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Full-Text Articles in Corporate Finance
A State-Stewardship View On Executive Compensation, Hao Liang, Luc Renneboog, Sunny Li Sun
A State-Stewardship View On Executive Compensation, Hao Liang, Luc Renneboog, Sunny Li Sun
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We take a state-stewardship view on corporate governance and executive compensation in economies with strong political involvement, where state-appointed managers act as responsible ‘stewards’ rather than ‘agents’ of the state. We test this view on China and find that Chinese managers are remunerated not for maximizing equity value but for increasing the value of state-owned assets. Managerial compensation depends on political connections and prestige, and on the firms’ contribution to political goals. These effects were attenuated since the market-oriented governance reform. In a social welfare perspective, such compensation stimulates not the maximization of shareholder value but the preservation of the …
Ceo Contractual Protection And Managerial Short-Termism, Xia Chen, Qiang Cheng, Alvis K. Lo, Xin Wang
Ceo Contractual Protection And Managerial Short-Termism, Xia Chen, Qiang Cheng, Alvis K. Lo, Xin Wang
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
How to address managerial short-termism is an important issue for companies, regulators, and researchers. We examine the effect of CEO contractual protection, in the form of employment agreements and severance pay agreements, on managerial short-termism. We find that firms with CEO contractual protection are less likely to cut R&D expenditures to avoid earnings decreases and are less likely to engage in real earnings management. The effect of CEO contractual protection is both statistically and economically significant. We further find that this effect increases with the duration and monetary strength of CEO contractual protection. The cross-sectional analyses indicate that the effect …