Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
-
- Regulation (3)
- APA (2)
- Administrative Law (2)
- Administrative Procedure Act (2)
- Administrative law (2)
-
- Common Law (2)
- Judicial Review (2)
- Originalism (2)
- Pragmatism (2)
- Purposivism (2)
- Regulatory (2)
- Stare Decisis (2)
- Textualism (2)
- Accountability (1)
- Agency rulemaking (1)
- Appointments Clause (1)
- Bureaucracy (1)
- Civil rights (1)
- Conflict of interest (1)
- Congress (1)
- Ethics (1)
- Freilich (Janet) (1)
- Government Misinformation Platforms (1)
- Government contractors (1)
- Government procurement (1)
- Government publications (1)
- Government-enabled misinformation (1)
- Humphrey's Executor (1)
- Immigration (1)
- Immigration enforcement (1)
Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Law
Revisiting Immigration Exceptionalism In Administrative Law, Christopher J. Walker
Revisiting Immigration Exceptionalism In Administrative Law, Christopher J. Walker
Reviews
With all the changes swirling in administrative law, one trend seems to be getting less attention than perhaps it should: the death of regulatory exceptionalism in administrative law. For decades, many regulatory fields—such as tax, intellectual property, and antitrust—viewed themselves as exceptional, such that the normal rules of the road in administrative law do not apply. The Supreme Court and the lower courts have increasingly rejected such exceptionalism in many regulatory contexts, emphasizing that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and related administrative law doctrines are the default rules unless Congress has clearly chosen to depart from them by statute in …
Interpreting The Administrative Procedure Act: A Literature Review, Christopher J. Walker, Scott Macguidwin
Interpreting The Administrative Procedure Act: A Literature Review, Christopher J. Walker, Scott Macguidwin
Law & Economics Working Papers
The modern administrative state has changed substantially since Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946. Yet Congress has done little to modernize the APA in those intervening seventy-seven years. That does not mean the APA has remained unchanged. Federal courts have substantially refashioned the APA’s requirements for administrative procedure and judicial review of agency action. Perhaps unsurprisingly, calls to return to either the statutory text or the original meaning (or both) have intensified in recent years. “APA originalism” projects abound.
As part of the Notre Dame Law Review’s Symposium on the History of the Ad- ministrative Procedure Act …
Trust, Trustworthiness, And Misinformation Shared By The Government, Nicholson Price Ii
Trust, Trustworthiness, And Misinformation Shared By The Government, Nicholson Price Ii
Reviews
Where does trusted information come from? In a world of misinformation, where everyone is skeptical of everything, at least we can rely on expert, authoritative government agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency, the Centers for Disease Control, the Patent Office, and the Food and Drug Administration, right? Right?
Outsourcing Agency Rulemaking, Christopher J. Walker
Outsourcing Agency Rulemaking, Christopher J. Walker
Reviews
When it comes to understanding the political dynamics of agency rulemaking, the place to start is Rachel Potter’s book Bending the Rules: Procedural Politicking in the Bureaucracy, about which the Yale Journal on Regulation published a blog symposium in 2019. Through a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods, Potter explores how agency officials—both career civil servants and political appointees—play a role in the rulemaking process and leverage procedural rules to help advance their preferred policy outcomes.
Responding To The New Major Questions Doctrine, Christopher J. Walker
Responding To The New Major Questions Doctrine, Christopher J. Walker
Articles
The new major questions doctrine has been a focal point in administrative law scholarship and litigation over the past year. One overarching theme is that the doctrine is a deregulatory judicial power grab from both the executive and legislative branches. It limits the president’s ability to pursue a major policy agenda through regulation. And in the current era of political polarization, Congress is unlikely to have the capacity to pass legislation to provide the judicially required clear authorization for agencies to regulate major questions. Especially considering the various “vetogates” imposed by Senate and House rules, it is fair to conclude …
Assessing Visions Of Democracy In Regulatory Policymaking, Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Christopher J. Walker
Assessing Visions Of Democracy In Regulatory Policymaking, Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Christopher J. Walker
Articles
Motivated in part by Congress’s failure to legislate, presidents in recent years seem to have turned even more to the regulatory process to make major policy. It is perhaps no coincidence that the feld of administrative law has similarly seen a resurgence of scholarship extolling the virtues of democratic accountability in the modern administrative state. Some scholars have even argued that bureaucracy is as much as if not more democratically legitimate than Congress, either in the aggregative or deliberative sense, or both.
Interpreting The Administrative Procedure Act: A Literature Review, Christopher J. Walker
Interpreting The Administrative Procedure Act: A Literature Review, Christopher J. Walker
Articles
The modern administrative state has changed substantially since Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946. Yet Congress has done little to modernize the APA in those intervening seventy-seven years. That does not mean the APA has remained unchanged. Federal courts have substantially refashioned the APA’s requirements for administrative procedure and judicial review of agency action. Perhaps unsurprisingly, calls to return to either the statutory text or the original meaning (or both) have intensified in recent years. “APA originalism” projects abound.
As part of the Notre Dame Law Review’s Symposium on the History of the Administrative Procedure Act and …
Congress's Anti-Removal Power, Christopher J. Walker, Aaron Nielson
Congress's Anti-Removal Power, Christopher J. Walker, Aaron Nielson
Articles
Statutory restrictions on presidential removal of agency leadership enable agencies to act independently from the White House. Yet since 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court has held two times that such restrictions are unconstitutional precisely because they prevent the President from controlling policymaking within the executive branch. Recognizing that a supermajority of the Justices now appears to reject or at least limit the principle from Humphrey’s Executor that Congress may prevent the President from removing agency officials based on policy disagreement, scholars increasingly predict that the Court will soon further weaken agency independence if not jettison it altogether.
This Article challenges …