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Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Business
The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo
The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo
Paolo Santella
No abstract provided.
The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo
The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo
Carlo Drago
No abstract provided.
The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo
The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo
Paolo Santella
No abstract provided.
The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo
The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo
Carlo Drago
No abstract provided.
The Rise Of Regulatory Capitalism And The Decline Of Auditor Independence: A Critical And Experimental Examination Of Auditors’ Conflicts Of Interest, Carolyn A. Windsor, Bent Warming-Rasmussen
The Rise Of Regulatory Capitalism And The Decline Of Auditor Independence: A Critical And Experimental Examination Of Auditors’ Conflicts Of Interest, Carolyn A. Windsor, Bent Warming-Rasmussen
Carolyn Windsor
This study investigates the decline of auditor independence coinciding with the rise of regulatory capitalism. A critical analysis supported by experimental evidence reveals regulatory capitalism's influence on auditor independence. Regulatory capitalism began in the United States during the 1970s when state enforced neo-liberal free-market doctrines of competition and deregulation commercialized the profession. Since then, regulatory capitalism's economic neo-liberal agenda has transformed the auditing profession and the employer firms into a transnational network of professional services firms that now promote and diffuse regulatory capitalism worldwide. Regulatory capitalism is further facilitated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the PCAOB that provide interconnections of …
The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo
The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo
Paolo Santella
No abstract provided.
The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo
The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo
Carlo Drago
No abstract provided.
Antitrust More Than A Century After Sherman: Why Protecting Competitors Promotes Competition More Than Economically Efficient Mergers, Andreas Koutsoudakis
Antitrust More Than A Century After Sherman: Why Protecting Competitors Promotes Competition More Than Economically Efficient Mergers, Andreas Koutsoudakis
Andreas Koutsoudakis, Esq.
The evolution of antitrust laws in the United States, from the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 to the Hart-Scott Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, has been disrupted throughout this country’s history by a dispute as to whether antitrust legislation passed by the United States Congress (“Congress”) should have broad or narrow implications with regards to a merger between two companies. Historically, Congress has enacted antitrust legislation with broad implications, and the United States Supreme Court (“Court”) has applied the legislation narrowly. Thus, disagreement between these two branches of the United States government has existed, creating an obstacle to the …