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Research Collection School Of Accountancy

Corporate governance

Accounting

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Accounting Scandals And Implications For Directors: Lessons From Enron, Pearl Hock-Neo Tan, Gillian Yeo Aug 2022

Accounting Scandals And Implications For Directors: Lessons From Enron, Pearl Hock-Neo Tan, Gillian Yeo

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

We analyze the Enron case to identify the risk factors that potentially led to its collapse and specific issues relating to its aggressive accounting and high-light the lessons for independent directors. In Enron, the interactions between external stimuli, strategies, corporate culture, and risk exposures possibly created an explosive situation that eventually led to its demise. Much of the post-Enron reforms have been directed towards regulating the roles and responsibilities of executive directors and auditors. However, the role of independent directors has received relatively lesser attention. Independent directors should analyze the risks of their companies and understand the pressures that arise …


Active Independent Directors And Earnings Quality, Yuanto Kusnadi, Bin Srinidhi Jun 2022

Active Independent Directors And Earnings Quality, Yuanto Kusnadi, Bin Srinidhi

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

We examine the relationship between active independent directors and earnings quality for U.S. firms. We construct measures that proxy for activeness of independent directors and find that the proportion of active independent directors is under half on average. Our finding shows that earnings quality increases with the percentage of active independent directors on the board. Once the active independent directors are separated out, the other independent directors do not have any effect on earnings quality. This finding supports the hypothesis that the activeness of independent directors is incrementally significant over just the proportion of independent directors for the quality of …


What Are The Four Traits Of Digitally Mature Organizations?, Clarence Goh, Gary Pan, Poh Sun Seow, Yuanto Kusnadi, Gek Choo Shirlena Tan Oct 2021

What Are The Four Traits Of Digitally Mature Organizations?, Clarence Goh, Gary Pan, Poh Sun Seow, Yuanto Kusnadi, Gek Choo Shirlena Tan

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

A study conducted by Deloitte Southeast Asia and the Singapore Management University said there are four traits that could identify digitally mature organisations based on how they manage the governance, risk, and compliance aspects of digital transformation.


Robust And Ethical Data Governance Critical To Growth In Digital Age, Themin Suwardy, Melvin Yong Sep 2021

Robust And Ethical Data Governance Critical To Growth In Digital Age, Themin Suwardy, Melvin Yong

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

With increasing digitalisation, and companies collecting an ever-increasing amount of their customer and business data, organisations have to become more accountable to stakeholders such as regulators, customers and investors on the issue of data. Observers say expectations are also increasing, with incidents of data breaches capturing much media attention. Just as corporate governance encompasses more than just compliance, experts say data governance is more than just data protection and security but also about creating value.


Corporate Governance: Avoid The Groupthink Pitfall, Themin Suwardy Mar 2019

Corporate Governance: Avoid The Groupthink Pitfall, Themin Suwardy

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

Consensus due to similar personal backgrounds, lack of diversity in views and failure to see things from others’ perspective can lead to bad decisions.


Not Clawing The Hand That Feeds You: The Case Of Co-Opted Boards And Clawbacks, Sterling Huang, Chee Yeow Lim, Jeffrey Ng Jan 2019

Not Clawing The Hand That Feeds You: The Case Of Co-Opted Boards And Clawbacks, Sterling Huang, Chee Yeow Lim, Jeffrey Ng

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

We examine how board co-option, defined as the fraction of the board comprising directors appointed after the CEO assumed office, is related to clawback adoption. We find that co-opted boards have a lower probability of adopting clawback provisions. Further, the negative association between board co-option and clawback adoption is more pronounced when at least one co-opted member is on the compensation committee and when there is a higher likelihood that a clawback provision will be triggered. Finally, we find that board co-option is an important mechanism through which longer-tenured CEOs reduce the likelihood of clawback adoption.


