes, Harold H. Bruff, Ernest Gellhorn
Congressional Control Of Administrative Regulation: A Study Of Legislative Vetoes, Harold H. Bruff, Ernest Gellhorn
Publications
Several administrative programs contain provisions allowing Congress to veto agency rules, and there is now a bill before Congress to extend this veto power to all agency rulemaking. In this Article, Professor Bruff and Dean Gellhorn analyze the histories of five federal programs subject to the legislative veto to determine the effect of the veto on the rulemaking process and on the relationships between the branches of government. Extrapolating from this practical experience, they suggest that a general legislative veto is unlikely to increase the overall efficiency of the administrative process, may impede the achievement of reasoned decisionmaking based on …
Presidential Exemption From Mandatory Retirement Of Members Of The Independent Regulatory Commissions, Harold H. Bruff
Presidential Exemption From Mandatory Retirement Of Members Of The Independent Regulatory Commissions, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
No abstract provided.