Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons™
Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
-
- Law (12)
- Antitrust and Trade Regulation (11)
- Social and Behavioral Sciences (8)
- Economics (7)
- Law and Economics (7)
-
- Courts (5)
- Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration (5)
- Economic Policy (4)
- Industrial Organization (3)
- Intellectual Property Law (3)
- Law and Society (3)
- Litigation (3)
- Technology and Innovation (3)
- Business Administration, Management, and Operations (2)
- Business Organizations Law (2)
- Economic History (2)
- Economic Theory (2)
- Legal History (2)
- Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation (2)
- Political Economy (2)
- Public Economics (2)
- Social Welfare (2)
- Social Welfare Law (2)
- American Politics (1)
- Banking and Finance Law (1)
- Communication (1)
- Communication Technology and New Media (1)
- Communications Law (1)
- Institution
- Publication Year
Articles 1 - 13 of 13
Full-Text Articles in Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics
Leniency Inflation, Cartel Damages, And Criminalization, Catarina Marvao, Giancarlo Spagnolo
Leniency Inflation, Cartel Damages, And Criminalization, Catarina Marvao, Giancarlo Spagnolo
Articles
We revisit the pros and cons of introducing cartel criminalization in the EU. We document the recent EU “leniency inflation”, whereby leniency has been increasingly awarded to many (or all) cartel members, which softens the “courthouse race” effect. Coupled with the insufficient protection of leniency applicants from damages (2014 Damages Directive), it may have led to a decrease in leniency applications and cartel convictions. Given the current level of fines, criminalization may have to be introduced. We then explore US criminal sanctions (1990–2015) to highlight potential areas of concern for EU policymakers, of which recidivism appears to be a significant …
The Rule Of Reason, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Rule Of Reason, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Antitrust’s rule of reason was born out of a thirty-year (1897-1927) division among Supreme Court Justices about the proper way to assess multi-firm restraints on competition. By the late 1920s the basic contours of the rule for restraints among competitors was roughly established. Antitrust policy toward vertical restraints remained much more unstable, however, largely because their effects were so poorly understood.
This article provides a litigation field guide for antitrust claims under the rule of reason – or more precisely, for situations when application of the rule of reason is likely. At the time pleadings are drafted and even up …
Progressive Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Progressive Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Several American political candidates and administrations have both run and served under the “progressive” banner for more than a century, right through the 2016 election season. For the most part these have pursued interventionist antitrust policies, reflecting a belief that markets are fragile and in need of repair, that certain interest groups require greater protection, or in some cases that antitrust policy is an extended arm of regulation. This paper argues that most of this progressive antitrust policy was misconceived, including that reflected in the 2016 antitrust plank of the Democratic Party. The progressive state is best served by a …
Appraising Merger Efficiencies, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Appraising Merger Efficiencies, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Mergers of business firms violate the antitrust laws when they threaten to lessen competition, which generally refers to a price increase resulting from a reduction in output. However, a merger that threatens competition may also enable the post-merger firm to reduce its costs or improve its product. Attitudes toward mergers are heavily driven by assumptions about efficiency gains. If mergers of competitors never produced efficiency gains but simply reduced the number of competitors, a strong presumption against them would be warranted. We tolerate most mergers because of a background, highly generalized belief that most or at least many produce cost …
Antitrust Balancing, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust Balancing, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Antitrust litigation often confronts situations where effects point in both directions. Judges sometimes describe the process of evaluating these factors as “balancing.” In its e-Books decision the Second Circuit believed that the need to balance is what justifies application of the rule of reason. In Microsoft the D.C. Circuit stated that “courts routinely apply a…balancing approach” under which “the plaintiff must demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm…outweighs the procompetitive benefit.” But then it decided the case without balancing anything.
