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Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Organizational Behavior and Theory

Singapore Management University

Series

Corporate governance

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics

When Elites Forget Their Duties: The Double-Edged Sword Of Prestigious Directors On Boards, Jana Oehmichen, Daniel Braun, Michael Wolff, Toru Yoshikawa Nov 2017

When Elites Forget Their Duties: The Double-Edged Sword Of Prestigious Directors On Boards, Jana Oehmichen, Daniel Braun, Michael Wolff, Toru Yoshikawa

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School of Business

Previous research indicates that the performance effect of prestigious directors is ambiguous. Our study addresses this issue by integrating the theoretical lens of board capital and the institutional perspective. We argue that prestigious directors can bring benefits as well as costs. We claim that the emergence of these costs depends on the institutional context, specifically the institutional characteristics of the country's corporate elite circle which is characterized by the elite cohesion and the elite exclusiveness. Our empirical results with a 15-country sample covering the period of 2005 to 2014 provide evidence for the overall existence of a positive performance effect …


The Impact Of Ownership Structure On Wage Intensity In Japanese Corporations, Toru Yoshikawa, Phillip H. Phan, Parthiban David Apr 2005

The Impact Of Ownership Structure On Wage Intensity In Japanese Corporations, Toru Yoshikawa, Phillip H. Phan, Parthiban David

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

The authors studied the effect of ownership structure on human capital investments as indicated by wage intensity, defined as the ratio of expenditure on employee wages to sales, in a sample of 996 Japanese manufacturing firms during their economic recession of 1998-2002. They found that domestic shareholders, with interests beyond financial considerations, enhance wage intensity, especially when performance is low, and thereby safeguard human capital investments. Foreign shareholders with sole interest in financial returns have an opposite effect; they reduce wage intensity when firm performance is low.