Law Commons^™

The Constitutional (And Political) Safeguards Against Impeachment, Victoria Frances Nourse

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Will the Trump impeachments inspire a flurry of future presidential impeachments? Will the second Trump impeachment, which occurred after the President left office, spur impeachments of lesser, former government officials? These and other questions emerged during the 2022 Missouri Law Review Symposium and on the Senate floor during the Trump impeachment trials. I have argued that we can make an educated prognosis about these possibilities based on constitutional structure. I called this argument the “political safeguards” of impeachment in my recent book, The Impeachments of Donald Trump: An Introduction to Constitutional Argument. What I called political safeguards, invoking the …

What Consensus? Ideology, Politics And Elections Still Matter, Steven C. Salop

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article, which was prepared for an ABA Antitrust Section Panel, discusses the role of ideology and politics in antitrust enforcement and the impact of elections in the last twenty year on enforcement and policy at the federal antitrust agencies. The article explains the differences in antitrust ideologies and their impact on policy preferences. The article then uses a database of civil non-merger complaints by the DOJ and FTC over the last three Presidential administrations to analyze changes in the number, type and other characteristics of antitrust enforcement. It also discusses change in vertical merger enforcement and other antirust policies …

Of Law And The Revolution, Lama Abu-Odeh

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Egyptian revolution is proving to be a very legal one. That is not to say that the revolution’s demands have been legalized, nor that Egypt’s law has been revolutionized, rather, the forces that have come to the fore since the toppling of Mubarak in Feb 2011 have chosen law as the privileged form through which to bargain with each other. The density of the legal back and fro has been overwhelming: constitutional amendments, constitutional supplementary declarations, parliamentary laws, legislative amendments, military decrees, court trials, constitutional court decisions overturning laws passed, conflicting decisions from various courts, presidential decrees, emergency laws …

Mandatory Hpv Vaccination And Political Debate, Lawrence O. Gostin

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Vaccinations are among the most cost-effective and widely used public health interventions, but have provoked popular resistance, with compulsion framed as an unwarranted state interference. When the FDA approved a human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine in 2006, conservative religious groups strongly opposed a mandate, arguing it would condone pre-marital sex, undermine parental rights, and violate bodily integrity. Yet, Governor Rick Perry signed an executive order in 2007 making Texas the first state to enact a mandate — later revoked by the legislature.

Mandatory HPV vaccination reached the heights of presidential politics in a recent Republican debate. Calling the vaccine a "very …

Science, Politics, And Values: The Politicization Of Professional Practice Guidelines, Lawrence O. Gostin, John D. Kraemer

O'Neill Institute Papers

The Connecticut Attorney General’s recent allegations that the Infectious Disease Society of America violated antitrust law through its treatment guidelines for Lyme disease were neither based in sound science or appropriate legal judgment. Strong scientific evidence favors IDSA’s position that chronic infection with the etiologic agent of Lyme disease does not occur in the absence of objective signs of ongoing infection and that long-term antibiotic use to treat dubious infection, recommended in the quasi-scientific guidelines put forth by the International Lyme and Associated Diseases Society (ILADS), are of no benefit. In siding with ILADS and other chronic Lyme disease advocates, …

The Politics Of Administrative Law: New York's Anti-Bureaucracy Clause And The O'Brian-Wagner Campaign Of 1938, Daniel R. Ernst

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The controversy over administrative law in New York in 1938 was a decisive moment in the emergence of procedural Diceyism in the United States. On a stage crowded with partisan and legal performers, the politics of administrative law played out in two acts. In the first, the state's trial lawyers mounted a campaign to heighten judicial review of the state's administrative agencies. Their efforts culminated in the adoption of the anti-bureaucracy clause at the state constitutional convention when regular factions in the state's two major parties decided it would serve their purposes. New Yorkers rejected the measure after liberal politicians …

Impeachment: Advice And Dissent, Susan Low Bloch

Georgetown Law Faculty Lectures and Appearances

In this lecture, the author describes how she first met Professor William Van Alstyne at a Federalist Society debate at Wayne State Law School in Detroit. Their colleague, the late Professor Joe Grano, had invited them to discuss whether one can sue a sitting president. Of course, this debate was not merely academic. Paula Jones had begun her sexual harassment suit against President Clinton and the suit was on its way to the Supreme Court. They got together before the debate and walked around the campus. The author thought that the president could not be sued while in office. Although …

Constitutional Hardball, Mark V. Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

For the past several years I have been noticing a phenomenon that seems to me new in my lifetime as a scholar of constitutional law. I call the phenomenon constitutional hardball. This Essay develops the idea that there is such a practice, that there is a sense in which it is new, and that its emergence (or re-emergence) is interesting because it signals that political actors understand that they are in a position to put in place a new set of deep institutional arrangements of a sort I call a constitutional order. A shorthand sketch of constitutional hardball is this: …