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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Business
Optimal Ceo Compensation With Search: Theory And Empirical Evidence, Melanie Cao, Rong Wang
Optimal Ceo Compensation With Search: Theory And Empirical Evidence, Melanie Cao, Rong Wang
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We integrate an agency problem into search theory to study executive compensation in a market equilibrium. A CEO can choose to stay or quit and search after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the firm. The market equilibrium endogenizes CEOs’ and firms’ outside options and captures contracting externalities. We show that the optimal pay-to-performance ratio is less than one even when the CEO is risk neutral. Moreover, the equilibrium pay-to-performance sensitivity depends positively on a firm's idiosyncratic risk and negatively on the systematic risk. Our empirical tests using executive compensation data confirm these results.
A Survey Of Executive Compensation Contracts In China’S Listed Companies, Yubo Li, Fang Lou, Jiwei Wang, Hongqi Yuan
A Survey Of Executive Compensation Contracts In China’S Listed Companies, Yubo Li, Fang Lou, Jiwei Wang, Hongqi Yuan
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than local-government-controlled and non-government-controlled companies. Cash-based payments are the main form of executive compensation, whereas equity-based payments are seldom used by Chinese listed companies. On average, there are no significant differences in the value of basic salaries and performance-based compensation in executive compensation contracts. But, compared with their counterparts in non-government-controlled companies, executives in government-controlled companies are given more incentive compensation. Accounting earnings are typically used in executive compensation contracts, with few firms using stock returns …
Insider Trading Restrictions And Top Executive Compensation, David J. Denis, Jin Xu
Insider Trading Restrictions And Top Executive Compensation, David J. Denis, Jin Xu
Purdue CIBER Working Papers
The use of equity incentives is significantly greater in countries with stronger insider trading restrictions, and these higher incentives are associated with higher total pay. These findings are robust to alternative definitions of insider trading restrictions and enforcement, and to panel regressions with country fixed effects. We also find significant increases in top executive pay and the use of equity-based incentives in the period immediately following the initial enforcement of insider trading laws. We conclude that insider trading laws are one channel through which cross-country differences in pay practices can be explained.
Sue On Pay: Say On Pay’S Impact On Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, Lisa Fairfax
Sue On Pay: Say On Pay’S Impact On Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, Lisa Fairfax
All Faculty Scholarship
This Article advances a normative case for using say on pay litigation to enhance the state courts’ role in policing directors’ compensation decisions. Outrage over what many perceive to be excessive executive compensation has escalated dramatically in recent years. In 2010, such outrage prompted Congress to mandate say on pay—a nonbinding shareholder vote on executive compensation. In the wake of say on pay votes, some shareholders have brought suit against directors alleging that a negative vote indicates a breach of directors’ fiduciary duties. To date, the vast majority of courts have rejected these suits. This Article insists that such rejection …