The term “balancing” is a very poor label for what courts actually do in these cases. Balancing requires that two offsetting effects …
Merger Settlement And Enforcement Policy For Optimal Deterrence And Maximum Welfare, Steven C. Salop
Merger Settlement And Enforcement Policy For Optimal Deterrence And Maximum Welfare, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Merger enforcement today relies on settlements more than litigation to resolve anti-competitive concerns. The impact of settlement policy on welfare and the proper goals of settlement policy are highly controversial. Some argue that gun-shy agencies settle for too little while others argue that agencies use their power to delay to extract over-reaching settlement terms, even when mergers are not welfare-reducing. This article uses decision theory to throw light on this controversy. The goal of this article is to formulate and analyze agency merger enforcement and settlement commitment policies in the face of imperfect information, litigation costs, and delay risks by …
Toward A Unified Theory Of Access To Local Telephone Systems, Daniel F. Spulber, Christopher S. Yoo
Toward A Unified Theory Of Access To Local Telephone Systems, Daniel F. Spulber, Christopher S. Yoo
All Faculty Scholarship
One of the most distinctive developments in telecommunications policy over the past few decades has been the increasingly broad array of access requirements regulatory authorities have imposed on local telephone providers. In so doing, policymakers did not fully consider whether the justifications for regulating telecommunications remained valid. They also allowed each access regime to be governed by its own pricing methodology and set access prices in a way that treated each network component as if it existed in isolation. The result was a regulatory regime that was internally inconsistent, vulnerable to regulatory arbitrage, and unable to capture the interactions among …
Unilateral Refusals To Deal, Vertical Integration, And The Essential Facility Doctrine, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Unilateral Refusals To Deal, Vertical Integration, And The Essential Facility Doctrine, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Where it applies, the essential facility doctrine requires a monopolist to share its "essential facility." Since the only qualifying exclusionary practice is the refusal to share the facility itself, the doctrine comes about as close as antitrust ever does to condemning "no fault" monopolization. There is no independent justification for an essential facility doctrine separate and apart from general Section 2 doctrine governing the vertically integrated monopolist's refusal to deal. In its Trinko decision the Supreme Court placed that doctrine about where it should be. The Court did not categorically reject all unilateral refusal to deal claims, but it placed …
Patent Deception In Standard Setting: The Case For Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Patent Deception In Standard Setting: The Case For Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Many patent applications are rejected upon initial submission, but they are almost never rejected with absolute finality. Further, subsequent to filing its original application a patent applicant might wish to write an application with broader or somewhat different claims, or perhaps add claims that were not made in the original application. Or it may wish to rewrite claims that had been rejected in the original application. A patent "continuation" is an application for additional claims made on a patent that was previously applied for.
Under generally accepted patent practices in the United States, when a subsequent continuation or divisional application …
The Legal Periphery Of Dominant Firm Conduct, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Legal Periphery Of Dominant Firm Conduct, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
This essay explores two different but related problems and how U.S. antitrust law and EU competition law approach them. The first is the offense of attempt to monopolize, which concerns the acts that a firm that is not yet dominant might undertake in order to become dominant. The second is the offense of monopoly or dominant firm leveraging, which occurs when a firm uses its dominant position in one market to cause some kind of harm in a different market where it also does business.
The language of EU and U.S. provisions concerning dominant firms provokes one to think that …
Adequacy Of The 1995 Antitrust Guidelines For The Licensing Of Intellectual Property In Complex High Tech Markets, Clovia Hamilton
Adequacy Of The 1995 Antitrust Guidelines For The Licensing Of Intellectual Property In Complex High Tech Markets, Clovia Hamilton
Winthrop Faculty and Staff Publications
In 1995, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission adopted new guidelines for those wishing to license intellectual property rights without violating antitrust laws. Designed to provide clarity, these guidelines instead breed confusion because they misunderstand the nature of intellectual property markets and provide insufficient guidance in the most difficult areas. Section I of this article will discuss the basic provisions of the guidelines, especially their treatment of "innovation markets." It argues that government enforcers should focus primarily on activity that creates entry barriers. Understanding the use and misuse of licensing is the key to analyzing barriers in …
Corporate Law Through An Antitrust Lens, Edward B. Rock
Corporate Law Through An Antitrust Lens, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Workable Antitrust Law: The Statutory Approach To Antitrust, Thomas Arthur
Workable Antitrust Law: The Statutory Approach To Antitrust, Thomas Arthur
Faculty Articles
This Article will demonstrate the superiority of the statutory approach for producing more stable and consistent antitrust law. Part I details the development of the constitutional approach to antitrust, demonstrating how the rise of the pragmatic and instrumentalist view of law led to the displacement of the original statutory approach to antitrust. Part II illustrates that the constitutional approach fundamentally cannot produce workable antitrust law. It summarizes both the doctrinal disarray that continues to plague each major area of antitrust law and the irreconcilable policy prescriptions of the contending antitrust "schools." Part III presents an alternative, statutory approach to antitrust …