Director Tenure Diversity And Board Monitoring Effectiveness, Na Li, Aida Sijamic Wahid Sep 2018

Director Tenure Diversity And Board Monitoring Effectiveness, Na Li, Aida Sijamic Wahid

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

This study examines the impact of director tenure diversity on board effectiveness. We find that tenure-diverse boards exhibit significantly higher CEO performance-turnover sensitivity and that firms with tenure-diverse audit committees are less likely to experience accounting restatements. Furthermore, we document that tenure-diverse compensation committees also award less excess compensation and are less likely to overcompensate. Even though tenure-diverse boards seem to exhibit superior monitoring performance, there is limited evidence that their firms exhibit superior financial performance. The findings suggest that recent calls for board renewal, to the extent that it would increase tenure diversity rather than just decrease average board …


Shareholder Litigation And Corporate Disclosure: Evidence From Derivative Lawsuits, Thomas Bourveau, Yun Lou, Rencheng Wang Jun 2018

Shareholder Litigation And Corporate Disclosure: Evidence From Derivative Lawsuits, Thomas Bourveau, Yun Lou, Rencheng Wang

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

Using the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws in the United States, we study the effect of shareholder litigation risk on corporate disclosure. We find that disclosure significantly increases after UD laws make it more difficult to file derivative lawsuits. Specifically, firms issue more earnings forecasts and voluntary 8-K filings, and increase the length of management discussion and analysis (MD&A) in their 10-K filings. We further assess the direct and indirect channels through which UD laws affect firms' disclosure policies. We find that the effect of UD laws on corporate disclosure is driven by firms facing relatively higher ex …


Do High Ceo Pay Ratios Destroy Firm Value?, Qiang Cheng, Tharindra Ranasinghe, Sha Zhao Jul 2017

Do High Ceo Pay Ratios Destroy Firm Value?, Qiang Cheng, Tharindra Ranasinghe, Sha Zhao

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

There is growing public concern over the rapid growth in CEO pay relative to average worker pay (CEO pay ratio). Critics contend that high CEO pay ratios could destroy firm value by damaging employee morale and/or signal CEO rent extraction. In this paper, we use a proprietary dataset to examine the relationship between CEO pay ratio and firm value/performance. Contrary to critics’ arguments, we find that industry-adjusted CEO pay ratios are positively associated with both firm value and performance. We also find that high CEO pay ratios are associated with higher quality acquisitions and stronger CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. Our results …


Audit Committees And Financial Reporting Quality In Singapore, Yuanto Kusnadi, Kwong Sin Leong, Themin Suwardy, Jiwei Wang Nov 2016

Audit Committees And Financial Reporting Quality In Singapore, Yuanto Kusnadi, Kwong Sin Leong, Themin Suwardy, Jiwei Wang

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

We examine three characteristics (independence, expertise, and overlapping membership) of audit committees and their impact on the financial reporting quality for Singapore-listed companies. The main finding is that financial reporting quality will be higher if audit committees have mixed expertise in accounting, finance, and/or supervisory. In addition, we do not find evidence that incremental independence of audit committees enhances financial reporting quality because audit committees already consist of a majority of independent directors. Finally, we fail to find any impact of overlapping membership on audit and remuneration committees on financial reporting quality. Overall, the results have policy implications on improving …


Female Board Representation And Corporate Acquisition Intensity, Guoli Chen, Craig Crossland, Sterling Huang Feb 2016

Female Board Representation And Corporate Acquisition Intensity, Guoli Chen, Craig Crossland, Sterling Huang

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

This study examines the impact of female board representation on firm-level strategic behavior within the domain of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). We build on social identity theory to predict that greater female representation on a firm's board will be negatively associated with both the number of acquisitions the firm engages in and, conditional on doing a deal, acquisition size. Using a comprehensive, multi-year sample of U.S. public firms, we find strong support for our hypotheses. We demonstrate the robustness of our findings through the use of a difference-in-differences analysis on a sub-sample of firms that experienced exogenous changes in board …


The Effect Of Board Independence On Information Asymmetry, Beng Wee Goh, Jimmy Lee, Jeffrey Ng, Kevin Ow Yong Jan 2016

The Effect Of Board Independence On Information Asymmetry, Beng Wee Goh, Jimmy Lee, Jeffrey Ng, Kevin Ow Yong

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

Boards have an important role in ensuring that investors’ interests are protected. Our paper first examines whether the independence of a firm's board affects information asymmetry among investors. We provide evidence that greater board independence leads to lower information asymmetry. Next, we provide evidence that more voluntary disclosure and greater analyst coverage are two underlying mechanisms via which greater board independence reduces information asymmetry. Of the two mechanisms, we find that analyst coverage is more significant in influencing how board independence affects information asymmetry. Overall, our paper contributes to a better understanding of the effect of board independence on information …


Does Increased Board Independence Reduce Earnings Management? Evidence From Recent Regulatory Reforms, Qiang Cheng, Xia Chen, Xin Wang Jun 2015

Does Increased Board Independence Reduce Earnings Management? Evidence From Recent Regulatory Reforms, Qiang Cheng, Xia Chen, Xin Wang

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

In this paper, we examine whether recent regulatory reforms requiring majority board independence are effective in reducing earnings management. Firms that did not have a majority of independent directors prior to the reforms (referred to as non-compliance firms) are required to increase their board independence. We find that overall, compared to the other firms, noncompliance firms do not experience a significant decrease in the extent of earnings management from prior to the reforms to afterwards. However, we find that non-compliance firms with low information acquisition cost experience a significant reduction in earnings management compared with the other firms. The results …


Does Increased Board Independence Reduce Earnings Management? Evidence From The Recent Regulatory Reform, Xia Chen, Qiang Cheng, Xin Wang Jun 2015

Does Increased Board Independence Reduce Earnings Management? Evidence From The Recent Regulatory Reform, Xia Chen, Qiang Cheng, Xin Wang

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

We examine whether recent regulatory reforms requiring majority board independence reduce the extent of earnings management. Firms that did not have a majority of independent directors before the reforms (referred to as noncompliant firms) are required to increase their board independence. We find that, while noncompliant firms on average do not experience a significant decrease in earnings management after the reforms compared to other firms, noncompliant firms with low information acquisition cost experience a significant reduction in earnings management. The results are similar when we examine audit committee independence and when we use alternative proxies for information acquisition cost and …


Banks' Survival During The Financial Crisis: The Role Of Regulatory Reporting Quality, Jeffrey Ng, Tjomme O. Rusticus Dec 2012

Banks' Survival During The Financial Crisis: The Role Of Regulatory Reporting Quality, Jeffrey Ng, Tjomme O. Rusticus

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

In this paper, we investigate the effect of bank transparency before the crisis on bank stability during the financial crisis that erupted in 2008. Using a large sample of private and public commercial banks in the United States, we find that transparency enhances stability. We use two measures of transparency. We develop a new measure of financial reporting transparency based on loan loss provision estimation errors. We corroborate our findings using a second measure based on the incidence of accounting restatements. We show that lower transparency before the crisis is associated with higher non-performing loans and lower profitability at the …


Disciplinary Effect Of Internal Control Provisions Of Sox On Corporate Governance Structures, Beng Wee Goh Jun 2012

Disciplinary Effect Of Internal Control Provisions Of Sox On Corporate Governance Structures, Beng Wee Goh

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

This study examines whether the internal control provisions under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) have a disciplining effect on the governance structures of firms. We find that audit committee members and outside directors of firms that disclose material weaknesses (MWs) under Section 302 of SOX are more likely to leave the firms compared to their counterparts in a matched sample of control firms without such weaknesses, and they lose more outside directorships than their counterparts in the control firms. These results are consistent with the notion that the labor market imposes reputational penalties for internal control failures. Although the MW firms …


Cfos Versus Ceos: Equity Incentives And Crashes, Jeong-Bon Kim, Yinghua Li, Liandong Zhang Sep 2011

Cfos Versus Ceos: Equity Incentives And Crashes, Jeong-Bon Kim, Yinghua Li, Liandong Zhang

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

Using a large sample of U.S. firms for the period 1993-2009, we provide evidence that the sensitivity of a chief financial officer's (CFO) option portfolio value to stock price is significantly and positively related to the firm's future stock price crash risk. In contrast, we find only weak evidence of the positive impact of chief executive officer option sensitivity on crash risk. Finally, we find that the link between CFO option sensitivity and crash risk is more pronounced for firms in non-competitive industries and those with a high level of financial leverage.


Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, And Auditor Choice In Emerging Markets, Mahmud Hossain, Chee Yeow Lim, Patricia Mui Siang Tan Mar 2010

Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, And Auditor Choice In Emerging Markets, Mahmud Hossain, Chee Yeow Lim, Patricia Mui Siang Tan

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

In this study, we examine the effect of firm-level governance on the firm's choice of an external auditor. Further, we test how the relation between corporate governance and auditor choice may be affected by the strength of legal environment. The results show that firm-level governance scores are positively related to the firm's auditor choice. This association is strengthened by country-level legal protection. Specifically, the positive association between auditor choice and the firm-level governance scores is weaker (stronger) in a low (high) legal environment. These findings are robust after controlling for determinants that were found to be significant in earlier research. …


Moral Hazard, Firms’ Internal Governance And Management Earnings Forecasts, Jimmy Lee Jan 2010

Moral Hazard, Firms’ Internal Governance And Management Earnings Forecasts, Jimmy Lee

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

This paper investigates the role of management earnings forecasts in mitigating information asymmetry between investors andmanagers relating to moral hazard, and explains how earnings guidance facilitates monitoring. I demonstrate that firms that are more susceptible to moral hazard problems and more difficult to monitor are also more likely to issue annual earningsforecasts and they do so more frequently. In addition, I examine how firm internal governance drives forecasting decisions andshow that stronger board governance and managerial equity incentives are associated with higher likelihood and frequency of forecast issuance. Finally, I provide robust evidence that managerial equity incentives are associated with …


National Corporate Governance And Corruption Prevention, Soo Ping Lim Feb 2009

National Corporate Governance And Corruption Prevention, Soo Ping Lim

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

No abstract provided.


Asking Tougher Questions In Tough Times, Irving Low, Claudia Eio, See Liang Foo, Yang Hoong Pang, Kwong Sin Leong, John Joseph Williams Jan 2009

Asking Tougher Questions In Tough Times, Irving Low, Claudia Eio, See Liang Foo, Yang Hoong Pang, Kwong Sin Leong, John Joseph Williams

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

The recent wave of corporate governance disasters globally raises many eyebrows and burning questions whether audit committees (ACs) are doing the right things to effectively discharge their roles and responsibilities. To further test the integrity and reputation of the Singapore market as a listing gateway for foreign companies in turbulent times like these, the headlines are also reporting a spate of suspected and actual corporate fraud and scandals involving China-based, Singapore listed companies (commonly referred to as “S-chips”). Many angry investors and the public question whether ACs and independent directors are doing their jobs.


Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter?, Xia Chen, Jarrad Harford, Kai Li Nov 2007

Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter?, Xia Chen, Jarrad Harford, Kai Li

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

Within a cost–benefit framework, we hypothesize that independent institutions with long-term investments will specialize in monitoring and influencing efforts rather than trading. Other institutions will not monitor. Using acquisition decisions to reveal monitoring, we show that only concentrated holdings by independent long-term institutions are related to post-merger performance. Further, the presence of these institutions makes withdrawal of bad bids more likely. These institutions make long-term portfolio adjustments rather than trading for short-term gain and only sell in advance of very bad outcomes. Examining total institutional holdings or even concentrated holdings by other types of institutions masks important variation in the …


Bonding To The Improved Disclosure Environment In The Us: Firms Listing Choices And Their Capital Market Consequences, Ole-Kristian Hope, Tony Kang, Yoonseok Zang Jun 2007

Bonding To The Improved Disclosure Environment In The Us: Firms Listing Choices And Their Capital Market Consequences, Ole-Kristian Hope, Tony Kang, Yoonseok Zang

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

This paper examines whether the current reporting and disclosure requirements for foreign registrants in the United States affect foreign firms' decisions to list on a U.S. exchange. We find that while firms from a weak disclosure environment are more likely to cross-list and either trade over-the-counter or be placed privately among institutional investors, they are less likely to list on an exchange in which firms are required to comply with U.S. GAAP. This is consistent with the idea that the decrease in the potential private control benefits accruing to managers discourages them from listing on an organized exchange. We further …


Firm Ownership Structure And Intellectual Capital Disclosures, Stephen Firer, S. M. Williamson May 2005

Firm Ownership Structure And Intellectual Capital Disclosures, Stephen Firer, S. M. Williamson

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

The primary purpose of this study is to investigate the association between three ownership structure characteristics and voluntary intellectual capital (IC) disclosure practices. Data for this study is hand collected from the 2000 annual reports of 390 Singapore publicly traded firms. Empirical results indicate Singapore publicly traded firms more closely owned were less likely to voluntarily disclose IC related information than were those where executive directors had smaller holdings in the entity. Finally, findings indicate government linked corporations (GLCs) will likely make more voluntary IC disclosures than non-GLCs. Overall, this study makes several unique contributions to the literature. First, the …