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- Bulletin Articles (4)
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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Education
There Is Always An Iceberg, Valerie Lucus-Mcewen Cem, Cbcp
There Is Always An Iceberg, Valerie Lucus-Mcewen Cem, Cbcp
Valerie Lucus-McEwen CEM CBCP
No abstract provided.
This Ain't The Same Cert, Valerie Lucus-Mcewen Cem, Cbcp
This Ain't The Same Cert, Valerie Lucus-Mcewen Cem, Cbcp
Valerie Lucus-McEwen CEM CBCP
No abstract provided.
Culturally Responsive Counseling: What To Consider?, Teresa A. Smith
Culturally Responsive Counseling: What To Consider?, Teresa A. Smith
Teresa A. Smith
Understanding differences
Fema Deputy Administrator Challenges Emergency Managers, Valerie Lucus-Mcewen Cem, Cbcp
Fema Deputy Administrator Challenges Emergency Managers, Valerie Lucus-Mcewen Cem, Cbcp
Valerie Lucus-McEwen CEM CBCP
No abstract provided.
The Challenge Is High, Valerie Lucus-Mcewen Cem, Cbcp
The Challenge Is High, Valerie Lucus-Mcewen Cem, Cbcp
Valerie Lucus-McEwen CEM CBCP
No abstract provided.
Cultural Identity Everybody Has One, Teresa A. Smith
Cultural Identity Everybody Has One, Teresa A. Smith
Teresa A. Smith
Rituals and traditions influence on cultural identity development.
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz
This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …