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Full-Text Articles in Business
Why Do Publicly Listed Firms Evade Taxes: Evidence From China, Travis Chow, Bin Ke, Hongqi Yuan, Yao Zhang
Why Do Publicly Listed Firms Evade Taxes: Evidence From China, Travis Chow, Bin Ke, Hongqi Yuan, Yao Zhang
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
Taking advantage of the mandatory disclosure of detected corporate tax evasions in China, we examine why publicly listed firms evade taxes. Different from most prior studies that focus on corporate income tax avoidance, we consider tax evasions related to both income taxes and non-income taxes. We also use a bivariate probit model to account for the partial observability of corporate tax evasion. Many of our regression results using the bivariate probit model are different from the results using the reduced form probit model that ignores the partial observability of tax evasion. Many of our results are also different from those …
Do Politically Connected Directors Affect Accounting Quality? Evidence From China's Anti-Corruption Campaign (Rule 18), Ole-Kristian Hope, Heng Yue, Qinlin Zhong
Do Politically Connected Directors Affect Accounting Quality? Evidence From China's Anti-Corruption Campaign (Rule 18), Ole-Kristian Hope, Heng Yue, Qinlin Zhong
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
We examine the impact of politically connected directors on accounting quality using a quasi experiment in China. In October 2013, “Rule 18” was issued to prohibit government and party officials, who were concurrently holding public offices or had recently retired from such positions within the last three years, from serving as directors for publicly listed firms. The regulation is part of China’s anti-corruption campaign, and it has led to a large number of politically connected directors resigning from their roles as directors involuntarily. As such, Rule 18 has effectively weakened, if not fully discontinued, the political connections of the firms …