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Full-Text Articles in Accounting

From Legally Confidential To Financially Confident: Resolving The Tension Between Lawyers And Auditors Over Contingent Liability Disclosure, Samantha Nicole Kunz Jan 2015

From Legally Confidential To Financially Confident: Resolving The Tension Between Lawyers And Auditors Over Contingent Liability Disclosure, Samantha Nicole Kunz

CMC Senior Theses

Auditors review documented financial figures to test for their accuracy and materiality. Lawyers analyze evidential facts and records to build sound legal arguments. These parties work toward a mutual purpose: to present their clients as legitimate and compliant businesses. But what happens when the concrete facts upon which lawyers and auditors base their work are obscured by their inability to see into the future? In other words, how can these professions conjunctively handle potential future obligations brought about by contingent liabilities?

This study will attempt to resolve the tensions that emerge between lawyers and auditors when tasked with estimating the …


Who Pays The Auditor Calls The Tune?: Auditing Regulations And Clients' Incentives, Amy Shapiro Jan 2005

Who Pays The Auditor Calls The Tune?: Auditing Regulations And Clients' Incentives, Amy Shapiro

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

As we move on from the financial scandals of the early 2000s, the question of how to prevent the next Enron continues to be a pressing one. This Article focuses on the law’s deeply conflicted treatment of auditors of public corporations. Though the audit firm is charged with serving as the public’s watchdog in insuring good financial disclosure, the auditor’s actual client is the audited corporation itself, whose interests concerning disclosure are not necessarily aligned with those of investors. Because the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 left this structure in place, further reform is needed. One promising suggestion is to give …


Uncertain Litigation Cost And Seller Behavior: Evidence From An Auditing Game, Ping Zhang, Bryan K. Church, Lucy Ackert Jan 2001

Uncertain Litigation Cost And Seller Behavior: Evidence From An Auditing Game, Ping Zhang, Bryan K. Church, Lucy Ackert

Faculty and Research Publications

Investigates difficulties that arise in estimating expected litigation costs in an auditing game in the United States. Effect of effort level on certain and uncertain costs of performing the engagement; Frequency of observed fee offers below the total expected cost of an engagement; Institutional arrangements and damage-sharing regimes; Theoretical and behavioral predictions.