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Articles 1 - 30 of 33
Full-Text Articles in Law
Sweetheart Deals, Deferred Prosecution, And Making A Mockery Of The Criminal Justice System: U.S. Corporate Dpas Rejected On Many Fronts, Peter Reilly
Faculty Scholarship
Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) are contracts negotiated between the federal government and defendants to address allegations of corporate misconduct without going to trial. The agreements are hailed as a model of speedy and efficient law enforcement, but also derided as making a “mockery” of America’s criminal justice system stemming from lenient deals being offered to some defendants. This Article questions why corporate DPAs are not given meaningful judicial review when such protection is required for other alternative dispute resolution (ADR) tools, including plea bargains, settlement agreements, and consent decrees. The Article also analyzes several cases in which federal district …
The Organization Of American States’ Model Law On Simplified Corporations, Francisco Reyes Villamizar
The Organization Of American States’ Model Law On Simplified Corporations, Francisco Reyes Villamizar
Journal of Civil Law Studies
Colombian Law 1258 of 2008 introduced the Simplified Corpo-ration (Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada or SAS). This type of business entity included modern corporate law features such as sim-plified incorporation proceedings, full-fledged limited liability for its shareholders, and broad freedom of contract for the definition of housekeeping and governance rules. It also reduced old-fashioned prohibitions pertaining to shareholders and managers activities and reduced transaction costs. The SAS’s “opt-in” approach also has allowed for private parties to draft the most suitable agreements. The enabling provisions of Law 1258 have been the starting point for the preparation of at least three Model Law …
The Public Cost Of Private Equity, William Magnuson
The Public Cost Of Private Equity, William Magnuson
William J. Magnuson
This Article presents a theory of the corporate governance costs of private equity. In doing so, it challenges the common view that private equity’s governance structure has resolved, or at least significantly mitigated, one of the fundamental tensions in corporate law, that is, the conflict between management and ownership. The Article argues that this widespread perception about the corporate governance benefits of private equity overlooks the many ways in which the private equity model, far from eliminating agency costs, in fact exacerbates them. These governance costs include compensation structures that incentivize excessive risk-taking, governance rights that provide investors with few …
Regulating Fintech, William Magnuson
Regulating Fintech, William Magnuson
William J. Magnuson
The financial crisis of 2008 has led to dramatic changes in the way that finance is regulated: the Dodd-Frank Act imposed broad and systemic regulation on the industry on a level not seen since the New Deal. But the financial regulatory reforms enacted since the crisis have been premised on an outdated idea of what financial services look like and how they are provided. Regulation has failed to take into account the rise of financial technology (or “fintech”) firms and the fundamental changes they have ushered in on a variety of fronts, from the way that banking works, to the …
Traceable Shares And Corporate Law, George S. Geis
Traceable Shares And Corporate Law, George S. Geis
Northwestern University Law Review
A healthy system of shareholder voting is crucial for any regime of corporate law. The proper allocation of governance power is subject to debate, of course, but the fitness of the underlying mechanism used to stuff the ballot boxes should concern everyone. Proponents of shareholder power, for instance, cannot argue for greater control if the legitimacy of the resulting tallies is suspect. And those who advocate for board deference do so on the bedrock of authority that reliable shareholder elections supposedly confer.
