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Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Business
Complex And Diverse Roles Performed By Non-Executive Directors In The Context Of The Implementation Of The Non-Regulatory Codes Of Corporate Governance: Evidence From Small And Medium Firms In The Uk, H Gunathilake, Palli Mulla K A Chandrakumara
Complex And Diverse Roles Performed By Non-Executive Directors In The Context Of The Implementation Of The Non-Regulatory Codes Of Corporate Governance: Evidence From Small And Medium Firms In The Uk, H Gunathilake, Palli Mulla K A Chandrakumara
Anil Chandrakumara
This study aims to address two interrelated issues. (1) What is the role of nonexecutive directors (NEDs) of public companies listed in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in the UK? (2) Whether AIM listed companies accept the principles and provisions of the Combined Code of Corporate Governance (CCCG)? And, if so, to what extent? The findings indicate that the nature of task of NEDs of AMI listed firms is characterised by multiplicity of tasks and task variation by the type of chair. This study contributes to fill the knowledge gap in the literature with regard to the role of NEDs …
Venture Capital And Executive Incentives In China, Jerry Cao, Qigui Liu, Gary Tian
Venture Capital And Executive Incentives In China, Jerry Cao, Qigui Liu, Gary Tian
Qigui Liu
This paper examines the effect that venture capital (VC) has on the pay-performancerelationship in listed Chinese firms. We find that VC has a significantly positive effect onCEO compensation and the pay-performance relationship, such effect particularly stronger infirms needing more managerial efforts and discretions (higher growth opportunity or higherlevels of capital expenditure). In addition, we show that VC-backed firms with moremanagerial discretions are more likely to use stock options. The evidence suggests thatventure capital investors use more sensitive compensation contract for top executives inChinese when the need for managerial discretion is greater. Such compensation schemes byVCs enhance firm performance subsequently.
The Deadweight Loss Of Equity-Based Compensation, Jessica Pence
The Deadweight Loss Of Equity-Based Compensation, Jessica Pence
CMC Senior Theses
In order to maximize shareholder value, firms attempt to align the incentives of the executives with those of the shareholders by giving them equity as a portion of their compensation package. The terms associated with this equity compensation forces the executives to hold undiversified portfolios, resulting in a sizeable deadweight loss. This paper uses the formula developed by Meulbroek (2001)1 to calculate the dollar value of this deadweight loss, in order to quantify the costs associated with equity-based compensation. We find that the 56 executives in our data set have a combined deadweight loss of $70 billion, and that on …