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Full-Text Articles in Business
Not Clawing The Hand That Feeds You: The Case Of Co-Opted Boards And Clawbacks, Sterling Huang, Chee Yeow Lim, Jeffrey Ng
Not Clawing The Hand That Feeds You: The Case Of Co-Opted Boards And Clawbacks, Sterling Huang, Chee Yeow Lim, Jeffrey Ng
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
We examine how board co-option, defined as the fraction of the board comprising directors appointed after the CEO assumed office, is related to clawback adoption. We find that co-opted boards have a lower probability of adopting clawback provisions. Further, the negative association between board co-option and clawback adoption is more pronounced when at least one co-opted member is on the compensation committee and when there is a higher likelihood that a clawback provision will be triggered. Finally, we find that board co-option is an important mechanism through which longer-tenured CEOs reduce the likelihood of clawback adoption.
Government Governance And The Need To Reconcile Government Regulation With Board Fiduciary Duties, Lisa Fairfax
Government Governance And The Need To Reconcile Government Regulation With Board Fiduciary Duties, Lisa Fairfax
All Faculty Scholarship
Corporate governance scandals inevitably raise concerns about the extent to which corporate directors failed in their responsibility to monitor the corporation and its managers, especially in terms of the latter's’ misdeeds. Corporate governance reforms strive to shore up directors' roles by seeking to ensure that boards have sufficient incentives to engage in effective oversight and to hold the boards more accountable. The current financial crisis has ushered in an era of significant government reform of the financial system and involvement in corporate governance matters. Such involvement has increased board of directors' responsibilities but has not reconciled those responsibilities with board …