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Corporate Finance Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Singapore Management University

2015

Transparency

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Corporate Finance

Segment Disclosure Transparency And Internal Capital Market Efficiency: Evidence From Sfas No. 131, Young Jun Cho Sep 2015

Segment Disclosure Transparency And Internal Capital Market Efficiency: Evidence From Sfas No. 131, Young Jun Cho

Research Collection School of Accountancy

Using the adoption of SFAS 131, I examine the effect of segment disclosure transparency on internal capital market efficiency. SFAS 131 requires firms to define segments as internally viewed by managers, thereby improving the transparency of managerial actions in internal capital allocation. I find that diversified firms that improved segment disclosure transparency by changing segment definitions upon adoption of SFAS 131 experienced an improvement in capital allocation efficiency in internal capital markets after the adoption of SFAS 131. In addition, I find that the improvement in internal capital market efficiency was greater for firms that suffered more severe agency problems …


Opaque Financial Reporting Due To Unemployment Concerns, Jeffrey Ng, Tharindra Ranasinghe, Guifeng Shi, Holly I. Yang Aug 2015

Opaque Financial Reporting Due To Unemployment Concerns, Jeffrey Ng, Tharindra Ranasinghe, Guifeng Shi, Holly I. Yang

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

This paper examines the link between rank-and-file employees’ unemployment concerns and financial reporting opacity. Following Agrawal and Matsa (JFE, 2013), we use exogenous variations in state unemployment insurance benefits to capture changes to unemployment concerns. We find that when unemployment concerns are lower, there is less opaque financial reporting. This relation is stronger when workers face higher unemployment risk, labor union participation is high, and executives have higher equity incentives. Using Tobin’s Q to capture firm value, we also find that the economic rationale to engage in opaque financial reporting reduces when unemployment benefits are high. Our findings suggest that …


Opaque Financial Reporting Due To Unemployment Concerns, Jeffrey Ng, Tharindra Ranasinghe, Guifeng Shi, Holly I. Yang Jul 2015

Opaque Financial Reporting Due To Unemployment Concerns, Jeffrey Ng, Tharindra Ranasinghe, Guifeng Shi, Holly I. Yang

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

This paper examines the link between rank-and-file employees’ unemployment concerns and financial reporting opacity. Following Agrawal and Matsa (JFE, 2013), we use exogenous variations in state unemployment insurance benefits to capture changes to unemployment concerns. We find that when unemployment concerns are lower, there is less opaque financial reporting. This relation is stronger when workers face higher unemployment risk, labor union participation is high, and executives have higher equity incentives. Using Tobin’s Q to capture firm value, we also find that the economic rationale to engage in opaque financial reporting reduces when unemployment benefits are high. Our findings suggest that …