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Does Increased Board Independence Reduce Earnings Management? Evidence From Recent Regulatory Reforms, Qiang Cheng, Xia Chen, Xin Wang
Does Increased Board Independence Reduce Earnings Management? Evidence From Recent Regulatory Reforms, Qiang Cheng, Xia Chen, Xin Wang
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
In this paper, we examine whether recent regulatory reforms requiring majority board independence are effective in reducing earnings management. Firms that did not have a majority of independent directors prior to the reforms (referred to as non-compliance firms) are required to increase their board independence. We find that overall, compared to the other firms, noncompliance firms do not experience a significant decrease in the extent of earnings management from prior to the reforms to afterwards. However, we find that non-compliance firms with low information acquisition cost experience a significant reduction in earnings management compared with the other firms. The results …
Does Increased Board Independence Reduce Earnings Management? Evidence From The Recent Regulatory Reform, Xia Chen, Qiang Cheng, Xin Wang
Does Increased Board Independence Reduce Earnings Management? Evidence From The Recent Regulatory Reform, Xia Chen, Qiang Cheng, Xin Wang
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
We examine whether recent regulatory reforms requiring majority board independence reduce the extent of earnings management. Firms that did not have a majority of independent directors before the reforms (referred to as noncompliant firms) are required to increase their board independence. We find that, while noncompliant firms on average do not experience a significant decrease in earnings management after the reforms compared to other firms, noncompliant firms with low information acquisition cost experience a significant reduction in earnings management. The results are similar when we examine audit committee independence and when we use alternative proxies for information acquisition cost and …
The Influence Of External Auditors, Capital Markets, And Main Banks On Earnings Manipulations: Evidence From Japan, Kazuhiko Kobori, Robert Hutchinson
The Influence Of External Auditors, Capital Markets, And Main Banks On Earnings Manipulations: Evidence From Japan, Kazuhiko Kobori, Robert Hutchinson
College of Business Publications
The present study investigates the influence of main industrial banks, capital markets, and international audit firms on earnings manipulations in Japan using a sample of firms listed on Japanese stock exchanges. A modified Jones model is used to measure earnings management using discretionary accruals as proxy, and the findings suggest that the main industrial banks continue to play a primary role in Japan’s system of corporate governance. However, global capital markets and international accounting standards may be slowly eroding this influence. This may have significant implications for international investors and policy makers as Japan continues through a protracted economic recession.
Ceo Equity Incentives And Audit Fees, Yongtae Kim, Haidan Li, Siqi Li
Ceo Equity Incentives And Audit Fees, Yongtae Kim, Haidan Li, Siqi Li
Accounting
This study examines whether CEO equity incentives have an impact on audit pricing. Prior studies investigate whether CEO equity incentives motivate executives to manage earnings for personal financial gains. Our focus is on whether auditors perceive CEO equity incentives to be associated with greater earnings manipulation risk and incorporate such risk in their pricing decisions. We find that CEO equity portfolio vega is positively related to audit fees after controlling for other determinants of audit fees, while equity portfolio delta is not significantly related to audit fees. This result holds after we account for potential endogeneity. The evidence suggests that …