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Full-Text Articles in Business

Conflict Between Controlling Family Owners And Minority Shareholders: Much Ado About Nothing, Geoffrey P. Martin Dr, Luis R. Gomez-Mejia Prof, Marianna Makri, Pascual Berrone Nov 2016

Conflict Between Controlling Family Owners And Minority Shareholders: Much Ado About Nothing, Geoffrey P. Martin Dr, Luis R. Gomez-Mejia Prof, Marianna Makri, Pascual Berrone

Geoffrey P Martin

We examine the unique nature of conflict between controlling family owners and minority shareholders (principal-principal conflict) in publicly traded family controlled firms through examining shareholder proposals. Implicit in prior governance and family business research has been that non-family shareholders are likely to be in conflict with the dominant family owners. In general, we find that much of this fear may be unwarranted except under specific circumstances. Our findings elucidate sources of heterogeneity in family firm principal-principal conflict and add greater nuance to our understanding of this type of agency problem within family firms.


Essays On Empirical Asset Pricing, Mu-Shu Yun Jan 2016

Essays On Empirical Asset Pricing, Mu-Shu Yun

LSU Doctoral Dissertations

This work contains three essays on empirical pricing. In the first essay, I propose to re-examine the evidence on mutual fund managers' illiquidity and volatility timing ability by using a holdings-based approach, which is free from the artificial timing bias occurred in the traditional return-based timing method. Through testing the timing evidence by the holdings approach, I am able to know to what degree the results in the literature are biased by no-information reasons. In the second essay, I investigate mutual fund managers' skills from their reactions to the observable market condition, which is a relatively overlooked dimension in the …