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Disproportionate Ownership Structure And Ipo Long-Run Performance Of Non-Soes In China, Xiaoming Wang, Jerry Cao, Qigui Liu, Jinghua Tang, Gary Tian
Disproportionate Ownership Structure And Ipo Long-Run Performance Of Non-Soes In China, Xiaoming Wang, Jerry Cao, Qigui Liu, Jinghua Tang, Gary Tian
Gary Tian
This paper examines the relationship between ownership structures and IPO long-run performance of non-SOEs in China. Although non-SOEs underperform the market in general after IPO but the poor performance is mainly caused by the IPOs with ownership control wedge. Non-SOEs with one share one vote structure outperform those with control-ownership wedge by 30% for three years post-IPO performance in adjusted buy-and-hold returns. Non-SOEs with control-ownership wedge have higher frequency of undertaking value-destroying related party transactions. These findings suggest that non-SOEs need to improve corporate governance such as disproportionate ownership structure to better safeguard the interest of long-run shareholders.
Do Venture Capitalists Play A Monitoring Role In An Emerging Market? Evidence From The Pay-Performance Relationship Of Chinese Entrepreneurial Firms, Jerry Cao, Qigui Liu, Gary Tian
Do Venture Capitalists Play A Monitoring Role In An Emerging Market? Evidence From The Pay-Performance Relationship Of Chinese Entrepreneurial Firms, Jerry Cao, Qigui Liu, Gary Tian
Gary Tian
This paper investigates venture capitalists' monitoring of managerial behaviour by examining their impact on CEO pay-performance sensitivity across various controlling structures in Chinese firms. We find that the effectiveness of venture capitalists' monitoring depends on different types of agency conflict. In particular, we find that venture capital (VC) monitoring is hampered in firms that experience severe controlling-minority agency problems caused by disproportionate ownership structures. We provide further evidence that VC is more likely to exert close monitoring in firms that have greater managerial agency conflict, and thus require more direct monitoring. However, controlling-minority agency problems have a greater impact on …
Macroeconomic Determinants Of Corporate Performance And Failure: Evidence From An Emerging Market The Case Of Jordan, Rami Zeitun, Gary Tian, Steve Keen
Macroeconomic Determinants Of Corporate Performance And Failure: Evidence From An Emerging Market The Case Of Jordan, Rami Zeitun, Gary Tian, Steve Keen
Gary Tian
This study investigates the impact of aggregate economic risk on a company’s performance and failure in a panel estimation using 167 Jordanian companies during 1989-2003. Our finding shows that unanticipated changes in interest rate negatively and significantly affect firms’ performance measured by ROA, which suggests that an interest rate rise increases the cost of borrowing and then further negatively affects a firm’s profit. We also found that both the production manufacturing index and Islamic credit facilities positively and significantly affect a firm’s performance. The positive and significant impact of Islamic credit facilities reflects the importance and the significance of the …
Board Composition, Board Activity And Ownership Concentration, The Impact On Firm Performance, Shiguang Ma, Gary Tian
Board Composition, Board Activity And Ownership Concentration, The Impact On Firm Performance, Shiguang Ma, Gary Tian
Gary Tian
This paper provides a parallel investigation on the impact of board composition, board activity and ownership concentration on the performance of listed Chinese firms. We find that independent directors enhance firm performance effectively than other board factors. The frequency of shareholder meetings, rather than board meetings, is positively associated with firm value. Tradable share ownership concentration has a positive and linear relationship with firm value, while state and total share ownership concentration represent U(V) shapes. Importantly, companies with the highest levels of both total share and tradable share ownership concentration have a greater firm values than companies with the highest …