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Articles 1 - 10 of 10
Full-Text Articles in Business
The Effects Of The Environment And Corporate Governance On Illegal Cartel Activity, David Kunsch
The Effects Of The Environment And Corporate Governance On Illegal Cartel Activity, David Kunsch
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository
Illegal corporate activity, including the price fixing activity of two or more firms through cartels, costs the global economy billions of dollars a year, yet its causes are neither well studied nor well understood in organizational literature. This thesis explores possible external and internal antecedents of illegal cartel activity through the management lenses of resource dependency theory and agency theory and the criminological theory of anomie in the examination of the research question “Why do corporations engage in illegal activity?” I posit that illegal international cartel activity is influenced by the environment in which the organization finds itself, moderated by …
Three Essays On External Sources Of Corporate Governance, Kevin K. Lee
Three Essays On External Sources Of Corporate Governance, Kevin K. Lee
Graduate Theses and Dissertations
Corporate governance is the system by which corporations are controlled. External sources of governance include regulatory and market mechanisms as well as the interplay of goals between managers, the board, and shareholders. Other external sources can include informal institutions which can shape goals as well as suggested by institutional theory, effectively constrain human behavior. In my first essay, I argue that foreign direct investors can act as agents of change in corporate governance. Investigating changes in ownership and control of Swedish firms, I find that active foreign investors' participation move firms away from a Swedish stakeholder orientation toward an Anglo-American …
Executive Compensation, Firm Performance And Liquidity Under Imperfect Corporate Governance, Yongli Luo
Executive Compensation, Firm Performance And Liquidity Under Imperfect Corporate Governance, Yongli Luo
Theses and Dissertations - UTB/UTPA
This dissertation examines the relationship between executive compensation, firm performance and liquidity under imperfect corporate governance institution by using a novel Chinese dataset over 2001-2010. The first essay examines the determinants of Chinese executive compensation from the agency-based theoretical framework. I find that there is a positive relationship between Chinese executive compensation and firm performance. The weak corporate governance in China exhibits strong liquidity and control effects after the split-share structure reform. It seems that CEO duality, the establishment of compensation committee, and the involvement of state ownership in Chinese public firms may lead executive compensation to a relation-based rather …
Clawback Provisions: How Sharp Are The Claws? An Analysis Of The Deterrence Effectiveness Of Voluntary Clawback Provisions, Allison Kristina Beck
Clawback Provisions: How Sharp Are The Claws? An Analysis Of The Deterrence Effectiveness Of Voluntary Clawback Provisions, Allison Kristina Beck
Doctoral Dissertations
This paper investigates the effectiveness of voluntary clawback provisions as a deterrent for earnings management behavior. The Dodd-Frank (DF) Bill signed into law July 21, 2010 mandates that the SEC adopt a rule requiring all U.S.-listed companies to implement clawback provisions that recapture excess compensation received by executives on the basis of a faulty financial statement filing with the SEC that later must be restated. Implicitly, the DF regulation assumes that clawbacks will successfully constrain financial misreporting and that a “one-size-fits-all” approach is best. In contrast with prior research that has investigated factors associated with a firm’s decision to adopt …
Does Race Influence Executive Compensation In Chinese Firms?, Elizabeth Mahoney
Does Race Influence Executive Compensation In Chinese Firms?, Elizabeth Mahoney
Business and Economics Honors Papers
In this study, we considered the effects of Chinese cultural and political influences on executive compensation in Chinese firms. The chief focus of this study is on whether the race of executives or the racial composition of the compensation committee affects the average compensation of executives, though other factors such as sales, industry, and compensation committee size were also included in the model. Data was collected from Chinese firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange, with data for the companies gathered for the year 2009 and executive salaries collected for the year 2010.
What Effect Do Corporate Governance Characteristics Have On Ceo Compensation In A Small Cap Firm?, Kiley Stauffer
What Effect Do Corporate Governance Characteristics Have On Ceo Compensation In A Small Cap Firm?, Kiley Stauffer
Business and Economics Honors Papers
Extensive research has been conducted to examine the effect that corporate governance structure has on CEO compensation. Past studies have focused primarily on larger corporations and have neglected smaller public firms. By shifting focus to small cap firms, this study hopes to find patterns between CEO compensation and specific corporate governance components. These include CEO duality, the presence of a dual founder CEO, and the level of equity ownership held by the CEO. Empirical evidence has suggested that CEO duality and increased ownership equity of a dual founder CEO may significantly impact CEO compensation.
The Impact Of Regulation And Governance On The Risk Profile Of Banks, Giovanna M. Carrillo
The Impact Of Regulation And Governance On The Risk Profile Of Banks, Giovanna M. Carrillo
ETD Archive
The impact of regulation and corporate governance on banks' risk profiles has gained greater importance with the passage of new legislations starting late 1990s and the recent global turmoil in the financial services industry. The extant literature indicates that the effects of corporate governance mechanisms differ between financial and non-financial firms. Yet, the effects on risk-taking have been less conclusive for financial firms primarily because of changing regulations impacting incentives and risk-taking patterns of banks. While the objective of regulation in the banking industry is to preserve the stability of the financial sector and the economic system, corporate governance mechanisms …
Essays On The Effect Of Excess Compensation And Governance Changes On Firm Value, Mustafa A. Dah
Essays On The Effect Of Excess Compensation And Governance Changes On Firm Value, Mustafa A. Dah
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
This dissertation consists of three essays on the effect of excess compensation and corporate governance changes on the firm’s performance. The first paper utilizes a cost minimization stochastic frontier approach to investigate the efficiency of director total compensation. Our findings suggest that board members are over compensated. We show that, on average, the director actual compensation level is above the efficient compensation level by around 63%. Our results suggest that an increase in director excess compensation decreases the likelihood of CEO turnover, reduces the turnover-performance sensitivity, and increases managerial entrenchment. Thus, the surplus in director compensation is directly associated with …
Two Essays On Corporate Governance, Yuwei Wang
Two Essays On Corporate Governance, Yuwei Wang
USF Tampa Graduate Theses and Dissertations
This dissertation includes two related chapters that investigate corporate governance. In the first chapter, we examine the effectiveness of board monitoring on CEOs. It is widely believed that outsider boards are better monitors. In fact, regulations now require that the board of directors of publicly traded firms be composed of a majority of independent directors (or outsiders). However, this paper documents that an insider-dominated board can monitor the CEO just as well as an outsider board can when the firm's CEO is hired from outside. The results suggest that what matters is not so much as the structure of the …
Two Essays On Behavioral Finance, Quang Viet Vu
Two Essays On Behavioral Finance, Quang Viet Vu
Theses and Dissertations in Business Administration
The first essay is entitled: "CEO Overconfidence, Corporate Governance Practices and Firm Innovation". In this study, I examine if overconfident CEOs overinvest or underinvest in innovative projects. I also investigate if overconfident CEOs pursue innovative projects to benefit personal interests or the interest of shareholders. By focusing on the effect of corporate governance in monitoring the behavior of overconfident CEOs, my results show that there is a negative relation between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation among firms with poor governance. In these cases, the finding is consistent with the implication that overconfident CEO are entrenched and invest inadequately …