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Full-Text Articles in Business

Paper Dragon Thieves, J.S. Nelson Dec 2016

Paper Dragon Thieves, J.S. Nelson

J.S. Nelson

Developments in the law are making the corporate form more opaque and allowing the agents who animate it to escape individual accountability for their actions. The law now provides protection for agents to engage in widespread frauds that inflict massive harm on the public. This article challenges the academic orthodoxy that shareholder and director liability are enough to control agent behavior by developing a paper dragon analogy to focus on the importance of agents in corporate animation. Lack of agent accountability encourages the patterns of fraud that caused the financial crisis in which forty-five percent of the world’s wealth disappeared, …

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The Corporate Shell Game, J.S. Nelson Dec 2015

The Corporate Shell Game, J.S. Nelson

J.S. Nelson

This Article identifies for the first time the hardening of the corporate shell. It provides compelling evidence that shell-hardening pushes and disguises the way that corporations and agents commit large-scale wrongdoing, and it traces the contributing legal streams that protect the agents who engage in this behavior. The only way to combat widespread frauds that inflict damage on the public is for the corporate shell to be-come less opaque.

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Do Private Equity Investors Conspire With Ultimate Owners In The Ipo Process?, Qigui Liu, Vincent Tang, Gary Tian Feb 2014

Do Private Equity Investors Conspire With Ultimate Owners In The Ipo Process?, Qigui Liu, Vincent Tang, Gary Tian

Qigui Liu

This paper examines the interactive effect of private equity (PE) and ultimate owners on the process of firms' going public. We find that firms with high excess control rights have more earnings management before IPO, and they are more likely to seek PE investors especially when the earnings management are high. We further show that the involvement of PE investors increases the probability of the firms' IPO application being approved by the regulators in firms with high excess control rights. However, the PE-backed firms with high excess control rights are found to have higher IPO fee, lower initial returns and …

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Do Private Equity Investors Conspire With Ultimate Owners In The Ipo Process?, Qigui Liu, Vincent Tang, Gary Tian Jan 2014

Do Private Equity Investors Conspire With Ultimate Owners In The Ipo Process?, Qigui Liu, Vincent Tang, Gary Tian

Qigui Liu

This paper examines the interactive effect of private equity (PE) and ultimate owners on the process of firms' going public. We find that firms with high excess control rights have more earnings management before IPO, and they are more likely to seek PE investors especially when the earnings management are high. We further show that the involvement of PE investors increases the probability of the firms' IPO application being approved by the regulators in firms with high excess control rights. However, the PE-backed firms with high excess control rights are found to have higher IPO fee, lower initial returns and …

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Equity Issuance Trends In Australia's Listed Investment Fund Markets, Martin Gold Feb 2013

Equity Issuance Trends In Australia's Listed Investment Fund Markets, Martin Gold

Martin L Gold

No abstract provided.

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