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Full-Text Articles in Business
Choice Of Law And The Preponderantly Multistate Rule: The Example Of Successor Corporation Products Liability, Diana Sclar
Choice Of Law And The Preponderantly Multistate Rule: The Example Of Successor Corporation Products Liability, Diana Sclar
Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)
Most state rules of substantive law, whether legislative or judicial, ordinarily adjust rights and obligations among local parties with respect to local events. Conventional choice of law methodologies for adjudicating disputes with multistate connections all start from an explicit or implicit assumption of a choice between such locally oriented substantive rules. This article reveals, for the first time, that some state rules of substantive law ordinarily adjust rights and obligations with respect to parties and events connected to more than one state and only occasionally apply to wholly local matters. For these rules I use the term “nominally domestic rules …
A New Standard For Governance: Reflections On Worker Representation In The United States, Julian Constain
A New Standard For Governance: Reflections On Worker Representation In The United States, Julian Constain
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
The contemporary state of corporate law in the United States is one that is skewed toward the archaic principle of shareholder primacy. This narrow conception of corporate purpose has resulted in governance mechanisms that tend to overlook the many stakeholders that are affected by, and, in turn, affect the bottom line of modern corporations. In the wake of the recently proposed Accountable Capitalism Act, this Note investigates the viability of adopting a system of mandated worker board representation—codetermination—in the United States. The Note employs a comparative analysis of the German and Swedish experiences with codetermination, and then evaluates the policy, …
Executive Compensation In Controlled Companies, Kobi Kastiel
Executive Compensation In Controlled Companies, Kobi Kastiel
Indiana Law Journal
Conventional wisdom among corporate law theorists holds that the presence of a controlling shareholder should alleviate the problem of managerial opportunism because such a controller has both the power and incentives to curb excessive executive pay. This Article challenges that common understanding by proposing a different view based on an agency problem paradigm. Controlling shareholders, this Article suggests, may in fact overpay managers in order to maximize controllers’ consumption of private benefits, due to their close social and business ties with professional managers or for other reasons, such as being captured by professional managers. This tendency to overpay managers is …
Russia's Lack Of American-Style Agency Priciples: A Primary Cause Of Corporate Governance Problems Today, C. Keith Marshall Jr.
Russia's Lack Of American-Style Agency Priciples: A Primary Cause Of Corporate Governance Problems Today, C. Keith Marshall Jr.
South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business
No abstract provided.
Foreword: In Berle’S Footsteps, Charles R.T. O'Kelley
Foreword: In Berle’S Footsteps, Charles R.T. O'Kelley
Seattle University Law Review
On the weekend of November 6–8, 2009, scholars from around the world gathered in Seattle for a symposium—In Berle’s Footsteps—celebrating the launch of the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law and Society. As founding director of the Berle Center, I described our undertaking: “It is with a profound sense of obligation to the legacy that has been entrusted to my care, that I announce the launching of the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law and Society. It is a privilege to follow in Berle’s footsteps.”
Opening Remarks, Chancellor William B. Chandler Iii
Opening Remarks, Chancellor William B. Chandler Iii
Seattle University Law Review
Law is, in many ways, a backwards-looking field. We litigate over facts that have already occurred, challenge deals that have already been signed, and apply rules of decision based on previously-established precedent or statutes already enacted. To the extent that this Center and the symposium reflect on Berle’s work, they too are an exercise in looking back. Indeed, some might say the establishment of a Center named in Berle’s honor is a monument to the past.
Securities Intermediaries And The Separation Of Ownership From Control, Jill E. Fisch
Securities Intermediaries And The Separation Of Ownership From Control, Jill E. Fisch
Seattle University Law Review
The Modern Corporation & Private Property is a paradigm-shifting analysis of the modern corporation. The book is perhaps best known for the insights of Berle and Means about the separation of ownership from control and the consequences of that separation for the allocation of power within the corporation. The Berle and Means story focuses on the shareholder as the owner of the corporation. Berle and Means saw the mechanism of centralized management—in which the shareholder retains the economic interest but not the control rights associated with ownership—as threatening the conception of shareholder interests in terms of property rights. In particular, …
Revisiting Berle And Rethinking The Corporate Structure, Kelli A. Alces
Revisiting Berle And Rethinking The Corporate Structure, Kelli A. Alces
Seattle University Law Review
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means painted what remains a defining portrait of corporate law. The separation of ownership and control they described and the agency costs it causes are still a central concern of the law of corporate governance. For that reason, Berle’s work is relevant nearly eighty years after its publication. Seemingly forgotten, however, is that Berle’s enduring description of the corporate structure was published before most of today’s corporate law was in place. His work preceded the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and even preceded the dominance of Delaware common law in …
Power Without Property, Still: Unger, Berle, And The Derivatives Revolution, Cristie Ford, Carol Liao
Power Without Property, Still: Unger, Berle, And The Derivatives Revolution, Cristie Ford, Carol Liao
Seattle University Law Review
We are in a time when the notion of property is in flux. The derivatives revolution has shattered the “atom of property” well beyond what was originally imagined in 1932 by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means. This disaggregation has had fascinating, and often adverse, effects on corporate law and securities regulation. Moreover, the phenomenon has had the unexpected effect of permitting some parties that already possess considerable social, economic, and political power to accumulate even more.
The New Financial Assets: Separating Ownership From Control, Tamar Frankel
The New Financial Assets: Separating Ownership From Control, Tamar Frankel
Seattle University Law Review
In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner Means wrote about the separation of ownership from control in corporations. They noted that the interests of the controlling directors and managers can diverge from those of the shareholder owners of the firm. . . . There are those who consider such a decoupling beneficial. Others express the same concern that Berle and Means have expressed. And depending on what one focuses on in viewing the pluses and minuses of these separations, one could reach different conclusions. I reach a number of conclusions. First, the separation of …
Understanding New Hampshire’S Rule 4.2 As Applied To Corporate Litigants: An Explanation And Suggestions For Improvement, Heather Menezes
Understanding New Hampshire’S Rule 4.2 As Applied To Corporate Litigants: An Explanation And Suggestions For Improvement, Heather Menezes
The University of New Hampshire Law Review
[Excerpt] “Consider this scenario: an attorney represents a client in litigation against a corporation. The attorney gets a call from an employee of that corporation and the employee says, “Everything in your complaint is absolutely correct.” However excited the attorney is to speak with this person, the Rules of Professional Conduct constrain whom the attorney can talk to if a corporation is involved in the pending litigation. In New Hampshire, any attorney can quickly find that Rule 4.2 prohibits contact with a represented party.1 But is this corporate employee a represented party? Even after reading the comment to the rule …