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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Non-Merger Virtual Merger: Is Corporate Law Ready For Virtual Reality?, Stuart Cohn
The Non-Merger Virtual Merger: Is Corporate Law Ready For Virtual Reality?, Stuart Cohn
Stuart R. Cohn
The term virtual mergers describes the relatively recent phenomenon of companies entering into contractual arrangements that are functionally, but not legally, equivalent to mergers prescribed by corporate statutes. Virtual mergers usually involve the shared use of assets contributed by each of the companies. A central element of the transaction is that the two companies remain legally independent, each with its own directors, officers, and shareholders. The arrangements can usually be terminated by either party, allowing each company to return to the status quo ante or exercise buyout rights if contractually provided. Although virtual mergers have occurred among public companies in …
Exalting The Corporate Form Over Environmental Protection The Corporate Shell Game And The Enforcement Of Water Management Law In Florida, Mary Jane Angelo, Charles Lobdell, Tara Boonstra
Exalting The Corporate Form Over Environmental Protection The Corporate Shell Game And The Enforcement Of Water Management Law In Florida, Mary Jane Angelo, Charles Lobdell, Tara Boonstra
Mary Jane Angelo
Current laws in Florida afford substantial protection to the “people behind the corporations” (corporate principals) and generally do not allow environmental permitting agencies such as the water management districts to consider such people in their permitting or enforcement efforts. This article poses the question “Do existing corporate law principles of limited liability defeat the important public policy of water resource protection in Florida?” First, in Parts II and III, this article introduces the problem and provides an overview of Florida water management district permitting and enforcement authorities and processes. Next, in Part IV, this article explores the existing legal authorities …
Democracy In The Private Sector: The Rights Of Shareholders And Union Members, Michael Goldberg
Democracy In The Private Sector: The Rights Of Shareholders And Union Members, Michael Goldberg
Michael J Goldberg
In the years since Enron, there has been a lively debate over the value of shareholder democracy as a means to improve corporate performance and reduce the likelihood of future Enrons or Lehman Brothers. That debate has been enriched by comparative scholarship looking at corporate governance abroad, and comparing corporate governance with public government. This Article explores a different comparison, between corporations and their sometime adversaries across bargaining tables and picket lines – labor unions. More specifically, this article compares the regulation of corporate governance and the regulation of the internal affairs of unions, and the rights of shareholders and …
Director Nominations, Lawrence Hamermesh
Director Nominations, Lawrence Hamermesh
Lawrence A. Hamermesh
“I don't care who does the electing, so long as I get to do the nominating.” William M. (“Boss”) Tweed. Shareholder election of directors is widely accepted as an important tool in corporate governance. As Boss Tweed’s aphorism demonstrates, the shareholder’s ability to nominate director candidates should therefore also be deemed important. With ever-increasing shareholder activism and increased sensitivity on the part of management to the prospect of director election contests, the scope of the right to nominate and the scope of permissible limitations of that right are likely to come under increasing scrutiny. Yet corporate statutes are largely silent …
In Quest Of The Arbitration Trifecta, Or Closed Door Litigation?: The Delaware Arbitration Program, Thomas Stipanowich
In Quest Of The Arbitration Trifecta, Or Closed Door Litigation?: The Delaware Arbitration Program, Thomas Stipanowich
Thomas J. Stipanowich
The Delaware Arbitration Program established a procedure by which businesses can agree to have their disputes heard in an arbitration proceeding before a sitting judge of the state’s highly regarded Chancery Court. The Program arguably offers a veritable trifecta of procedural advantages for commercial parties, including expert adjudication, efficient case management and short cycle time and, above all, a proceeding cloaked in secrecy. It also may enhance the reputation of Delaware as the forum of choice for businesses. But the Program’s ambitious intermingling of public and private forums brings into play the longstanding tug-of-war between the traditional view of court …
Response, The Still-Elusive Quest To Make Sense Of Veil-Piercing, David Millon
Response, The Still-Elusive Quest To Make Sense Of Veil-Piercing, David Millon
David K. Millon
No abstract provided.
Networks Of Heightened Scrutiny In Corporate Law, Reza Dibadj
Networks Of Heightened Scrutiny In Corporate Law, Reza Dibadj
Reza Dibadj
This Article is a follow-up to a previous article, Networks of Fairness Review in Corporate Law (Fairness). After an overview of the fundamentals of the fairness standard and network theory, Fairness deployed network and statistical analyses to conduct an empirical study of the fairness doctrine as articulated by the Delaware Supreme Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery. This initial analysis focused on the fairness standard for one principal reason: it is considered to be the most plaintiff-friendly standard of review, in marked distinction to the well-known business judgment rule (BJR). But there are also four other prominent standards of …
From Incongruity To Cooperative Federalism, Reza Dibadj
From Incongruity To Cooperative Federalism, Reza Dibadj
Reza Dibadj
The conventional wisdom has been that state law governs internal affairs, and federal law governs disclosure. This reassuring construct, however, has little basis in today's reality. Left alone, states have not provided adequate shareholder protections: state securities laws were historically anemic, and the regulatory reach of state corporate law shrank under a prevailing contractarian ethos. As consequence, beginning in 1933, federal securities laws emerged to regulate many internal affairs. Curiously, however, as federal regulation has grown and become increasingly preemptive over the past decade, it has often decreased shareholder protections. As a consequence, some states have recently reversed course, using …
Delayering Corporate Law, Reza Dibadj
Delayering Corporate Law, Reza Dibadj
Reza Dibadj
Corporate law has become unnecessarily complicated. Despite the proliferation of laws, problems fester and scandals erupt. Something is wrong. This Article seeks to delayer corporate law - to strip it down to its essence - and after doing so, offer concrete suggestions for reform. It is a first step toward a new minimalist architecture for corporate law. The Article begins by arguing that the core of state corporate law - corporation statutes and fiduciary duties - currently offer precious little protection to shareholders. Contractarianism, manifested through enabling statues, reflects weak economics. Existing fiduciary duties are little more than rhetorical flourish. …
Director Communications And The Uneasy Relationship Between The Fiduciary Duty Of Disclosure And The Anti-Fraud Provisions Of The Federal Securities Laws, Jennifer O'Hare
Director Communications And The Uneasy Relationship Between The Fiduciary Duty Of Disclosure And The Anti-Fraud Provisions Of The Federal Securities Laws, Jennifer O'Hare
Jennifer O'Hare
This Article addresses a conflict between the fiduciary duty of disclosure under state law and the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. In the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Congress balanced the federal interest of discouraging frivolous securities litigation against the need of the states to regulate the conduct of corporate directors. In the Uniform Act, Congress preempted most state securities fraud class actions, but also specifically preserved state claims based on the fiduciary duty of disclosure as enunciated by the Delaware courts at the time of enactment. At that time, the Delaware courts had limited the …
Communitarianism In Corporate Law: Foundations And Law Reform Strategies, David Millon
Communitarianism In Corporate Law: Foundations And Law Reform Strategies, David Millon
David K. Millon
No abstract provided.
Paramount: The Mixed Merits Of Mush, Alan E. Garfield
Paramount: The Mixed Merits Of Mush, Alan E. Garfield
Alan E Garfield
The Article critiques the Delaware Supreme Court’s 1990 decision, Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc. It argues that Paramount left no clear standards in its wake. While the decision seemed to lean in favor of more managerial discretion in the takeover context, it was not clear how far it leaned, or how closely tied the court’s reasoning was to the peculiar facts of the case. While other commentators critiqued Paramount for its management bias, this article instead focuses on the decision’s murkiness. It considers the merits of moving takeover jurisprudence away from the clearer standards that had been evolving in …