Unfortunately, our trust in the corporate franchise was forged during an era that predates modern complexities in the …
The Trouble With Corporate Conscience, James D. Nelson
The Trouble With Corporate Conscience, James D. Nelson
Vanderbilt Law Review
Accomplished corporate law scholars claim that modern businesses need an infusion of morality. Disappointed by conventional regulatory responses to recurring corporate scandal, these scholars argue that corporate conscience provides a more fruitful path to systemic economic reform. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, which held that for-profit businesses can claim religious exemptions from general laws, the Supreme Court gave this notion of corporate conscience added momentum. Emboldened by the Court's embrace of business goals extending beyond shareholder profit, proponents of a moralized marketplace now celebrate corporate conscience as an idea whose time has come. This Essay criticizes the leading arguments for …
The Diminishing Duty Of Loyalty, Julian Velasco
The Diminishing Duty Of Loyalty, Julian Velasco
Journal Articles
Fiduciary duties comprise an integral part of corporate law. It is generally understood that directors owe the corporation and its shareholders two fiduciary duties: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. Although both duties are firmly established in corporate law, they are not treated equally. It is generally understood that the duty of loyalty is enforced far more rigorously than the duty of care. The justification for this dichotomy is twofold. First, differential treatment is appropriate because of the relative urgencies of the underlying subject matter: loyalty issues pose greater risks than do care issues. Second, the deference …
Redefining Roles And Duties Of The Transactional Lawyer: A Narrative Approach, Lori D. Johnson
Redefining Roles And Duties Of The Transactional Lawyer: A Narrative Approach, Lori D. Johnson
St. John's Law Review
(Excerpt)
This Article posits that narrative theory can assist the transactional lawyer in walking this tightrope effectively and ethically.
Specifically, this Article proceeds to show that the use of narrative techniques, specifically those proposed by Walter Fisher, can assist transactional lawyers: (1) in understanding their clients’ goals more fully; (2) in more effectively advancing their clients’ goals through persuasion; and (3) in creating complete, holistic documents to govern the proposed deal. As such, the appropriate use of narrative techniques and understanding of narrative theory can enhance the skills of transactional lawyers, and improve client outcomes.
This Article proceeds in three …
Trapped In A Metaphor: The Limited Implications Of Federalism For Corporate Governance, Robert B. Ahdieh
Trapped In A Metaphor: The Limited Implications Of Federalism For Corporate Governance, Robert B. Ahdieh
Robert B. Ahdieh
Trapped in a metaphor articulated at the founding of modern corporate law, the study of corporate governance has - for some thirty years - been asking the wrong questions. Rather than a singular race among states, whether to the bottom or the top, the synthesis of William Cary and Ralph Winter’s famous exchange is better understood as two competitions, each serving distinct normative ends. Managerial competition advances the project that has motivated corporate law since Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means - effective regulation of the separation of ownership and control. State competition, by contrast, does not promote a race to …
The (Misunderstood) Genius Of American Corporate Law, Robert B. Ahdieh
The (Misunderstood) Genius Of American Corporate Law, Robert B. Ahdieh
Robert B. Ahdieh
In this Reply, I respond to comments by Bill Bratton, Larry Cunningham, and Todd Henderson on my recent paper - Trapped in a Metaphor: The Limited Implications of Federalism for Corporate Governance. I begin by reiterating my basic thesis - that state competition should be understood to have little consequence for corporate governance, if (as charter competition's advocates assume) capital-market-driven managerial competition is also at work. I then consider some of the thoughtful critiques of this claim, before suggesting ways in which the comments highlight just the kind of comparative institutional analysis my paper counsels. Rather than a stark choice …
From "Federalization" To "Mixed Governance" In Corporate Law: A Defense Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Robert B. Ahdieh
From "Federalization" To "Mixed Governance" In Corporate Law: A Defense Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Robert B. Ahdieh
Robert B. Ahdieh
Since the very moment of its adoption, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been subject to a litany of critiques, many of them seemingly well-placed. The almost universal condemnation of the Act for its asserted 'federalization' of corporate law, by contrast, deserves short shrift. Though widely invoked - and blithely accepted - dissection of this argument against the legislation shows it to rely either on flawed assumptions or on normative preferences not ordinarily acknowledged (or perhaps even accepted) by those who criticize Sarbanes-Oxley for its federalization of state corporate law.
Once we appreciate as much, we can begin by replacing …
Uncharted Waters? Legal Ethics And The Benefit Corporation, Joseph Pileri
Uncharted Waters? Legal Ethics And The Benefit Corporation, Joseph Pileri
St. Mary's Journal on Legal Malpractice & Ethics
Corporate law norms are reflected in lawyers’ ethical duties. The enactment of benefit corporation legislation across the country signals a legislative acknowledgment that corporate law can serve as a public, rather than a merely private, ordering mechanism. Benefit corporations expressly adopt a public benefit as a legal purpose of the enterprise. While many have written about this important development with respect to corporate fiduciary law, this essay is the first to explore the professional and ethical responsibility of lawyers representing benefit corporations. In the last century, as scholars and courts drove an understanding of corporate law that elevated the interests …
The Public Cost Of Private Equity, William Magnuson
The Public Cost Of Private Equity, William Magnuson
Faculty Scholarship
This Article presents a theory of the corporate governance costs of private equity. In doing so, it challenges the common view that private equity’s governance structure has resolved, or at least significantly mitigated, one of the fundamental tensions in corporate law, that is, the conflict between management and ownership. The Article argues that this widespread perception about the corporate governance benefits of private equity overlooks the many ways in which the private equity model, far from eliminating agency costs, in fact exacerbates them. These governance costs include compensation structures that incentivize excessive risk-taking, governance rights that provide investors with few …
Regulating Fintech, William Magnuson
Regulating Fintech, William Magnuson
Faculty Scholarship
The financial crisis of 2008 has led to dramatic changes in the way that finance is regulated: the Dodd-Frank Act imposed broad and systemic regulation on the industry on a level not seen since the New Deal. But the financial regulatory reforms enacted since the crisis have been premised on an outdated idea of what financial services look like and how they are provided. Regulation has failed to take into account the rise of financial technology (or “fintech”) firms and the fundamental changes they have ushered in on a variety of fronts, from the way that banking works, to the …
The Diminishing Duty Of Loyalty, Julian Velasco
The Diminishing Duty Of Loyalty, Julian Velasco
Washington and Lee Law Review
Fiduciary duties comprise an integral part of corporate law. It is generally understood that directors owe the corporation and its shareholders two fiduciary duties: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. Although both duties are firmly established in corporate law, they are not treated equally. It is generally understood that the duty of loyalty is enforced far more rigorously than the duty of care. The justification for this dichotomy is twofold. First, differential treatment is appropriate because of the relative urgencies of the underlying subject matter: loyalty issues pose greater risks than do care issues. Second, the deference …
Justice Deferred Is Justice Denied: We Must End Our Failed Experiment In Deferring Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, Peter Reilly
Justice Deferred Is Justice Denied: We Must End Our Failed Experiment In Deferring Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, Peter Reilly
Peter R. Reilly
According to the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), deferred prosecution agreements are said to occupy an “important middle ground” between declining to prosecute on the one hand, and trials or guilty pleas on the other. A top DOJ official has declared that, over the last decade, the agreements have become a “mainstay” of white collar criminal law enforcement; a prominent criminal law professor calls their increased use part of the “biggest change in corporate law enforcement policy in the last ten years.”
However, despite deferred prosecution’s apparent rise in popularity among law enforcement officials, the article sets forth the argument …
Polishing Up Wisconsin's Fiduciary Duties In Llc Law To Attract New Suitors, Collin D. Brunk
Polishing Up Wisconsin's Fiduciary Duties In Llc Law To Attract New Suitors, Collin D. Brunk
Marquette Law Review
None
The Evolution Of Entrepreneurial Finance: A New Typology, J. Brad Bernthal
The Evolution Of Entrepreneurial Finance: A New Typology, J. Brad Bernthal
Publications
There has been an explosion in new types of startup finance instruments. Whereas twenty years ago preferred stock dominated the field, startup companies and investors now use at least eight different instruments—six of which have only become widely used in the last decade. Legal scholars have yet to reflect upon the proliferation of instrument types in the aggregate. Notably missing is a way to organize instruments into a common framework that highlights their similarities and differences.
