Law Commons^™

Depoliticizing Judicial Review Of Agency Rulemaking, Scott A. Keller

Washington Law Review

Administrative law doctrines for reviewing agency rulemaking, such as the Supreme Court’s dicta in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. and the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine, give judges significant discretion to invalidate agency rules. Many commentators recognize that this discretion politicizes judicial review of agency rulemaking, as judges appointed by a president of one political party are more likely to invalidate agency rules promulgated under the presidential administration of a different political party. Unelected judges, though, should not be able to use indeterminate administrative law doctrines to invalidate agency rules on the basis …

A New Deal For End Users? Lessons From A French Innovation In The Regulation Of Interoperability, Jane K. Winn, Nicolas Jondet

Articles

In 2007, France created the Regulatory Authority for Technical Measures (lAutoritj de Rdgulation des Mesures Techniques or ARMT), an independent regulatory agency charged with promoting the interoperability of digital media distributed with embedded "technical protection measures" (TPM), also known as "digital rights management" technologies (DRM). ARMT was established in part to rectify what French lawmakers perceived as an imbalance in the rights of copyright owners and end users created when the European Copyright Directive (EUCD) was transposed into French law as the "Loi sur le Droit d'Auteur et les Droits Voisins dans la Société de l'Information" (DADVSI).

ARMT is both …

Proposing A Place For Politics In Arbitrary And Capricious Review, Kathryn A. Watts

Articles

Current conceptions of “arbitrary and capricious” review focus on whether agencies have adequately explained their decisions in statutory, factual, scientific, or otherwise technocratic terms. Courts, agencies, and scholars alike, accordingly, generally have accepted the notion that influences from political actors, including the President and Congress, cannot properly help to explain administrative action for purposes of arbitrary and capricious review. This means that agencies today tend to sweep political influences under the rug even when such influences offer the most rational explanation for the action.

This Article argues that this picture should change. Specifically, this Article argues for expanding current conceptions …