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Full-Text Articles in Accounting
Managers' Pay Duration And Voluntary Disclosures, Qiang Cheng, Young Jun Cho, Jae Bum Kim
Managers' Pay Duration And Voluntary Disclosures, Qiang Cheng, Young Jun Cho, Jae Bum Kim
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
In this paper, we examine the effect of managers’ pay duration on firms’ voluntary disclosures. Pay duration refers to the average period that it takes for managers’ annual compensation to vest. We hypothesize and find that pay duration can incentivize managers to provide more bad news earnings forecasts. This result holds after controlling for the level of stock-based compensation and the endogeneity of pay duration. In addition, we find that the effect of pay duration is more pronounced for firms with weaker governance and for firms with a more opaque information environment, where the marginal benefits of additional disclosures are …
Managers' Pay Duration And Voluntary Disclosures, Qiang Cheng, Young Jun Cho, Jae Bum Kim
Managers' Pay Duration And Voluntary Disclosures, Qiang Cheng, Young Jun Cho, Jae Bum Kim
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
In this paper, we examine the effect of managers’ pay duration on firms’ voluntary disclosures. Pay duration refers to the average period that it takes for managers’ annual compensation to vest. We hypothesize and find that pay duration can incentivize managers to provide more bad news earnings forecasts. This result holds after controlling for the level of stock-based compensation and the endogeneity of pay duration. In addition, we find that the effect of pay duration is more pronounced for firms with weaker governance and for firms with a more opaque information environment, where the marginal benefits of additional disclosures are …
Executive Compensation And Regulation Imposed Governance: Evidence From The California Non-Profit Integrity Act (2004), Sandip Dhole, Saleha B. Khumawala, Sagarika Mishra, Tharindra Ranasinghe
Executive Compensation And Regulation Imposed Governance: Evidence From The California Non-Profit Integrity Act (2004), Sandip Dhole, Saleha B. Khumawala, Sagarika Mishra, Tharindra Ranasinghe
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
This study examines the impact of the California Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004 on CEO compensation costs in affected organizations. Contrary to the stated objective of the Act that executive compensation is “just and reasonable,” we find that CEO compensation costs for affected nonprofits during the post-regulation periods have increased by about 6.3 percent when compared with a control group of comparable unaffected nonprofits. In addition, the relative increase in CEO compensation appears to come from nonprofits that have experienced greater regulatory cost increases. We do not find evidence that the Act resulted in a change in CEO pay performance …
Friends In High Places: Measuring The Effects Of Compensation Committee Characteristics On Ceo Pay Packages In 2013, Danielle M. Knott
Friends In High Places: Measuring The Effects Of Compensation Committee Characteristics On Ceo Pay Packages In 2013, Danielle M. Knott
CMC Senior Theses
In the past decade, public scrutiny surrounding rising levels of executive compensation has led to more stringent independence requirements for compensation committees. However, there is little research studying the effects of compensation committees on executive pay from the time these new requirements were implemented. My paper studies the effects of compensation committee chair personal ties to the CEO, economic interests, and group committee characteristics on both the level and structure of CEO compensation. My findings suggest that certain committee chair personal ties to the CEO are associated with both a higher level of CEO compensation and a higher percentage of …