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Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Business
Controlling Urban Air Pollution Caused By Households: Uncertainty, Prices, And Income, Carlos Chávez, John K. Stranlund, Walter Gómez
Controlling Urban Air Pollution Caused By Households: Uncertainty, Prices, And Income, Carlos Chávez, John K. Stranlund, Walter Gómez
John K. Stranlund
We examine the control of air pollution caused by households burning wood for heating and cooking in the developing world. Since the problem is one of controlling emissions from nonpoint sources, regulations are likely to be directed at household choices of wood consumption and combustion technologies. Moreover, these choices are subtractions from, or contributions to, the pure public good of air quality. Consequently, the efficient policy design is not independent of the distribution of household income. Since it is unrealistic to assume that environmental authorities can make lump sum income transfers part of control policies, efficient control of air pollution …
Cittaslow, Slow Cities, Slow Food: Searching For A Model For The Development Of Slow Tourism, Linda L. Lowry, Misoon Lee
Cittaslow, Slow Cities, Slow Food: Searching For A Model For The Development Of Slow Tourism, Linda L. Lowry, Misoon Lee
Linda L Lowry
Slow Tourism, a new trend that originated in Italy, is now traversing the globe. This study traces its evolution, synthesizes existing definitions, and develops a conceptual model for the stages of Slow Tourism development. It uses a qualitative, exploratory framework situated in the paradigms of constructivism and critical theory and a critical, interpretative form of inquiry and analysis. Data sources included various types of secondary data as well as primary data collected during personal interviews conducted in November of 2010 with key leaders in the first two CittaSlow designated cities in the U.S. Findings suggest that Slow Tourism, which can …
Thin And Lumpy: An Experimental Investigation Of Water Quality Trading, Jordan F. Suter, John M. Spraggon, Gregory L. Poe
Thin And Lumpy: An Experimental Investigation Of Water Quality Trading, Jordan F. Suter, John M. Spraggon, Gregory L. Poe
John M. Spraggon
Water quality trading schemes in the United States can predominantly be character- ized by low trading volumes. In this paper we utilize laboratory economics experiments to explore the extent to which the technology through which pollution abatement is achieved in uences market outcomes. Mirroring the majority of water quality trading markets, the sessions utilize small trading groups composed of six participants. To understand the extent to which abatement technology in uences trading behavior, the experimental treatments vary the degree of heterogeneity in initial abatement costs and the potential for long-lived investments in cost-reducing abatement technology.
An Experimental Analysis Of Compliance In Dynamic Emissions Markets, John K. Stranlund, James J. Murphy, John M. Spraggon
An Experimental Analysis Of Compliance In Dynamic Emissions Markets, John K. Stranlund, James J. Murphy, John M. Spraggon
John M. Spraggon
Two important design elements for emission trading programs are whether and to what extent firms are able to bank emissions permits, and how these programs are to be enforced. In this paper we present results from laboratory emissions markets designed to investigate enforcement and compliance when these markets allow permit banking. Banking is motivated by a decrease in the aggregate permit supply in the middle of multi-period trading sessions. Consistent with theoretical insights, our experiments suggest that high permit violation penalties have little deterrence value in dynamic emissions markets, and that the main challenge of enforcing these programs is to …
Who Should Bear The Administrative Costs Of An Emissions Tax?, John K. Stranlund, Carlos A. Chavez
Who Should Bear The Administrative Costs Of An Emissions Tax?, John K. Stranlund, Carlos A. Chavez
John K. Stranlund
All environmental policies involve administrative costs, the costs of implementing and managing policies that extend beyond abatement costs. We examine theoretically the optimal distribution of these costs between the public and regulated sources of pollution. The distribution of administrative costs affects social welfare only if public funds are more expensive than private funds, or if the distribution of administrative costs affects the size of a regulated industry. If having the public take on a larger part of administrative costs increases the size of the industry and this does not lead to lower emissions for a given emissions tax, then it …
The Endogenous Formation Of Coalitions To Provide Public Goods: Theory And Experimental Evidence, David M. Mcevoy, Todd L. Cherry, John K. Stranlund
The Endogenous Formation Of Coalitions To Provide Public Goods: Theory And Experimental Evidence, David M. Mcevoy, Todd L. Cherry, John K. Stranlund
John K. Stranlund
This paper examines the endogenous formation of coalitions that provide public goods in which players implement a minimum participation requirement before deciding whether to join. We demonstrate theoretically that payoff-maximizing players will vote to implement efficient participation requirements and these coalitions will form. However, we also demonstrate that if some players are averse to inequality they can cause inefficient outcomes. Inequality-averse players can limit free riding by implementing larger than efficient coalitions or by blocking efficient coalitions from forming. We test the theory with experimental methods and observe individual behavior and coalition formation consistent with a model of inequality-averse players.
A Feast Or Famine Economy: The Bay State’S Robust But Imbalanced Economic Recovery, Michael Goodman, Robert A. Nakosteen
A Feast Or Famine Economy: The Bay State’S Robust But Imbalanced Economic Recovery, Michael Goodman, Robert A. Nakosteen
Robert A Nakosteen
Massachusetts ’ rebound from the recession has outpaced the nation, but the Bay State’s recovery has been skewed. It has been business-led, white collar, and regionally imbalanced.
Economic Currents: Diverging Destinies, Michael Goodman, Robert A. Nakosteen
Economic Currents: Diverging Destinies, Michael Goodman, Robert A. Nakosteen
Robert A Nakosteen
The State’s overall economic recovery masks widening inequality in education, innovation, and incomes, as well as growing regional imbalances.