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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Business
Disproportionate Ownership Structure And Ipo Long-Run Performance Of Non-Soes In China, Xiaoming Wang, Jerry Cao, Qigui Liu, Jinghua Tang, Gary Tian
Disproportionate Ownership Structure And Ipo Long-Run Performance Of Non-Soes In China, Xiaoming Wang, Jerry Cao, Qigui Liu, Jinghua Tang, Gary Tian
Gary Tian
This paper examines the relationship between ownership structures and IPO long-run performance of non-SOEs in China. Although non-SOEs underperform the market in general after IPO but the poor performance is mainly caused by the IPOs with ownership control wedge. Non-SOEs with one share one vote structure outperform those with control-ownership wedge by 30% for three years post-IPO performance in adjusted buy-and-hold returns. Non-SOEs with control-ownership wedge have higher frequency of undertaking value-destroying related party transactions. These findings suggest that non-SOEs need to improve corporate governance such as disproportionate ownership structure to better safeguard the interest of long-run shareholders.
Does Banks' Dual Holding Affect Bank Lending And Firms' Investment Decisions? Evidence From China, Xiaofei Pan, Gary Tian
Does Banks' Dual Holding Affect Bank Lending And Firms' Investment Decisions? Evidence From China, Xiaofei Pan, Gary Tian
Gary Tian
This study investigates the effect of banks' dual holding on bank lending and firms' investment decisions using a sample of listed firms in China. We find that dual holding leads to easier access to bank loans, a result that is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than SOEs. We also find that dual holding distorts banks' lending decisions and harms the investment efficiency for SOEs, while resulting in optimal lending decisions and enhanced investment efficiency for non-SOEs. For non-SOEs, further analysis suggests that optimal lending decisions and efficient investment can be achieved for firms with higher ownership concentration, and firms …
Do Venture Capitalists Play A Monitoring Role In An Emerging Market? Evidence From The Pay-Performance Relationship Of Chinese Entrepreneurial Firms, Jerry Cao, Qigui Liu, Gary Tian
Do Venture Capitalists Play A Monitoring Role In An Emerging Market? Evidence From The Pay-Performance Relationship Of Chinese Entrepreneurial Firms, Jerry Cao, Qigui Liu, Gary Tian
Gary Tian
This paper investigates venture capitalists' monitoring of managerial behaviour by examining their impact on CEO pay-performance sensitivity across various controlling structures in Chinese firms. We find that the effectiveness of venture capitalists' monitoring depends on different types of agency conflict. In particular, we find that venture capital (VC) monitoring is hampered in firms that experience severe controlling-minority agency problems caused by disproportionate ownership structures. We provide further evidence that VC is more likely to exert close monitoring in firms that have greater managerial agency conflict, and thus require more direct monitoring. However, controlling-minority agency problems have a greater impact on …
Does Bank Ownership Imply Efficient Monitoring? Evidence From Bank Lending And Firm Investment Efficiencies In China, Gary G. Tian, Xiaofei Pan
Does Bank Ownership Imply Efficient Monitoring? Evidence From Bank Lending And Firm Investment Efficiencies In China, Gary G. Tian, Xiaofei Pan
Gary Tian
This study investigates the effect of bank ownership on lending and firm investment efficiencies to give reasons for the mixed evidence that exists on the impact of bank ownership on firm performance. Using China's listed firms as an example, we find that bank ownership reduces the efficiency of bank lending and harms investment efficiency for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), while simultaneously relating to optimal lending decisions and enhanced investment efficiency for non-SOEs. Our findings suggest that banks monitor non-SOEs effectively, but are less effective at monitoring SOEs. We document that banks' ex post monitoring on non-SOEs' investment policy results from their …
Bank Connection, Corruption And Collateral In China, Xiaofei Pan, Gary Tian
Bank Connection, Corruption And Collateral In China, Xiaofei Pan, Gary Tian
Gary Tian
Using a sample of China's listed entrepreneurial firms, we investigate the relationship between bank connection, corruption and collateral requirements. We find that when a firm is connected with banks, collateral requirements are significantly lower. We also find that bank connection is the channel through which corruption is exercised to benefit those firms with favoured loan terms. Our analysis further reveals that bank connection and corruption have jointly improved bank lending efficiency. However, these positive effects become weaker with government intervention in the form of an economic stimulus package. We argue that in an emerging market, bank connection facilitates rent seeking …