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Full-Text Articles in Business
Ceo Long-Term Incentive Pay In Mergers And Acquisitions, Randy Beavers
Ceo Long-Term Incentive Pay In Mergers And Acquisitions, Randy Beavers
SPU Works
This paper analyzes the CEO incentives of inside debt in the form of deferred equity compensation in the context of M&A decisions. This study runs statistical regressions on the likelihood of a merger, whether the deal is diversifying, how much stock is used to pay for the deal, and the relative deal size controlling for CEO long-term incentive pay as the main variable of interest and including controls for firm characteristics, merger characteristics, industry, and year. This paper sheds light on LTIP effects before compensation changes occur after an M&A event. This study uses archival data from 1996 to 2005 …
Competitive Repertoire Complexity: Governance Antecedents And Performance Outcomes, Brian L. Connelly, Laszlo Tihanyi, David J. Ketchen Jr., Christina Matz Carnes, Walter J. Ferrier
Competitive Repertoire Complexity: Governance Antecedents And Performance Outcomes, Brian L. Connelly, Laszlo Tihanyi, David J. Ketchen Jr., Christina Matz Carnes, Walter J. Ferrier
Department of Management: Faculty Publications
Research summary: Past inquiry has found that implementing complex competitive repertoires (i.e., diverse and dynamic arrays of actions) is challenging, but firms benefit from doing so. Our examination of the antecedents and outcomes of complex competitive repertoires develops a more nuanced perspective. Data from 1,168 firms in 204 industries reveal that complexity initially harms performance, but then becomes a positive factor, except at high levels. We use agency and tournament theories, respectively, to examine how key governance mechanisms—ownership structure and executive compensation—help shape firms’ competitive repertoires. We find that the principals of agency theory and the pay gap of tournament …