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Full-Text Articles in Business
Notice Risk And Registered Agency, Andrew K. Jennings
Notice Risk And Registered Agency, Andrew K. Jennings
Faculty Articles
To sue a firm is to sue an artificial person, making the most reliable service method—physically handing papers to the defendant—unusable. This problem illustrates notice risk: if a plaintiff’s service obligations are loose, it is advantaged (because the defendant may never receive notice), whereas if they are strict, the defendant is advantaged (because the plaintiff may struggle to effect service). For litigation involving corporate defendants, civil procedure and corporate law mitigate this problem through a technology for managing notice risk: registered agency. A firm using this technology, because it cannot be served directly, appoints an agent who will accept papers …
The Importance Of Being Dismissive: The Efficiency Role Of Pleading Stage Evaluation Of Shareholder Litigation, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Michael L. Wachter
The Importance Of Being Dismissive: The Efficiency Role Of Pleading Stage Evaluation Of Shareholder Litigation, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Michael L. Wachter
All Faculty Scholarship
It has been claimed that the risk/reward dynamics of shareholder litigation have encouraged quick settlements with substantial attorneys’ fee awards but no payment to shareholders, regardless of the merits of the case. Fee-shifting charter and bylaw provisions may be too blunt a tool to control agency costs associated with excessive shareholder litigation, and are in any event now prohibited by Delaware statute. We claim, however, that active judicial supervision of public company shareholder litigation at an early stage reduces the costs of frivolous litigation to shareholders by separating meritorious from unmeritorious litigation before the full costs of discovery are incurred. …
Regulation Fd: An Alternative Approach To Addressing Information Asymmetry, Jill E. Fisch
Regulation Fd: An Alternative Approach To Addressing Information Asymmetry, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
This chapter traces the development of the SEC’s use of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) to address information asymmetry in the securities markets. The chapter describes the SEC’s developing enforcement policy and notes, in particular, the SEC’s efforts, through its selection and settlement of Regulation FD cases, to provide guidance to corporations and corporate officials about areas of key concern. The chapter concludes by highlighting current areas of particular importance, including disclosure of information through private meetings and the implications of technological innovations such as the internet and social media. The chapter is forthcoming in Research Handbook on Insider Trading (Stephen …