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Articles 1 - 10 of 10
Full-Text Articles in Law
Tying Meets The New Institutional Economics: Farewell To The Chimera Of Forcing, Alan J. Meese
Tying Meets The New Institutional Economics: Farewell To The Chimera Of Forcing, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
The Team Production Theory Of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment, Alan J. Meese
The Team Production Theory Of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Raising Rivals' Costs: Can The Agencies Do More Good Than Harm?, Alan J. Meese
Raising Rivals' Costs: Can The Agencies Do More Good Than Harm?, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Monopoly Bundling In Cyberspace: How Many Products Does Microsoft Sell?, Alan J. Meese
Monopoly Bundling In Cyberspace: How Many Products Does Microsoft Sell?, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Price Theory, Competition, And The Rule Of Reason, Alan J. Meese
Price Theory, Competition, And The Rule Of Reason, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
Challenging traditional antitrust jurisprudence, Professor Alan J. Meese argues that the present structure of Rule of Reason analysis, applied pursuant to Standard Oil v. United States, has become outdated. The Rule of Reason as currently applied by the courts rests upon neoclassical price theory, an economic paradigm that assumes that legitimate competition consists of unbridled technological rivalry, unconstrained by nonstandard contracts. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has begun to apply a competing paradigm- Transaction Cost Economics-when determining whether a contract is unreasonable "per se" or instead deserving of Rule of Reason scrutiny. Professor Meese argues that Transaction Cost Economics more …
Liberty And Antitrust In The Formative Era, Alan J. Meese
Liberty And Antitrust In The Formative Era, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Limitations On Corporate Speech: Protection For Shareholders Or Abridgement Of Expression?, Alan J. Meese
Limitations On Corporate Speech: Protection For Shareholders Or Abridgement Of Expression?, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Don't Disintegrate Microsoft (Yet), Alan J. Meese
Debunking The Purchaser Welfare Account Of Section 2 Of The Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us A Total Welfare Standard And Why We Should Keep It, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
The last several years have seen a vigorous debate among antitrust scholars and practitionersa bout the appropriates tandardf or evaluating the conduct of monopolists under section 2 of the Sherman Act. While most of the debate over possible standards has focused on the empirical question of each standard's economic utility, this Article undertakes a somewhat different task: It examines the normative benchmark that courts have actually chosen when adjudicating section 2 cases. This Article explores three possible benchmarks-producer welfare, purchaser welfare, and total welfare-and concludes that courts have opted for a total welfare normative approach to section 2 since the …
Antitrust Balancing In A (Near) Coasean World: The Case Of Franchise Tying Contracts, Alan J. Meese
Antitrust Balancing In A (Near) Coasean World: The Case Of Franchise Tying Contracts, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.