Law Commons^™

Justice Stevens: The First Three Terms, George C. Lamb, Iii, Charles L. Schlumberger, D. J. Simonetti, James D. Spratt Jr., Joel R. Tew, Douglas W. Ey, Jr. Special Projects Editor

Vanderbilt Law Review

This Special Project undertakes an examination of Justice Stevens' Supreme Court opinions in an effort to identify his philosophical orientations, to evaluate the consistency of his views, and to determine the extent to which he has developed workable analytical methods. To achieve these goals, Justice Stevens' opinions are examined in three contexts: first, the area of federal-state relations,including commerce clause and supremacy clause questions; second, the individual rights area, emphasizing criminal constitutional and first amendment issues, and problems of fifth and fourteenth amendment analysis; and third, questions concerning the proper role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional scheme. Even …

The Due Process Mandate And The Constitutionality Of Admiralty Arrests And Attachments Pursuant To Supplemental Rules B And C, Jon L. Goodman

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

In the past decade, the area of procedural due process, including traditional doctrines of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, has undergone a constitutional facelift. As a result, two of admiralty's most extraordinary features--maritime attachment and garnishment and actions in rem--have been questioned from a constitutional standpoint.

The United States Supreme Court inaugurated the new era with its decision in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. In that case, the Court first began changing its procedural due process philosophy by broadening its conception of constitutionally protected forms of property. Having narrowly addressed itself to the question of what constitute constitutionally …

Reason Of Slavery: Understanding The Judicial Role In The Peculiar Institution, A. E. Keir Nash

Vanderbilt Law Review

The results most relevant to the concerns of this Article are of course the effects upon how we judge the judges-for almost always we are sufficiently Whiggish to attempt such a judgment, either explicitly or implicitly. At times the consequence of so summing can be to imagine that one catches the judicial conscience by asking questions phrased as Sentence D's query, whether the judges"collaborated" in a system of racial oppression. When we put the question this way, two unfortunate things happen. First, we create a verbal and historical muddle, for if anything ought to be clear by now it is …