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Patent Law, Copyright Law, And The Girl Germs Effect, Ann Bartow Oct 2016

Patent Law, Copyright Law, And The Girl Germs Effect, Ann Bartow

Law Faculty Scholarship

[Excerpt] "Inventors pursue patents and authors receive copyrights.

No special education is required for either endeavor, and nothing

precludes a person from being both an author and an inventor.

Inventors working on patentable industrial projects geared

toward commercial exploitation tend to be scientists or engineers.

Authors, with the exception of those writing computer code, tend

to be educated or trained in the creative arts, such as visual art,

performance art, music, dance, acting, creative writing, film

making, and architectural drawing. There is a well-warranted

societal supposition that most of the inventors of patentable

inventions are male. Assumptions about the genders …


Contextual Healing: What To Do About Scandalous Trademarks And Lanham Act 2(A), Megan M. Carpenter Sep 2016

Contextual Healing: What To Do About Scandalous Trademarks And Lanham Act 2(A), Megan M. Carpenter

Law Faculty Scholarship

Offensive trademarks have come to the forefront of trademark policy and practice in recent years. While it was once true that more attention had been paid to Lanham Act section 2(a) in the pages of law reviews than in the courts, recent prominent cases have focused attention on the ban on registration of offensive marks and the widespread impact of this ban on trademark owners.

In this Article, I answer the fundamental question: Given the problems that my previous research has identified, what should be done about the 2(a) bar on registration of scandalous trademarks? This Article argues, as a …


The Patent Spiral, Roger Allan Ford Apr 2016

The Patent Spiral, Roger Allan Ford

Law Faculty Scholarship

Examination — the process of reviewing a patent application and deciding whether to grant the requested patent — improves patent quality in two ways. It acts as a substantive screen, filtering out meritless applications and improving meritorious ones. It also acts as a costly screen, discouraging applicants from seeking low-value patents. Yet despite these dual roles, the patent system has a substantial quality problem: it is both too easy to get a patent (because examiners grant invalid patents that should be filtered out by a substantive screen) and too cheap to do so (because examiners grant low-value nuisance patents that …