Business Commons^™

Disproportionate Ownership Structure And Ipo Long-Run Performance Of Non-Soes In China, Xiaoming Wang, Jerry Cao, Qigui Liu, Jinghua Tang, Gary Tian

Gary Tian

This paper examines the relationship between ownership structures and IPO long-run performance of non-SOEs in China. Although non-SOEs underperform the market in general after IPO but the poor performance is mainly caused by the IPOs with ownership control wedge. Non-SOEs with one share one vote structure outperform those with control-ownership wedge by 30% for three years post-IPO performance in adjusted buy-and-hold returns. Non-SOEs with control-ownership wedge have higher frequency of undertaking value-destroying related party transactions. These findings suggest that non-SOEs need to improve corporate governance such as disproportionate ownership structure to better safeguard the interest of long-run shareholders.

Does Control-Ownership Divergence Impair Market Liquidity In An Emerging Market? Evidence From China, Xiaojun Chu, Qigui Liu, Gary Tian

Qigui Liu

This paper examines how institutional characteristics of emerging economies influence the effect of control-ownership divergence on market liquidity. We find that the divergence is negatively associated with liquidity and that this negative relationship is more pronounced in firms with more severe agency problems and information asymmetry. We argue that in an emerging market, the negative effect of the divergence on liquidity is worsened by state ownership and poorer shareholder protection, both of which result in more severe agency conflicts; we also find, however, that this effect is alleviated by the NTS reform, which aligns the interest of different shareholders.

Does Bank Ownership Imply Efficient Monitoring? Evidence From Bank Lending And Firm Investment Efficiencies In China, Gary G. Tian, Xiaofei Pan

Gary Tian

This study investigates the effect of bank ownership on lending and firm investment efficiencies to give reasons for the mixed evidence that exists on the impact of bank ownership on firm performance. Using China's listed firms as an example, we find that bank ownership reduces the efficiency of bank lending and harms investment efficiency for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), while simultaneously relating to optimal lending decisions and enhanced investment efficiency for non-SOEs. Our findings suggest that banks monitor non-SOEs effectively, but are less effective at monitoring SOEs. We document that banks' ex post monitoring on non-SOEs' investment policy results from their …

The Effect Of Ownership Structure On Leverage Decision: New Evidence From Chinese Listed Firms, Qigui Liu, Gary Tian, Xiaoming Wang

Qigui Liu

This paper examines the effect of state control and ownership structure on the leverage decision of firms listed in the Chinese stock market. Our results show that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have higher leverage ratios than non-SOEs, and SOEs in regions with a poorer institutional environment have higher leverage ratios than SOEs in better regions. We also show that the largest shareholding (the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder) in the SOEs has a negative relationship with the leverage ratio, while the largest shareholding in non-SOEs has a non-linear relationship with the short-term and long-term debt ratios. Finally, this …

Political Connections, Founding Family Ownership And Leverage Decision Of Privately Owned Firms, Qigui Liu, Gary Tian

Qigui Liu

In this paper, we examine the effect of political connections versus founding family ownership on the relationship between disproportional ownership structure and leverage decisions of privately owned firms listed in Chinese market. We find that disproportional ownership has positive effect on leverage, indicating that controlling shareholder tends to use both disproportional ownership structure and debt to expropriate. We also find that the interacted term between disproportional ownership and political connections has a positive impact on leverage ratio, and disproportional ownership structure is negatively related with leverage ratio of founding-family controlled firms, which indicate a substitute effect between political connections and …

Agency Theory Implications For Strategic Human Resource Management: Effects Of Ceo Ownership, Administrative Hrm, And Incentive Alignment On Firm Performance, Theresa M. Welbourne, Linda A. Cyr

Theresa M. Welbourne, PhD

Agency theory is used to expand the research in strategic human resource management (SHRM) by viewing the construct underlying SHRM as control over all employees. We develop hypotheses on the effects of CEO ownership, administrative HRM, and incentive stock ownership on firm performance. The results indicate that administrative HRM has a negative effect on stock price. Incentive alignment via stock ownership has a positive effect on stock price and productivity. CEO ownership has a positive effect on sales but a negative impact on productivity. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.

Disproportional Ownership Structure And Pay-Performance Relationship: Evidence From China's Listed Firms, Jerry Cao, Xiaofei Pan, Gary G. Tian

Xiaofei Pan

This paper examines the impact of disproportional ownership structure on the pay-performance relationship in China’s listed firms. We find that the cash flow rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder have a positive effect on this relationship while a divergence between the control rights and cash flow rights has a significantly negative effect. By dividing our sample into state owned enterprises (SOE), state assets management bureaus (SAMB), and privately controlled firms, we find that cash flow rights in SOE controlled firms have a significant impact on accounting based pay performance and cash flow rights in privately controlled firms also affect the …

Political Connections, Founding Family Ownership And Leverage Decision Of Privately Owned Firms, Qigui Liu, Gary Tian

Qigui Liu

In this paper, we examine the effect of political connections versus founding family ownership on the relationship between disproportional ownership structure and leverage decisions of privately owned firms listed in Chinese market. We find that disproportional ownership has positive effect on leverage, indicating that controlling shareholder tends to use both disproportional ownership structure and debt to expropriate. We also find that the interacted term between disproportional ownership and political connections has a positive impact on leverage ratio, and disproportional ownership structure is negatively related with leverage ratio of founding-family controlled firms, which indicate a substitute effect between political connections and …

