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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Management Information Systems
Interaction Between Manufacturer's Wholesale Pricing And Retailers’ Price-Matching Guarantees, Arcan Nalca, Gangshu (George) Cai
Interaction Between Manufacturer's Wholesale Pricing And Retailers’ Price-Matching Guarantees, Arcan Nalca, Gangshu (George) Cai
Information Systems and Analytics
In practice, many retailers employ price-matching guarantees (PMGs), committing to meet the price of an identical product at a competitor's outlet. Despite the profound linkage between retailers and manufacturers, existing literature has predominantly explored retailers' PMGs without contemplating the influence of manufacturers' wholesale pricing strategies. Employing a supply chain model comprising one manufacturer and two retailers, we scrutinize the implications of wholesale pricing—uniform or discriminatory—on supply chain members and consumers when retailers have the option to extend PMGs. Our analysis uncovers that retailers refrain from offering PMGs when the manufacturer is granted the discretion to set discriminatory wholesale prices—even if …
Online Manufacturer Referral To Heterogeneous Retailers, Hao Wu, Gangshu (George) Cai, Jian Chen, Chwen Sheu
Online Manufacturer Referral To Heterogeneous Retailers, Hao Wu, Gangshu (George) Cai, Jian Chen, Chwen Sheu
Information Systems and Analytics
Since the development of the Internet, thousands of manufacturers have been referring consumers visiting their websites to some or all of their retailers. Through a model with one manufacturer and two heterogeneous retailers, we investigate whether it is an equilibrium for the manufacturer to refer consumers exclusively to a retailer or nonexclusively to both retailers. Our analysis indicates that nonexclusive referral is the manufacturer's equilibrium choice if the referral segment market size is sufficiently large; otherwise, exclusive referral is the equilibrium choice. In exclusive referral, the manufacturer would refer consumers to the more cost-efficient and smaller retailer. In the presence …
Exclusive Channels And Revenue Sharing In A Complementary Goods Market, Gangshu (George) Cai, Yue Dai, Sean X. Zhou
Exclusive Channels And Revenue Sharing In A Complementary Goods Market, Gangshu (George) Cai, Yue Dai, Sean X. Zhou
Information Systems and Analytics
This paper evaluates the joint impact of exclusive channels and revenue sharing on suppliers and retailers in a hybrid duopoly common retailer and exclusive channel model. The model bridges the gap in the literature on hybrid multichannel supply chains with bilateral complementary products and services with or without revenue sharing. The analysis indicates that, without revenue sharing, the suppliers are reluctant to form exclusive deals with the retailers; thus, no equilibrium results. With revenue sharing from the retailers to the suppliers, it can be an equilibrium strategy for the suppliers and retailers to form exclusive deals. Bargaining solutions are provided …
Channel Selection And Coordination In Dual-Channel Supply Chains, Gangshu (George) Cai
Channel Selection And Coordination In Dual-Channel Supply Chains, Gangshu (George) Cai
Information Systems and Analytics
This paper investigates the influence of channel structures and channel coordination on the supplier, the retailer, and the entire supply chain in the context of two single-channel and two dual-channel supply chains. We extensively study two Pareto zone concepts: channel-adding Pareto zone and contract-implementing Pareto zone. In the channel-adding Pareto zone, both the supplier and the retailer benefit from adding a new channel to the traditional single-channel supply chain. In the contract-implementing Pareto zone, it is mutually beneficial for the supplier and the retailer to utilize the proposed contract coordination policy. The analysis suggests the preference lists of the supplier …