This Article makes four contributions. First, it catalogues the variety of startup investment forms. I describe novel instruments, such as revenue-based financing, which remain …
Quacks Or Bootleggers: Who’S Really Regulating Hedge Funds?, Jeremy Kidd
Quacks Or Bootleggers: Who’S Really Regulating Hedge Funds?, Jeremy Kidd
Washington and Lee Law Review
Influential scholars of corporate law have questioned previous federal interventions into corporate governance, calling it quackery. Invoking images of medical malpractice, these critiques have argued persuasively that Congress, in responding to crises, makes policy that disrupts efficient private rules and established state laws. This Article applies the Bootleggers and Baptists theory to show that Dodd–Frank’s hedge fund rules are more than just negligent or reckless, but designed to benefit special interests that compete with the hedge fund model. Those rules offer no solutions to any real or perceived risks arising from hedge fund investing, but might offer an advantage to …
Unintended Agency Problems: How International Bureaucracies Are Built And Empowered, Anu Bradford, Stavros Gadinis, Katerina Linos
Unintended Agency Problems: How International Bureaucracies Are Built And Empowered, Anu Bradford, Stavros Gadinis, Katerina Linos
Faculty Scholarship
The ground underneath the entire liberal international order is rapidly shifting. Institutions as diverse as the European Union, International Monetary Fund, United Nations, and World Trade Organization are under major threat. These institutions reflect decades of political investments in a world order where institutionalized cooperation was considered an essential cornerstone for peace and prosperity. Going beyond the politics of the day, this Article argues that the seeds of today’s discontent with the international order were in fact sown back when these institutions were first created. We show how states initially design international institutions with features that later haunt them in …
Corporate Governance, Capital Markets, And Securities Law, Adam C. Pritchard
Corporate Governance, Capital Markets, And Securities Law, Adam C. Pritchard
Book Chapters
This chapter explores the dividing line between corporate governance and securities law from both historical and institutional perspectives. Section 2 examines the origins of the dividing line between securities law and corporate governance in the United States, as well as the efforts of the SEC to push against that boundary. That history sets the stage for section 3, which broadens the inquiry by examining the institutional connections between capital markets and corporate governance. Are there practical limits to the connection between securities law and corporate governance? The US again illustrates the point, as Congress has increasingly crossed the traditional boundary …
Center-Left Politics And Corporate Governance: What Is The 'Progressive' Agenda?, Christopher Bruner
Center-Left Politics And Corporate Governance: What Is The 'Progressive' Agenda?, Christopher Bruner
Scholarly Works
For as long as corporations have existed, debates have persisted among scholars, judges, and policymakers regarding how best to describe their form and function as a positive matter, and how best to organize relations among their various stakeholders as a normative matter. This is hardly surprising given the economic and political stakes involved with control over vast and growing "corporate" resources, and it has become commonplace to speak of various approaches to corporate law in decidedly political terms. In particular, on the fundamental normative issue of the aims to which corporate decision-making ought to be directed, shareholder-centric conceptions of the …
Does Shareholder Voting Matter? Evidence From The Takeover Market, Paul Mason, Usha Rodrigues, Mike Stegemoller, Steven Utke
Does Shareholder Voting Matter? Evidence From The Takeover Market, Paul Mason, Usha Rodrigues, Mike Stegemoller, Steven Utke
Scholarly Works
Voting rights are a basic shareholder-protection mechanism. Outside of the core voting requirements state law imposes (election of directors and votes on fundamental changes), federal law grants shareholders additional voting rights. But these rights introduce concomitant costs into corporate governance. Each grant of a voting right thus invites the question: is the benefit achieved worth the cost the vote imposes?
The question is not merely a theoretical one. Recently the SEC, concerned about Nasdaq’s potential weakening of shareholder voting protections, has lamented that little evidence exists on the value of the shareholder vote. This Article provides that evidence. It examines …
Corporate Law Federalism In Historical Context: Comparing Canada And The United States, Camden Hutchison
Corporate Law Federalism In Historical Context: Comparing Canada And The United States, Camden Hutchison
All Faculty Publications
Although American and Canadian corporate law share many similarities, they are also marked by important institutional differences. Among the most notable are the differing roles of federal versus state/provincial policymaking in the two countries: While American corporate law has been deeply influenced by jurisdictional competition among the states, Canadian law has instead been shaped by federal legislative activity, as seen today in the standardizing influence of the Canada Business Corporations Act. These different institutional histories have led to distinct evolutionary paths, with important substantive consequences for contemporary corporate law. Despite considerable academic attention to the subject of corporate law federalism, …
Sexual Harassment And Corporate Law, Daniel Hemel, Dorothy S. Lund
Sexual Harassment And Corporate Law, Daniel Hemel, Dorothy S. Lund
Faculty Scholarship
The #MeToo movement has shaken corporate America in recent months, leading to the departures of several high-profile executives as well as sharp stock price declines at a number of firms. Investors have taken notice and taken action: Shareholders at more than a half dozen publicly traded companies have filed lawsuits since the start of 2017 alleging that corporate fiduciaries breached state law duties or violated federal securities laws in connection with sexual harassment scandals. Additional suits are likely in the coming months.
This Article examines the role of corporate and securities law in regulating and remedying workplace sexual misconduct. We …
Evolving Norms Of Corporate Social Responsibility: Lessons Learned From The European Union Directive On Non-Financial Reporting, Constance Z. Wagner
Evolving Norms Of Corporate Social Responsibility: Lessons Learned From The European Union Directive On Non-Financial Reporting, Constance Z. Wagner
All Faculty Scholarship
This article examines an important development in the field of corporate social responsibility, namely theadoption of a 2014 European Union Directive (“2014 EU Directive”) mandating non-financial reporting by certain large companies. Such disclosure has traditionally been provided by businesses on a voluntary basis, but the 2014 EU Directive reflects an emerging global trends toward mandatory reporting. Such trend emerged in response to the perceived low quantity and poor quality of information disclosed voluntarily onsocial and environmental topics of importance to corporate stakeholders. The author analyzes the history and development of policy and legislation on this issue both at the European …
Delaware's Retreat, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox
Delaware's Retreat, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
The 1980’s is appropriately considered the Golden Age of Delaware corporate law. Within that era, the Delaware courts won international attention by not just erecting the legal pillars that frame today’s corporate governance discourse but by interjecting a fresh perspective on the rights of owners and the prerogatives of managers. Four decisions stand out within a melodious chorus of great decisions of that era - Revlon , Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., and Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corporation. We refer collectively to the decisions as the Golden …
The Shifting Tides Of Merger Litigation, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Steven Davidoff Solomon, Randall S. Thomas
The Shifting Tides Of Merger Litigation, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Steven Davidoff Solomon, Randall S. Thomas
All Faculty Scholarship
In 2015, Delaware made several important changes to its laws concerning merger litigation. These changes, which were made in response to a perception that levels of merger litigation were too high and that a substantial proportion of merger cases were not providing value, raised the bar, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to win a lawsuit challenging a merger and more difficult for plaintiffs’ counsel to collect a fee award.
We study what has happened in the courts in response to these changes. We find that the initial effect of the changes has been to decrease the volume of merger …
Distributed Ledgers, Traceable Shares, And The Division Of Power In Corporate Law, Christopher M. Bruner
Distributed Ledgers, Traceable Shares, And The Division Of Power In Corporate Law, Christopher M. Bruner
Scholarly Works
Review of Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. __ by George S. Geis (forthcoming 2018)
Tournament Of Managers: Lessons From The Academic Leadership Market, Usha Rodrigues
Tournament Of Managers: Lessons From The Academic Leadership Market, Usha Rodrigues
Scholarly Works
Why do firms usually make, not buy, their chief executive officers (CEOs)? Public corporations hire their CEOs from within the firm 78% of the time. They do so although earlier studies have found no clear evidence that internal hires perform better than external ones. So why do firms prefer them? Few scholars have focused on this simple question.
The reason why firms favor internal candidates matters not only in its own right, but also for an overlooked reason: it informs the controversial question of executive compensation. Currently board-compensation committees look to peer benchmarks to set executive pay. But, taking cues …