The Effect Of Ownership Structure On Leverage Decision: New Evidence From Chinese Listed Firms, Qigui Liu, Gary Tian, Xiaoming Wang

Qigui Liu

This paper examines the effect of state control and ownership structure on the leverage decision of firms listed in the Chinese stock market. Our results show that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have higher leverage ratios than non-SOEs, and SOEs in regions with a poorer institutional environment have higher leverage ratios than SOEs in better regions. We also show that the largest shareholding (the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder) in the SOEs has a negative relationship with the leverage ratio, while the largest shareholding in non-SOEs has a non-linear relationship with the short-term and long-term debt ratios. Finally, this …

Migrant Remittances, Financial Sector Development And The Government Ownership Of Banks, Arusha V. Cooray

Arusha Cooray

This study investigates the influence of migrant remittances on twodimensions of the financial sector, namely, size and efficiency. Evidence suggests thatmigrant remittances contribute to increasing the size and efficiency of the financialsector. The study, in addition, examines the impact of remittances on financial sectorsize and efficiency through the government ownership of banks channel. While theresults suggest that remittances lead to larger increases in financial sector size incountries in which the government ownership of banks is lower and increases inefficiency in countries in which the government ownership of banks is higher, thegovernment is found to play an important role in promoting …

Board Composition, Board Activity And Ownership Concentration, The Impact On Firm Performance, Shiguang Ma, Gary Tian

Gary Tian

This paper provides a parallel investigation on the impact of board composition, board activity and ownership concentration on the performance of listed Chinese firms. We find that independent directors enhance firm performance effectively than other board factors. The frequency of shareholder meetings, rather than board meetings, is positively associated with firm value. Tradable share ownership concentration has a positive and linear relationship with firm value, while state and total share ownership concentration represent U(V) shapes. Importantly, companies with the highest levels of both total share and tradable share ownership concentration have a greater firm values than companies with the highest …

Disproportional Ownership Structure And Pay–Performance Relationship: Evidence From China's Listed Firms, Jerry Cao, Xiaofei Pan, Gary Tian

Xiaofei Pan

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in China's listed firms. We find that the cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders have a positive effect on the pay–performance relationship, while a divergence between control rights and cash flow rights has a significantly negative effect on the pay–performance relationship. We divide our sample based on ultimate controlling shareholders' type into state owned enterprises (SOE), state assets management bureaus (SAMB), and privately controlled firms. We find that in SOE controlled firms cash flow rights have a significant impact on accounting based pay–performance relationship. In privately controlled firms, …

Managerial Compensation, Ownership Structure And Firm Performance In China's Listed Firms, Xiaofei Pan, Gary G. Tian, Shiguang Ma, Aelee Jun, Qingliang Tang

Aelee Jun

This paper investigates managerial compensation and its relationship with firm performance in China's listed firms. In China, the largest shareholder dominates other shareholders, controls the firm and therefore exercises substantial impacts on manager compensation. After controlling for other firm and industry characteristics, we find that manager remuneration is greater and pay-performance relation is stronger for privately-controlled firms than for state-controlled firms. We also document that state-controlled firms exercise performance-based manager incentive schemes, which is contrary to evidence found in some earlier studies. Our results also indicate that top executives in firms with a foreign ownership are more highly compensated, relative …

Managerial Ownership, Capital Structure And Firm Value, Wenjuan Ruan, Gary G. Tian, Shiguang Ma

Shiguang Ma

This paper extends prior research to examine the managerial ownership influences on firm performance through the choices of capital structures by using a new sample of S&P 500 firm in 2005. The empirical results of OLS regressions replicate the nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm value. However, we found that the turning points had moved up in our sample compared with previous papers, which implies that the managerial control for pursuing self-interest, and the alignment of interests between managers and other shareholders can only be achieved now by management holding more ownership in a firm than that found in …

Board Composition, Board Activity And Ownership Concentration, The Impact On Firm Performance, Shiguang Ma, Gary Tian

Shiguang Ma

This paper provides a parallel investigation on the impact of board composition, board activity and ownership concentration on the performance of listed Chinese firms. We find that independent directors enhance firm performance effectively than other board factors. The frequency of shareholder meetings, rather than board meetings, is positively associated with firm value. Tradable share ownership concentration has a positive and linear relationship with firm value, while state and total share ownership concentration represent U(V) shapes. Importantly, companies with the highest levels of both total share and tradable share ownership concentration have a greater firm values than companies with the highest …

Managerial Compensation, Ownership Structure And Firm Performance In China's Listed Firms, Xiaofei Pan, Gary G. Tian, Shiguang Ma, Aelee Jun, Qingliang Tang

Shiguang Ma

This paper investigates managerial compensation and its relationship with firm performance in China's listed firms. In China, the largest shareholder dominates other shareholders, controls the firm and therefore exercises substantial impacts on manager compensation. After controlling for other firm and industry characteristics, we find that manager remuneration is greater and pay-performance relation is stronger for privately-controlled firms than for state-controlled firms. We also document that state-controlled firms exercise performance-based manager incentive schemes, which is contrary to evidence found in some earlier studies. Our results also indicate that top executives in firms with a foreign ownership are more highly compensated, relative …

The Influence Of National Culture And Institutional Voids On Family Ownership Of Large Firms: A Country Level Empirical Study, Subrata Chakrabarty

Subrata Chakrabarty